

THE ANDOVER REVIEW

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and Literature.*

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with the assistance of a large staff of
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THE
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A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

VOL. XVI.—DECEMBER, 1891.—No. XCVI.

THE BIBLICAL CONDITIONS OF SALVATION.

EVERY creed and every philosophy has asked this as the first question of its catechism, "What is the chief end of man?" and its answer, whether of epicureanism and pleasure, or of stoicism and virtue, or of Christianity and sacrifice, condemns it or approves it. I will not delay to ask what are the various answers that have been given to this question by various philosophies or religions, but simply what are the answers given in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, for we may be sure that the writers of these Scriptures, whether we call them inspired or not, had a special genius to teach the world what is the meaning of the word *duty*.

The Old Testament gives just one answer to the question, "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle?" and that answer is given in the 15th Psalm, and everywhere else in the Jewish Scriptures. "He that walketh uprightly and worketh righteousness, and speaketh the truth in his heart;" or again, in the 24th Psalm, when the question is asked: "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place?" the same answer is given in other words: "He that hath clean hands and a pure heart, who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully. He shall receive the blessing from the Lord, and righteousness from the God of his salvation." This condition of life, salvation, takes all the forms of duty known to the Hebrew world. It appears as the essence of the Ten Commandments. Honor your God and your parents, do no theft, no adultery, no murder, no false swearing, and you shall live; you shall have the favor of Jehovah. This is the whole condition.

The most remarkable exposition of practical ethics in the Old Testament is found in the wonderful eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel, a chapter which is without equal in literature in the emphasis and passion with which it represents God as appealing to man's own conscience to justify his moral government of the world. Notice what is the condition of life. A man must be just; must do that which is lawful and right; must worship no idols; must not be guilty of adultery, oppression, or usury; must have given bread to the hungry, and clothed the naked; must have judged justly between man and man, and dealt truly; "He is just, he shall surely live, saith Jehovah God." He begets a son who is a robber, a shedder of blood, an oppressor, a usurer: "Shall he then live? He shall not live; he hath done all these abominations; he shall surely die." And he begets a son that sees his father's sins, and considers, that does not oppress any nor withhold the pledge, nor spoil by violence, but gives bread to the hungry and clothes the naked: "he shall not die for the iniquity of his father; he shall surely live." Here we have the great doctrine of individuality, of personal responsibility, announced as against that doctrine which degrades the individual will and responsibility, and saves or condemns races or families in the mass, — the doctrine, I may say, of a national church.

But this is not all. This admirable prophet goes on still farther to develop the conditions of life by giving the same life to the oppressor or murderer who repents which he gives to the righteous man. "If the wicked turn from all his sins," and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall not die. All his transgressions that he hath committed, they shall not be mentioned unto him, in his righteousness that he hath done he shall live." And "when the righteous turneth away from his righteousness," "and doeth according to all the abominations of the wicked," "all his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned: in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die." It is the simple doctrine of righteousness, of duty, of individual responsibility. "The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die;" and there is all the emphasis which either the English or the Hebrew can put on that word *it*, which locates responsibility on the individual soul, and gives to *it* the free choice, unconstrained by parentage or by previous character, whether it will now, and for itself, choose righteousness and live, or choose sin and die. The condition, I say, is pure, simple duty to God and man, with nothing more than reformation

for the wicked, no expiation of the past, no sacrifices, no atonement, nothing but simple righteousness, or, for the guilty, reformation and righteousness.

Now this is, I say, substantially the teaching of the whole Old Testament. There are sacrifices, but they are a part of a ritual of free offering, or of taxes for the support of the priesthood, or of public confession of sin, that enter very little into the ethical constitution of the Old Testament. The one condition of life, according to the Hebrew Scriptures, is righteousness. "What doth the Lord require of thee, O man," says the prophet Micah, "but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" He offers an argument to show that it is not sacrifice, but righteousness, that is the sole condition of the divine favor, a positive — something more than a negative — morality.

Very frequently in the New Testament we find the same condition of salvation. John the Baptist said to those who came to ask him what they should do to escape the wrath to come: "Exact no more than that which is appointed you;" "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely;" "He that hath two coats, let him impart to him that hath none." It is the Old Testament doctrine of righteousness and mercy. James's doctrine of what is "pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father" is precisely the same,—"to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world." If we now read the Gospels and the Sermon on the Mount, we shall find that they are chiefly taken up with a development and amplification of the same doctrine of righteousness, showing how it must be "fulfilled," that is, filled fuller than the ordinary Jews filled it with love and spiritual power. We sometimes hear morality, as a ground of salvation, spoken of in depreciatory terms; but call it righteousness; let it be the positive morality which goes further than not doing an injustice; let it include a heart of mercy, and it is the one condition of salvation known to the Old Testament and to at least half of the New. If there is any truth in the natural conscience of man, or in the Hebrew Scriptures, or in the Sermon on the Mount, the righteous man, the man who seeks seriously, earnestly after righteousness, Jew or Gentile, Christian, pagan, or skeptic, will be saved. Such is the teaching of the Bible from Moses to Jesus.

But how great a word that *righteousness* is we may find out when we consider what other forms the answer takes to the question, "What must I do to be saved?" It takes the form of

repentance. As we have already seen, Ezekiel makes that the condition in the case of the unrighteous man: "If the wicked will *turn* from all his sins, and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live; he shall not die." The New Testament makes much of the same condition, makes it often the sole condition of salvation. In our Lord's last interview with his disciples, after his resurrection, as narrated by Luke, He ended his address to them by telling them that "thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day: and that *repentance* and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations." Accordingly, the one word of Peter's sermon on the day of Pentecost, or when he healed the lame man by the gate Beautiful, was, "Repent ye, therefore, and be converted" (conversion meaning reformation), "that your sins may be blotted out." And Paul ends his sermon on Mars' Hill with the same lesson, that God "now commandeth all men everywhere to *repent*; because he has appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness." Here the repentance and the righteousness go together. By a hearty repentance and converting, the righteousness, which was the condition of salvation, is recovered.

Another form which the condition of salvation takes in the New Testament is faith, sometimes faith in God, and sometimes faith in Jesus Christ. We find it formulated in Paul's answer to the jailer's question, "What must I do to be saved?" "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." And Paul says again: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." "Without faith," says the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "no man can please God." "He that believeth on him," says John's Gospel, "is not condemned." The doctrine of salvation by faith, or believing, is characteristic of the apostles Paul and John, rather than of the other writers of the New Testament.

This faith, this believing, is not to be looked on as a new and peculiar condition of salvation, which narrows and limits the condition given in the Old Testament; it rather refines and spiritualizes it. It must be judged by its opposite, which is *works*; and works is not righteousness, real righteousness, but ritual or formal righteousness, righteousness supposed to be acquired by birth, or by strictness of worship, or by exact correctness of belief. It was salvation by orthodoxy and going to church. But as works

was outward, so faith was inward, of the heart. It was not a very definite word, but it meant heart religion, accepting, believing in the heart Christ's teaching, which fulfilled the law by abrogating its form and filling it full of spirit, and which bade the weary heart believe that God was good, and would save the soul that tried to please Him from the heart. Faith was heart religion as against form religion; the spirit, and not the letter; the religion, says Paul, that Abraham had before he was circumcised, when he simply "believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness," so that he became the father, not of the circumcised Jews alone, but of all who believe. It was the same Paul that kept talking *faith*, that, I might almost say, introduced the word into the Christian vocabulary, who also said, "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink," — not outside, formal regularity, — "but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost," and who also said that faith itself is only an inferior expression of love: "and now abideth faith, hope, love; and the greatest of these is love."

This condition of salvation by faith in Jesus Christ, which has been made the corner-stone of Protestantism, and which so, perhaps, has received with us disproportionate attention, may profitably receive a somewhat fuller study.

Faith, or belief, is hardly referred to in the Old Testament as a special virtue or condition of life, and when it is used it is generally faithfulness rather than faith that is praised. When we come to the life of Christ as reported by Matthew, Mark, and Luke, we are struck by the fact that our Lord frequently required those who sought healing from his hand to believe that He could do it. The words *faith* and *believe* are used chiefly in connection with miracles, to indicate an assurance that the miracle will be performed. Faith is here used almost exactly in the sense in which we now speak of faith cures. There is scarcely an exception in the three Synoptic Gospels. The exceptions are the mentions of "these little ones which believe in me" (Matt. xviii. 6); the command, "Repent ye, and believe in the gospel" (Mark i. 15); the scoff of the Jews, "Let him come down, and we will believe in him;" and we are told that the publicans and harlots believed in Him. That is about all, if we except the later addition of Mark, which contains the words: "He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved, but he that disbelieveth shall be condemned." In these few passages we find the words *faith* and *believe* used to those who accept Jesus Christ as the Messiah.

The first stage in the use of the words is to apply them to the assurance that Jesus Christ can and will perform certain miraculous acts desired; the second is the belief and confession that He is the Messiah. The prominence of the idea of belief in these simple senses is very peculiar and new in the history of religion, but it does not seem to be made a new condition of salvation to take the place of the Old Testament conditions, much less of the conditions laid down by Christ in his discourses, which are those of spiritualized and positive, active, self-sacrificing righteousness.

Passing John's Gospel, which is a much later book, we come to the use of the term by the Apostle Paul. Paul was not a hearer of Jesus. He says distinctly that he learned nothing from the disciples who were the authorized witnesses and reporters of our Lord's teachings. He knew Christ's teachings in a general way, but imperfectly and unsympathetically, until he had the miraculous vision on the road to Damascus. At Damascus he could have got very little instruction. He says he got none from any of the disciples. They were ignorant men, none of them learned in the Scriptures or given to theological thinking. Jesus was not a rabbi, like Gamaliel, and never taught them, so far as we know, except very briefly, after his resurrection, how to accommodate the Jewish to the Christian dispensation and make the transition from the one to the other. But that was something that had to be done; and it had to be done by Paul, with no help from Peter or James, who could not have done it. So Paul went into Arabia, or was in retirement in Damascus, for three years. There he must have studied the Old Testament with an intensity we can hardly conceive. In this time he had to get his bearings and learn what Christianity meant. Peter never thoroughly learned it. He had not learned it a dozen years after the resurrection, and then the vision of the clean and the unclean beasts and the call to Cornelius did not fairly teach him. But Paul then learned it, and when he had finished this theological course he went, after a fortnight's visit to Peter, from whom he got nothing new, on his missionary tours, and it was fourteen years before he again visited Jerusalem and saw any of the apostles. He tells us that they had not a thing to teach him; indeed, it is clear that he taught them, and not they him.

Now what was it he learned? What did his study teach him was the connecting link between the Old and the New dispensations? He found it in the word *faith*. He had learned from Christ that the value of the Law was in its essence, not its ceremonial; that the Law was not to be annulled, but enlarged spirit-

ually, fulfilled. That, he saw, would make Christianity a world religion, and not a race religion. But this new Christianity he rightly saw, and we must believe that he saw it under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, must be founded on and connected with the old revelation. He found, I say, this nexus in the word *faith*, which the apostles and our Lord had used chiefly of miracles, but which Paul used chiefly of the relationship to Christ of those who believe in Him. We can seem to see him studying the Scriptures, and he comes across the passage which says that "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness." "What," he would exclaim in delight, "was he counted righteous, justified, then, before he had been circumcised, when he had received no seal of the covenant, when he was no Jew, but like any other Gentile? Then anybody else can be so justified, Jew or Gentile, and Jesus was right in disparaging ritual. And how was he justified? By *faith*, by believing God, nothing else, — so simple, so easy, so open to all the world." This passage and this thought so impressed Paul that it became his favorite Scripture, the key to all his theology, the bridge by which he passed over from Judaism to Christianity, the evidence he relied on to show that Christianity has a Biblical right to exist, that Christianity is in the Jewish Scriptures.

Now Paul's argument was a sound one. He does not twist the passage, nor use it rabbinically, as passages are often unscientifically quoted and applied in the New Testament. It was a fair deduction from the text, that salvation is outside of ritual, and that it is free to all the world.

He found another passage, less pertinent, but yet useful, that became also a favorite with him. It is that passage in Habakkuk which says that "the just shall live by his faith." The word in the Hebrew rather means faithfulness than faith, and St. Paul makes all he can out of it; but the word *faith*, or *believe*, is not a frequent one in the Old Testament as referring to a religious exercise, and Paul quotes four passages which contain the word. I only wonder he did not quote the passage from Jonah, which says that the people of Nineveh "believed in God," as that is one which gives salvation as a reward for belief. But the passage, "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness," and the other passage, "The just shall live by his faith," were especially pivotal to his new theology of Christianity, because they combined the two words *just* and *faith*, *believe* and *righteousness*, or justification. From these two passages, the key to

Paul's theology and the Christian theology, we get the two words *faith* and *justification*. And so St. Paul, in his two theological epistles, Romans and Galatians, develops out of these two Old Testament passages the New Testament doctrine of justification by faith. Out of the Old Testament Paul gets the doctrine that belief in God is the ground of justification, and not obedience to ritual law; and this he translates into the terms of Christianity, and gives us justification by believing in Jesus Christ. For God he substitutes generally, but not always, *Jesus Christ*.

Having thus tried to make clear how Paul got his doctrine of justification by faith in Christ, which was so dimly set forth in the teaching of Jesus, as given by the synoptists, and hardly used except of candidates for miraculous cures, though very strikingly characteristic of them, we now ask, what did Paul mean by faith?

Of course he could not have meant merely intellectual assent to the biographical facts about Jesus, his Messiahship, resurrection, etc., for St. James has made that clear in his epistle, in which he refers to St. Paul by name, and his doctrine of faith, and wittily and shrewdly remarks that the devils believe and tremble. In this same passage about Paul's theology we may note in passing that James quotes from Paul the latter's favorite passage about Abraham's believing God, and shows that Abraham's intellectual faith was not counted for righteousness, but his works which wrought with his faith.

Yet this is not quite a fair statement. Paul was as near right as James. In Paul's day the Messiahship of Jesus was not generally admitted. We may say that nobody admitted it who was not willing to be known as an obedient disciple. When the intellectual faith was confessed, that confession was the best evidence of discipleship. It is not true now, but it was substantially true then, that "if thou shalt confess with thy mouth Jesus as Lord, and shalt believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." There is no more definite statement in all Paul's writings of the saving virtue of faith, and this faith is purely intellectual in form; but it is combined with confession, a confession whose logical outcome was martyrdom. In those days nobody called himself a believer who did not mean by that that he accepted the whole body of Christ's teachings, and was a disciple. The intellectual assent of faith implied the spiritual life, the "works" of James, the "faith" of our Lord.

Now we must first get the meaning of faith by connecting it

with the passage in Genesis, out of which Paul drew his doctrine. That was faith in *God*. Paul's faith in *Christ* must have been substantially the same as Abraham's faith in God, and Habakkuk's faith or faithfulness by which the just live. That was not intellectual, it was trustful. It meant accepting God's word as true, and his law as master. It was discipleship of God, being led by him out of Chaldea, through Canaan, trusting his word for his seed, and living in obedience to Him. That was faith, and substantially that Paul must have meant when he transferred the word to the believer's relation to Jesus Christ. This is the use of the word in the Epistle to the Hebrews, in which the word *faith*, or *believe*, is always used in this general sense, and not in the specific sense in which Paul so often speaks of faith in Christ's blood or death.

Further, we get a clearer idea of what Paul meant by faith, if we keep in mind his own contrast. His chief contention is that we are not saved by the works of the law. The opposite to the works of the law, or formal righteousness, is faith, which must be heart righteousness, the kind of righteousness that Jesus was all the time inculcating. If we will only hold this contrast in mind, and ask what is the opposite to being saved by forms, by rites, by circumcision, by orthodoxy, by birth, we shall find that it must be substantially that which is in the heart. I cannot stop to develop this thought farther, but it is a point of cardinal importance in settling what the faith was, or its essential nature, considered philosophically, which Paul taught. It must have been, at the bottom, heart religion. It must have been what Paul meant when, near the end of his epistle in which he most fully develops his doctrine of justification by faith, he says that "the kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. For he that herein serveth Christ is pleasing to God." Serving Christ, then, in righteousness, peace, and joy, is substantially the same thing as faith, and is the opposite to strictness in eating and drinking and ritual works. Paul's whole argument requires that faith with Him shall be discipleship of Christ in heart righteousness.

But this does not fully exhaust the meaning of St. Paul in his use of the word *faith*. He is, I say, more specific than I have indicated, and more specific than any other writer, even than John. James, we have said, expressly argues that righteousness is the best part of faith, and Peter, in his epistle, makes little of faith, substituting hope for it as the term which best represents the Christian's attitude to his Master.

Faith, according to Paul in the Galatians and Romans, had a special relation to Jesus. This was developed as follows: In the Synoptic Gospels the Jews are said to have believed or not believed in John the Baptist; that is, some believed, and others did not, that he was a real teacher come from God, whose warnings were to be obeyed. In the same way some believed in Christ, that is, accepted his teachings and his claims as true, and took Him for Master. That is what is meant in the Synoptic Gospels in the few cases in which the word is used, by believing in Christ. St. Paul does all this and somewhat more. He taught that he was to believe in Jesus Christ as teacher, but also as providing a death for his salvation. He lives "by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."

Perhaps the clearest expression of this is Romans iii. 24, 25: "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith, by his blood, to show his righteousness, because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God." Here we have the figure of Redemption used, as if a slave were purchased; then of propitiation, as if an angry tyrant were placated; and then the mention of Christ's blood, as if Christ's death were an important condition; and then the whole apprehended by faith in this Christ and his blood. But it is curious to notice that this faith in Christ was just the same thing as faith in the Father; for after Paul has developed his great central thought which follows, of the relation of the doctrine of justification by faith to Abraham's being justified by faith in God, he sums it up with the statement that our faith will be reckoned to us for righteousness, as well as was Abraham's, if we "believe in him that raised Jesus our Lord from the dead." Here the belief is in the Father, but it is evidently the same thing as belief in the Son. Christ's death was spoken of as something important and essential in our faith, essential because through it came resurrection and eternal life; but Paul nowhere develops the thought that Christ's death was a sacrifice offered for our sins. In one case, very incidentally, He is compared to the Passover offering (1 Cor. v. 7), which was not a sin offering, and in one other passage, equally incidentally, where we are told to walk in love, we are told that Christ loved us, and gave himself up for us, an offering and sacrifice to God for an odor of sweet smell (Eph. v. 2).

It is curious, considering how much modern theology makes of Christ's death as a sacrifice, that Paul makes so little, or nothing,

of that thought, not so much as he does of *our* being a sacrifice to God. But he made faith in the whole of Christ's history, and especially in his bloody death and resurrection, the essential evidence that we accept the heart religion, which he taught, the world religion, which does not rest in ordinances, but in salvation freely offered and attested by Him who came from God, who died and rose again, and who was anticipated in the Old Testament, being witnessed to, says Paul, "by the Law," when it says that Abraham was justified by faith, and "by the prophets," when Habakkuk says that "the just shall live by his faith," the two passages which connect justification with faith.

But Paul's doctrine of faith he did not make a condition of salvation supreme over essential and spiritualized heart righteousness. After devoting most of the Epistle to the Galatians to proving that the gospel was a gospel of faith as against forms, he sums it up by saying that what avails is "neither circumcision nor uncircumcision, but faith that worketh by *love*," and that the freedom of our faith is not to be an occasion to the flesh, but that the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even this, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (v. 13, 14); and his hymn to love as superior to faith and hope is the very creed of Christendom.

Now a word as to the teaching of the Gospel of John as to belief in Christ and its necessity. This Gospel is full of it. It is stated scores of times that belief in Christ is necessary to salvation. This makes a striking, an amazing contrast to the Synoptic Gospels. Take a single passage from the third chapter: "Even so must the Son of man be lifted up: that whosoever *believeth* may in him have eternal life. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever *believeth* in him should not perish, but have eternal life." "He that believeth on him is not judged: but he that believeth not hath been judged, because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten Son of God." This belief is the acceptance of Christ as Saviour, Teacher, Master, rather than as sacrifice. The book of John presents very difficult problems, from its contrast with the other Gospels. I cannot but think that the Synoptic Gospels present the more verbally accurate view of Christ's teachings, while the book of John, written forty or fifty years after his death, gives rather an idealizing view of his teaching, such as it would appear when interpreted by the new light which the Holy Spirit had given the church during that time, and especially in the teaching of the Apostle Paul, who had first brought into prominence the doctrine of faith.

We may consider for a moment more the doctrine of faith as a condition of salvation, as treated in that other theological book, the Epistle to the Hebrews. The purpose of that epistle is not to teach the doctrine of faith, but to teach the superior dignity of Christianity as contrasted with Judaism, and of Christ as compared with Moses and Aaron. It was the aim of the author, as it was of Paul, to show that Christianity has its roots in the Old Testament; and for him the crucial passage is not that which teaches that Abraham was justified by faith, but the Psalmist's prophecy which records the oath of God, "Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek;" and he shows that this was a different, more universal, and spiritual order than that of Aaron. His chosen passage requires him somewhat to develop the thought that Jesus must be a priest, and so must and did offer up "prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto God," as his sacrifice, by which sufferings he became the author of eternal salvation (v. 3-9). He also offered up himself. The purpose of this offering is not discriminated by the author of Hebrews. Sometimes it seems to be a sin offering (vii. 37; ix. 13); at other times it is the covenant offering (ix. 19); but whatever it is, it is less an offering for justification than it is for sanctification: "By which will we have been *sanctified* through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all" (x. 10). "For by one offering he hath *perfected* forever them that are sanctified" (x. 14). "The blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified" (x. 29) [a covenant offering]. It is after this long development of the thought growing out of the quotation, "Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek," that the author tells his readers not to sink back into perdition, but to be of those that have faith unto the saving of the soul, faith thus being the condition of salvation; and he proceeds in the magnificent eleventh chapter, which redeems some tortuosities in the preceding chapters, to show how it was their faith that saved the old worthies. But he does not, as might be expected, develop how their faith prefigures Christian faith, but rather how their faith and endurance should encourage us. With him faith is pretty much the same as patience, as with Peter it is pretty much the same as hope. He does not at all develop it as a condition of salvation.

As a conclusion of our study we find that faith is used loosely, freely, as indicating first the faith which secures miraculous healing; second, the faith which accepts Jesus Christ as the revealer

of a heart religion; third, the faith most intensely realized in believing that Christ's death and resurrection assure our victory over death and our eternal life. But it always easily runs into hope and patience, and especially love.

But this brings us to the final and most philosophical statement of what is the Biblical condition of salvation. Paul learned from his Master that love is central to righteousness, or repentance, or faith. That was Jesus Christ's peculiar lesson. Some one asked Jesus: "What is the chief command of the law?" He replied: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." Again, He put it on the human side alone, in the words of the golden rule: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them," a rule for the positive search after the loving things you can do, — not a mere negative rule that avoids doing your neighbor ill, like that of Isocrates: "Do not to others the things that make you angry when others do them to you;" nor that of the Rabbi Hillel: "Whatsoever is hateful to you, do not to another;" nor the simple negative rule of Confucius. It is the active, positive, searching love which seeks whom it can help, the general, all embracing love, which finds a neighbor, not in family alone, but in strangers and enemies; that great love for God and all men, which has been called "love to Being in general." This is in the *heart* with faith; this underlies all the righteousness of the Old Testament, for it includes mercy as well as justice.

Here we reach the bottom answer to the question: "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle?" the final answer given by the nation which had the greatest genius of all nations for studying duty; the nation which originated the two highest forms of religion known, Judaism and Christianity; the answer given by its chief sage and teacher, Jesus, whether we can call Him man, or God in man. The whole world has found no higher or deeper answer. It is through this "faith that worketh by *love*," and thus "purifieth the heart," that the heart must be renewed and the man born again. Righteousness, which is also repentance; which is more than that, faith; which is more than that, love, — this righteousness is the one final and conclusive Biblical condition of salvation.

William Hayes Ward.

THE HALO OF INDUSTRIAL IDLENESS.

CERTAIN persons defend capital, when anybody speaks of the injustice to the many of the present holding of capital, as if capital itself had been attacked. This is the logical fallacy of appearing to disprove one point by disproving another one. In this instance the fallacy moves as follows: "You say that the possession of capital by non-producing persons works detrimentally; but do not those to whom the capital is loaned produce more, having it, than they could by any manner of exertion produce without it, and are they not therefore better off, as well as society at large, whose general product has been increased by the capital they have thus borrowed and used? Then capital is a benefaction, and the owners of it are benefactors, though themselves, as individuals, unproductive." Thus the defense of a drone class of capital-holders supported by society.

Be it first observed that no reflecting person thinks of questioning the importance of capital in production; working people, the bulk of them, do not think of questioning it. But here is the logical breach: Given the capital, is not the burden of all workers augmented because they have to support a body of people for letting them use it? Of course capital is a benefaction, but it does not follow from this that the owners of capital are benefactors. The fallacy arises from confounding capital with its owners. There are several possible cases. Both the owner and his capital may be useful, that is to say, when he is himself a producer, and when his capital is at the same time used productively; secondly, his capital may be useful, — when, for example, it is loaned to some one who uses it productively, — and he may be the opposite of useful, that is, when he not only does not produce, but when he squanders uselessly what is paid him by others for the privilege of producing with his capital; or, lastly, his capital and he together may be useless, as when he himself is an idler, and his capital is loaned to people who use it unproductively, though they secure to him the return of its equivalent.

The idea of capital and that of its owner must be dissociated, if there is to be any clearness or progress in political economy. Capital performs its function in increasing production through being capital, and through being applied and managed by capable persons, not at all by belonging to this man or that. The mere function of ownership is a sinecure, and yet the rewards for

ownership are absolutely enormous, and, all things thrown in the scale, greater than the remuneration for producing the things that keep the race alive and society going. Evidently the vindication of capital, which needed no vindication, is no vindication of a drone class of capital-holders. The capital would be as productive and useful without them; the capital would also be there for use without them. The alternative is not, as assumed, no capital if no non-producing owners of capital, but capital without the drag of non-producing owners, and a working society that would have, as return for its labor of social production and support, all that is now turned over to those who do nothing. If the latter class, instead of being drones living at the expense of the former, were obliged to become productive, the general social income would be increased by the amount they produced.

Here I must explain that I use the term "social production" to fix the mind upon the sum total of production and the whole effort involved in it, for the purpose of indicating that all persons really contributing to this sum are taxed to support non-working owners. To bring into existence all that is needed to support society for a year, a certain number of people have to expend a given quota of time and energy. The fact that the capital-owning drones are permitted to sit down before this whole product, which they have moved no finger to aid in creating, and to consume great portions of it, makes the quota of time and energy required for the workers to create it just so much the greater, as time and energy are taken to create what the drones consume. Now this burden of extra labor is diffused over the whole corps of workers; all have to work harder and longer for what they get in consequence of it.

As political economy treats the matter, this sum appears to come out of nobody, seems to be simply there, and no one is deprived or harmed by having it go to the idle. But would it not go to some one else if it did not go to the capitalist? And does it not always come out of the total product? Then those who create this total product are deprived and harmed by its loss. Accepting what we are accustomed to see, political economy finds ingenious explanations and excuses why it is so; it is not yet sufficiently developed as a science to interest itself whether there are reasons why it should not be so.

The burden is diffused over all portions of society that produce, though it may not be equally diffused. The *entrepreneur* must work harder to get enough to live up to his standard of life,

because he must turn so much of his product over to the owner of capital; he cannot pay the wages he might if such a proportion of his product were not in that manner disposed of, and the laborers therefore have less.

But one of the most important effects of capital-holding by drones is that by them the standard of life of the *entrepreneurs*, and all those of the upper class who are in any way actively engaged in production, is raised. The socially supported idle class takes the lead in establishing the vogue. Those who can live on their income without work are regarded as occupying a high social plane, and for this reason what they take the whim to do or have is copied. They have leisure to invent and import numerous varieties of embellishments and luxuries, and a considerable portion of them have no inclination to do anything else. These refinements and super-refinements, then, take their places as necessities for the people who desire to move in the best set, or on its level of expenditure. This reacts in various ways upon the workers. We have seen that it is they who are compelled to create all these luxuries, and to prepare and serve them to the idle with consummate elaboration; by raising the standard, the effect is carried farther. In an earlier paper we spoke of uncertainty as the great bane of business. "It is not only that I must support my family now, but that I must try to so conduct my affairs that I may be able to support it twenty-five years from now," we quoted the business-man as saying. Now, this high and complex and advancing standard of life, resulting so much from the evolution of luxury as the function of unproductive capital-holders, vastly increases the difficulty and uncertainty. The larger the expenses of a family each year, the heavier, other things equal, the strain on the head of it, the greater consequently the difficulties and uncertainty of his situation. The fund that he can apply to his business, and reserve for business emergencies, is less, and he is therefore more amenable to failure in close times and crises.

Of course the inference from what has preceded is that society should not support a class of drones. But a difficulty seems to be found in the fact that these non-producing owners are thought generally to confer a favor by keeping out of active production, in which they are pretty sure to fail, having no fitness or training, deranging general business and annihilating capital in the experiment. It is charged that our need is not of more business men, but of fewer; that our men of affairs stay at their posts too long,

making it harder for the younger men to obtain a footing, and rendering business severer for all new-comers by keeping competition high.

The first of these difficulties might be serious, if the unfitted capitalists were to be called on to attempt the productive manipulation of their property. But this does not follow. There exists no reason why an untrained and untried man should be allowed to essay the control of large means for industrial purposes, and there are the best reasons why he should not be allowed to do it. This stricture holds not only of those who own the capital that they employ, but even more vitally of those who venture the capital borrowed of others. To meet the trite question, "Has not a man the right to do what he wills with his own?" it is needed only that we recall a previous premise of these very questioners, — the value to society of capital. We agreed that production is more ample through its use. If, then, capital is annihilated, not the owner alone suffers, but those others who might, by use of it, have produced more valuable articles for their own and social consumption, and the consumers at large suffer because they have less to consume. Therefore, when an owner destroys his capital, as he does by putting it in an industrial plant that yields no return, or a disproportionately small return, he injures the community as well as himself, and this the community has a right to deprecate, and if possible prevent. It was undoubtedly very far from his will to destroy the capital, but he willed to take grave chances, and these chances it was his duty to minimize by the best previous training, and it was the duty of the community to see that he minimized them by not permitting him to make the venture without the highest preparation.

This principle is daily neglected, and with a consequent heavy proportion of failures in business. Twenty years ago, a man who was out of debt, and drawing a salary that supported his family in medium comfort, conceived the idea of building a business block. It cost several times more than his estimate; the builders took advantage of his ignorance of materials and cheated him; and at length he came to a stop, with a heavy debt and the block unfinished. There is still litigation over this structure. Many of the creditors lost money, and the projector of it lost everything he had, chief of which was his peace of mind for twenty years. He could not educate his children, nor give them any personal attention, being always close pushed to keep his importunate creditors at bay while he reserved enough from his constant

labor to live. He borrowed of his personal friends to appease his creditors, and then could not pay these latter debts. The sum of discomfort that this one man, who was perfectly honest, well-meaning, and industrious to a fault, was able to bring upon himself and fifty or sixty others directly, to say nothing of the derangement that he effected in the business community where he launched his venture, is not to be estimated. The commercial highway is strewn with such failures, which are the quite inevitable consequence of a business chaos that allows any one to undertake anything he is disposed to undertake without the least preparation or proven qualification. As a physician is educated in the principles and practice of medicine, the business novice ought to pass through a similar apprenticeship in business methods, required by the community for self-protection and for his protection.

The second charge noted, that there are already too many business men, and that the older ones hold on too long, — that, therefore, if the present non-producing capitalists entered active production they would do great mischief by making the struggle still harder, — opens a radical question. According to the theory of business as now conducted, and also according to its practice, nearly everything is overdone. One store or one manufactory thrives at the expense of another, or by getting people to buy more than they ought to buy. Consider retail trade: there are so many stores dealing in the same class of goods that owners and clerks in many of them have nothing to do half or a third of the time. Success means getting trade from competitors; “running them out,” as the phrase is, if possible. In manufacturing, there are so many shops making the same articles that some or all of them usually shut down a part of the year. They bid for one another’s trade, and, if one thrives more, some other or all thrive less; or the alternative phenomenon occurs, — people are induced to buy who will have difficulty to sell; who will have to pay a class of men to wheedle and hypnotize others to buy of them, whose final victims, the consumers, will have what they do not need, and what they may be seriously embarrassed to pay for. Following out these effects, the whole genius of the method is to make people live above their incomes, and to bring them to failure and sorrow.

Light is shed by this analysis on financial crises and what some call over-production. Manufacturers do their utmost to get a large quantity of their goods into the stock of the wholesalers;

the wholesalers have an army of skilled specialists in selling going about the country from one year's end to another, using every real and imaginary inducement to persuade the retailers to fill up with their wares, quite callous to the thought of the dead stock these wares may prove to be ; and the retailers, as they needs must to keep afloat, apply their genius to tempting displays of articles to the public, who, thus allured, buy and buy until they are bankrupt, and the series of failures constituting a panic sets in. No effort is spared by the retail, wholesale, and manufacturing sections of trade and industry to work up a glut. This is their most cherished art and purpose, although, of course, they do not desire the climax, from selling more than the buyers can stand, to come. Why, then, do they urge the buyers on to that climax? Economists have had much to say about the difficulty of calculating the markets as the cause of panics. Quite as accurate a statement of the cause is that the various grades of sellers do not estimate correctly the point where the buyers they are forcing their goods upon will be unable to pay ; and if they do see this point, their passion for selling is so strong that they cannot restrain themselves from overstepping it. When the sellers all along the line, from the producer to the shopkeeper, have stimulated the purchasing power of one another and of the public until it is exhausted, purchasing becomes slack, and the large houses, which had provided themselves with goods for increasing sales, begin to collapse. The error lies in this over-stimulation, but it seems inherent in the business system of getting trade away from rivals.

From the point of view of this business method, there are apparently too many stores and factories ; and if the older and established business men retired earlier, the field would be freer and fairer for others. The situation would be better for a few, and mainly for those few connected with the firms from which the heads resigned. Whatever gain there is from the early retirement of successful business conductors accrues from the fact that they have been too largely monopolizing the profits of the firm, or have been too autocratic in refusing scope to the genius of under-men, or both. In a change of management, those to lose would be the monopolizing conductors, since their incomes would fall ; but this would be proper enough, for their accumulated wealth would enable them to live fittingly without further profits.

But on the side of business itself, the new managers might be inferior, and cause the business to decay or fail. Some plant would be sacrificed, and the labor expended in organizing the

business would be partially lost. A successfully working business corps is not organized without time and intelligence and effort. But since it is usually easier to continue a successful business than to construct one, decadence would probably not often follow the change we are contemplating. Where it did so, the effects, measured by the standard of general loss and gain, would not be so bad as might appear; for as one house went down, some rival firm would obtain its vanishing trade and come up. But certainly, where the retirement of experienced captains occasions such a disruption and transference of business, it cannot be considered an advantage, save as the conductors of the new business belong to other families than those of the retiring captains, when the double delectation of making one fortune and inheriting another will not fall to the same person. There are also some objections to retirement by sale. If some one purchases the business of an extensive and prosperous manager, paying his own money, the case is not improved, for the buyer already had enough to retire on, as well as the one who sells. Suppose he purchases with money borrowed of others: he either has skill in the business acquired through practice of it with some other firm, or he has no acquired skill. In the latter case the chances are on the side of failure, bringing disaster to himself and his supporters; in the former, by undertaking the new business he withdraws his energy and skill from another place which may not prosper without him.

Summing up, then, the earlier retirement of the successful leaders of trade and industry is hardly a clear desideratum, even upon ordinary trade principles. A very few gain, and some will certainly lose. Competition is not reduced, for the new will compete with each other as hotly as if the old had remained for them to contend against.

But the further drift of these details is that energy and experience cannot so easily be spared from business. From the point of view of business antagonism, it might be greatly to my advantage if the entire plant of my most able business adversary were consumed by fire and he died; but it would probably be a misfortune to the public to have his talent and energy removed, as it certainly would be to have his capital destroyed. Intelligence and energy are less dispensable than material capital, and they create material capital and get the fullest utility from it. If we look at the matter from the viewing point of production instead of the private interest of a very limited number of persons, it may be wholly unfortunate if the more experienced leaders give up their posts early.

This is the parent error, that we neither view nor conduct business with reference to production, with the end in mind to create the most with the available brains and labor. What manufacturers, tradespeople, and carriers primarily aim at is to get the most they can, each for himself; and it is safe to say of the majority that the idea of production as an end never crosses their minds at all. If a company can enlarge its profits by limiting its production, it does so, though the comforts and necessities of all society but themselves are diminished in consequence. Now, of course, if business is a game of getting all you can away from your confrères, and the best man is the one getting the most away and honestly creating the least, then every player who retires does confer a boon on the rest, — excepting when it happens that he by chance is positively producing as well as getting away, and producing more than the idle men, or those merely getting away, can produce in his place. For at the basis of the whole process, however falsely conducted, production remains fundamental, since the manipulators would have nothing to manipulate if some were not creating things for them.

We need not long argue the self-evident, that the genius of business — using the term to include manufacturing and commerce — is to get the most one can from the rest.¹ Consider advertising: each firm is trying to suck the others' blood. Consider the number of persons who live by Board of Trade methods: the question is, how much real production can be conceded to this entire fraternity. Listen to the following: —

“Chicago Wheat. A lively day on the Board of Trade. May drops seven cents in a few hours; Bloom holding out against the crowd.

“CHICAGO, April 4. — There was another sensational feature in the wheat deal on 'change to-day. The crowd has been kept on the ragged edge for weeks, waiting for the final stroke of the great bull clique, which was to put the selling price for May contracts up to \$1.90. Instead of a corner the trade is treated to a collapse. So it looks now. The developments to-day were remarkable, and may lead to anything but the expected end of the deal.

“May started 1½ cents higher this morning. There was nothing unusual in that after the drop of four cents Wednesday. Leopold Bloom, said to be loaded with nearly 2,000,000 bushels of wheat

¹ See the writer's “Unfair Burdens on Real Production,” *The Andover Review*, February, 1890.

for May, was a buyer. He was encouraged a little at first by those who only the day before were charged with trying to shake him out. The shorts thought their time had come, and they bought also. May started at 97½ cents, and went flying to 99¼ cents.

"When Bloom bid for 200,000 bushels there was a jump to 99¾ cents. Then the original bull clique let go some wheat. Hutchinson sold in all the futures. The reaction was quick and decisive. Half a dozen brokers of the Fairbank syndicate sold at every fraction on the break. When 96 cents was reached, Baker put out wheat with the rest. The shorts, who were not filled before, held their sacks open. Down went May from 99¾ to 98, to 97, to 96, to 95.

"Will Bloom unload and run? This was the leading question. Such an action would have put fancy future at 90 cents in a breath. What did Bloom do? He had already margined his May to 90 cents. He stood on his holdings. He did more. It was stated that he walked into a commission house on the ground floor of the Board of Trade with nothing less than an armful of bonds, aggregating \$500,000. This was for additional margins. Down went May to 94 cents, then to 93, nearly seven cents from the top.

"The situation then was that the original clique was out of the way. The short interest in May wheat filled up, and one big 'tailer,' who attempted to follow the clique, was left with a great load to carry and no one to help him. Ninety per cent. of the trade regard Bloom's holding as a soft mark, and claim that there is no hope for him against the crowd and the natural situation. The other ten per cent. are dubious. They say the apparent discomfiture of Bloom is part of the original scheme, and that traders will be falling over each other to get May wheat at \$1.05, or \$1.10 perhaps, before the end of the week."¹

This is superb. Everything depends on Bloom. Will Bloom unload? Enough people to work a large woolen mill run to and fro, mad with excitement, while the great Bloom makes up his mind. This is business. This little army lifting up its eyes to Bloom might be at work. But they call this work. And if controlling wealth is work, they are great workers, for assuredly they do control no inconsiderable part of the country's wealth. And we have but to note the way they live to determine whether they control it at any profit to themselves. It was reported that during

¹ Newspaper report, April 4, 1889.

the wheat deals of August, 1891, the veteran speculator Hutchinson "earned," by industry and attention to business, \$500,000. We may go through business and show that, in the purpose of those who engage in it, actual production is secondary, where it receives any thought whatever.

Realizing this, our inquiry is simplified. The withdrawal from business of non-producing manipulators is an advantage, provided other manipulators do not step in to take their places. One of the great problems of business is to take out of it the element of manipulation. The withdrawal of a real producer will, under right conditions of production, be invariably an injury. But the conditions of production are not now right, for a great producer may, with all the appearance of deserving it, retain for himself vastly more of the general product than he creates. This is when a leader of industry does not give his subordinates their share of the product. It is not usually called manipulation, because until lately it has been considered not only legal but moral; but, defining business manipulation as getting that which one does not create, without incurring the penalty of the law, — stealing being the same thing so done as to incur the penalty of the law, — it is manipulation, although somewhat disguised. Now there are cases where a business may be so well organized in the hands of one man that his retirement, and perhaps even the breaking up of the business, may be a good thing. A less capable manager might be compelled to relax some of the burdens on the assistants, and, while making the invested capital show less in the form of clear profits, might, by his very incompetence for last exactions, occasion increased comfort and happiness in the lives of all his employees. Another application of the principle is that the positive destruction of capital may sometimes be beneficial. For example, great destruction of railroad property may give thousands of idle or semi-idle men work, supplying them in due measure with the necessities of life. Of course it is a great loss to the railroad company, but the company can lose without suffering, while the men cannot lie idle without starving. This is an expensive way of obtaining such a degree of equity in distribution that one class may merely live, for it is making the working class pay twice over in labor for what they have; but they would rather do this than starve, though the fact that portions of them are often forced to this extremity shows well that the employing class would leave them to starve on any other terms. Before the property was destroyed, the company had more wealth to disburse to laborers than afterwards,

but it would not let any of this wealth go until a further service had been exacted of the laborers.

In proposing to retire the successful capitalists sooner, it is tacitly recognized that the reward conferred upon them by society is greater than the services they have rendered to it, and that, if they continue active, the disproportionateness of the reward to service will increase. The sense of equity in observers says they have already enough, they should step aside and give others a chance; and this is the more true because the reward increases in rising ratio as one's capital and connections grow. A manufacturer said to me, "I spent fifteen years of hard labor organizing and establishing my business, and now the money flows in from all sides." During the next fifteen years this producer will probably receive a reward a dozen times greater than all the labor of his life fairly entitles him to. In the upper atmosphere of production, distribution is not proportioned with equity. But the remedy is certainly not, if the well being of society is regarded, to withdraw the producer from production because his reward is too high, to stop him from doing what somebody must do because his pay is too large, but to fix his reward more equitably, to cut down his wages.

We have traced this thought through for the light it throws on the original question, the question whether non-producing capitalists, the present drones, should be required to enter the life of action, adding many more to the already crowded field. If they go in to produce with a reward not too great, the answer is now simple enough. So long as they receive an income, they are bound to be down among those whose toil produces income, helping.

Morrison I. Swift.

RAVENNA, OHIO.

THREE CRITICS: MR. HOWELLS, MR. MOORE, AND MR. WILDE.¹

OF the new books in English that have fallen into my hands during 1891, the three that have interested me most are Mr. W. D.

¹ *Criticism and Fiction.* By W. D. Howells. Harper and Brothers. 1891.
Impressions and Opinions. By George Moore. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1891.

Intentions. By Oscar Wilde. Dodd, Mead & Company. 1891.

Howells's "Criticism and Fiction," Mr. Moore's "Impressions," and Mr. Wilde's "Intentions." They bear strong resemblance to one another. They are alike in being collections of short pieces, published from time to time in current periodicals, and expressing opinions with which the ordinary reader has become, by hearsay or by actual knowledge, somewhat familiar. They are alike in being, not poems or novels or plays, — not, in short, the kind of work usually styled creative, — but critical essays, parasitical, as distinguished from strictly original work. They are alike, too, in that popular opinion allows a certain degree of opprobrium to rest upon their authors. The newspapers jest, properly enough, on Mr. Howells's extreme proclivity for realism; occasionally they even — improperly — sneer at it. In America, at least, Mr. Wilde is as often referred to unceremoniously by his first name as his last, and the impression of the majority is to the effect that intellectually he deserves scarcely more respect than the most empty-headed of dandies. Mr. Moore's name is not so familiar to us, but those who know it at all are apt to associate it with somewhat scandalous novels, or with articles that trumpet the fame of some hitherto unknown author, or with random items in the papers to the effect that, in the columns of *So-and-So*, Mr. Moore, the brilliant young novelist, has made a violent attack on *This-and-That*. But in spite of whatever prejudicial associations of this sort one may quite casually and innocently have acquired concerning these three writers, the candid reader will find in their books much that is pleasant and instructive. More than that: from the work of men so totally different in their essential characteristics, he may obtain a singularly complete idea of the most important aspects of modern criticism. But this implies a rough analysis of the three books before us.

To judge "Impressions" fairly, one must first frankly rid himself of some surface irritation. Mr. Moore's inveterate habit of throwing all possible emphasis on the pronoun of the first person, his frequent swagger, his reckless grammar, and his indecorous heedlessness in many matters that deserve accuracy, are all displeasing. It is hard to keep one's temper when he insists on telling us what he said to Turgueneff, and not what Turgueneff said to him; when he habitually prefixes his "I told you so" to each account of a dramatic success or failure; or when he asserts complacently his ignorance of facts about which the nearest book of reference would inform him. Such faults we easily pardon in one writing in headlong haste, to meet an immediate exigency.

They are not so easily passed over in a volume of collected essays, in which, more than in books of any other sort, it is safe to assume that the writer works with entire leisure, and with the advantage of adequate previous criticism. Unessential faults, however, the earnest reader can bear with. Why should such trifles of detail spoil his real pleasure? For in books, as in life, minor faults are often the inseparable concomitants of major virtues. The honest man may be blunt even to rudeness, or the sensitive man unbearably fastidious. With defects that spring from virtue these frailties of Mr. Moore's, as we shall see, may be charitably classed.

What strikes first the reader of Mr. Moore's criticism is its refreshing provinciality. It is not the parochialism of a small city or a small clique, but the provincialism of Paris and a part of London. In this he betrays his foreign life and training, and illustrates the trend of his genius. His criticism observes strict historical and geographical limits: it is not concerned with Greek art or the Roman decadence, nor does it make capital of those continued references to the renaissance, or the fundamental unity of the arts, which it is now the fashion, following Mr. Pater, to introduce with a specious languor into the criticism of any subject. It is not concerned with that scholar's will-o'-the-wisp, comparative literature; not, in short, with aught but what passes in Paris or in the Anglo-French circles in London for current coin. To the wider if vaguer movements of contemporary literature, Mr. Moore turns a deaf ear. He can write ardently about the Théâtre Libre in Paris without a single hint of her younger and healthier sister at Berlin,—healthier, in that around her seem to cling more noble and more human ambitions. Russia, indeed, he knows through the novels of Tolstoi and Turgueneff, and whatever else has been reproduced in French. Ibsen, in spite of his enthusiasm, he quite fails to understand, treating his characters as if they were French, and forgetting that in not one of Ibsen's plays could the action be imagined as going on outside of Scandinavia or Anglo-Saxon surroundings. To the current movements in America, in Italy, in Spain, and in Germany he never so much as alludes. Germany, indeed, is to him a land still barbarous, and in literature capable only of "Faust," lexicons, and fairy stories.

We have in Mr. Moore's criticism, then, provinciality pure and simple, and a literary interest geographically as limited as if it reached only from Boston to Portland. But it is just this cir-

cumscription of interest that, particularly in the Latin races, has been productive of such splendid results in literature, and Mr. Moore is so thoroughly French in his style and his sympathies that one would be puzzled to find the Anglo-Saxon in him. He has nothing of the Englishman's reserve, nothing of his strict holding to models and ideals, of his grim, deductive following out of alleged established truth. In its place we find that supple and vivacious curiosity, that never resting desire to see or hear some new thing, which dignifies and vitalizes French interest in all artistic matters, and, behind this real desire to be amused in whatever ways art will amuse one, a deeper feeling that literature is often (not always) a serious instrument for the propagation of vital truths. Mr. Moore's work, indeed, is not unlike that which we associate with the "Figaro." His style has all the "Figaro's" pert jauntiness, its abruptness, and seeming incoherence, and, with them, its admirable sense of just how far one can go in the development of any idea; he has its frankness of expression, its familiarity, its odd Latin way of wearing its heart on its sleeve. This single quality of individuality is Mr. Moore's redeeming virtue. I cannot discover that he has any theory about literature, except that what interests and moves him is, *ipso facto*, interesting and moving. Such liberality of taste, even within the limits we have pointed out, is not a common quality: even when found, it is too often evanescent. But while it lasts — this healthy equipoise of taste and appetite — it is worthy of sincere admiration. We in America especially, who are in literature by far too much inclined to feed on the prehistoric or the exotic rather than on what is, so to speak, the daily bread of literature, may gain a zest from Mr. Moore's example. His taste is discriminating but heartily sympathetic, and, as a rule, carries the reader with it. Naturally he thinks Balzac the novelist one should read first and cling to longest, but he nevertheless appreciates Turgueneff and Zola, while in Verlaine he finds a singular note of distinction. Nowhere is he persistently immoderate; everywhere he gives natural expression to his distinct individuality, — an individuality unpedantic and as yet unsundered to the guidance of any system of aesthetics save that which is instinctive in him.

Sharply distinct from that individual criticism which, good or bad, forms the basis of Mr. Moore's "Impressions," is the theoretical criticism which we find demonstrated and illustrated in Mr. Oscar Wilde's "Intentions." Before we can discuss this theory, however, we are again forced to pass through a tedious

process of acclimatization, for in Mr. Wilde's book we find ourselves at first in a strange country, a "Wonderland" like Alice's, where the truth appears through its logical opposite. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that Mr. Wilde's only medium of communication is the paradox, — and a kind of paradox which strongly recalls his Irish origin. Where another advances by logical steps, slowly leading the reader to the comprehension of something he has not known before, at no point perplexing or confusing him, Mr. Wilde chooses another course. His first object is to bewilder. What he states is the exact opposite of the accepted truth. One's eyes grow large with wonder, or one smiles with an easy contempt and declines to give further time to the discussion of a thesis so ridiculous. On the very first page, for instance, of the dialogue, half Platonic, half after Renan, on "The Decay of Lying," we find this: "Enjoy nature! I am glad to say that I have entirely lost that faculty. . . . My own experience is that the more we study Art, the less we care for Nature. What Art reveals to us is Nature's lack of design, her curious crudities, her extraordinary monotony, her absolutely unfinished condition." A statement at first thought so astonishing and almost revolting as this is shortly followed by others scarcely less surprising. Many a man, says Mr. Wilde, who might have made a good artist, is spoiled by falling into careless habits of accuracy. It is far easier to do a thing than to talk about it. Action, he declares, is something blind, "dependent on external influences, and moved by an impulse of whose nature it is unconscious. It is incomplete in its essence, because limited by accident, and ignorant of its direction, being always at variance with its aim. Its basis is the lack of imagination. It is the last resource of those who do not know how to dream." Statements like these, seemingly so flippant, prejudice the casual reader against Mr. Wilde, especially when his style is so florid that he might almost be accused of following up Irish bulls with Irish blarney. But such faults of taste and of style, disagreeable as they are, I do not hesitate to call unessential. Mr. Wilde is best when, quitting the extravagant paradox and its luscious development, he writes plain prose. But, after all, that is neither here nor there. We do not care so much how an author writes at his worst, provided that, like Mr. Wilde, he has after all something important or interesting to tell us. In this case it is the author's theory of art, or more particularly his theory of literature, that arrests our attention and holds it throughout. Here, as we have said, Mr. Moore differs widely from his two contemporaries. He

follows his own strong bent, without seeing the necessity for a system of ethics or of æsthetics. But Mr. Wilde and Mr. Howells have both built theories for themselves. Each system is the exact opposite of the other: if brought before the general reader's tribunal of common sense, each will, I think, be found right, and each wrong. Both are thoroughly interesting.

Mr. Wilde's main thesis is that the decay of the art of lying accounts for the commonplace character of our contemporary literature. Where older authors have given us fiction for facts, those of to-day give us fact for fiction. They pore studiously over books, and shamelessly work up their subjects. As a result, we have historical novels like German treatises, realistic novels like the reports of a statistical society, and poems bolstered up with footnotes. Thus many who have in them the making of splendid liars fall finally back on personal reminiscences, and feel the need of corroborating their facts. Nor are foreign literatures better off. M. de Maupassant tears away the veil from life, and makes it ridiculous and ineffective. M. Zola aims at nothing else but the reconstruction of life from "human documents," — of low life, with vices and virtues equally commonplace and uninteresting. M. Bourget displays a fine subtlety in analyses of human nature, forgetting that at bottom we are all alike, and need not to be reminded of it. There are, of course, a few exceptions: Meredith, for instance, who has by deliberate choice made himself a romanticist, following the model of Balzac, who created life and disdained to copy it. But, as a rule, the modern authors are all in the wrong. They choose the wrong subject-matter; they give it the wrong treatment. Art is something very different from what they suppose. It lies outside of our lives, and scarcely touches them, — a land of pure beauty, where nature has little or no part. For nature and art are antipathetic: it was nature that gave Wordsworth "Martha Ray" and "Peter Bell;" it was art that gave him the ode and the fine sonnets.

To be sure, life and art have certain relations. "Art begins with abstract decoration, with purely imaginative and pleasurable work, dealing with what is unreal and non-existent. This is the first stage. Then life becomes fascinated with this new wonder, and asks to be admitted into the charmed circle. Art takes life as part of her rough material, re-creates it, and re-fashions it in fresh forms; is absolutely indifferent to fact; invents, imagines, dreams; and keeps between herself and reality the impenetrable barrier of beautiful style, of decorative or ideal treatment. The

third stage is when life gets the upper hand, and drives art into the wilderness. This is the true decadence, and it is from this that we are now suffering." What better historical instance can we have than the English drama? The miracle plays were abstract and theological: life scarcely entered into them. "But with the Elizabethan era the drama took on a language full of resonant music and sweet rhythm, made stately by solemn cadence, or made delicate by fanciful rhyme, jeweled with wonderful words, and enriched with lofty diction. She clothed her children in strange raiment and gave them masks, and at her bidding the antique world rose from its marble tomb. A new Cæsar stalked through the streets of risen Rome, and with purple sail and fluted oars another Cleopatra passed up the river to Antioch. Old myth and legend and dream took shape and substance. History was entirely rewritten, and there was hardly one of the dramatists who did not recognize that the object of art is not simple truth, but complex beauty. In this they were perfectly right. Art itself is really a form of exaggeration; and selection, which is the very spirit of art, is nothing more than an intensified mode of over-emphasis."

Art, then, according to Mr. Wilde, is the artist's lie, his deliberate feigning of what is unreal. Life gives the artist the clue which he follows, the stuff on which he in modeling bestows the beauty that charms for an hour, a lifetime, or forever. Life, the truth, the reality; art, the lie, the unreality, — this is Mr. Wilde's thesis, so brilliantly defended by him. And why not? Is not this "feigning" of the artist indubitably at the very foundations of all branches of literature, — historically, I mean? And are not we, impassioned for that shadow of reality which incites all the better workmen of to-day, at home or abroad, — are not we drifting away from one great side of art, that which is least concerned with life? "The literary spirit, in its full grace and vivacity," says Sainte-Beuve, "consists in being able to interest one's self in that which is delicately pleasing in reading, in that which is otherwise useless for one, in that which is of no practical service in the eyes of the vulgar, in that which pleads no positive cause, in that which is only the ornament, the flower, the immortal superfluity, of society and of life." "Literature," he says elsewhere, "implies leisure, curiosity, disinterestedness, a breadth of taste, even caprice." In this conception of literature Mr. Wilde and Sainte-Beuve agree. And why should we not agree with them? Why should we not take literature as it is?

It is and always has been a kind of ballet, as it were, a continual whirling and posing, with dainty music and softly colored lights, and all that is graceful and charming. But if literature is this, is it always this, this and nothing else? To such a question Mr. Howells answers in his "Criticism and Fiction."

The section of Mr. Howells's book which deals with criticism is not the most interesting part of it. On that subject he has already made declaration of his faith that critics are often prejudiced and uninformed persons, who write in unsigned articles more bitterly than they would dare to do over their names. But he has said this with more acerbity of manner than is customary with him; and, by way of rejoinder, some conspicuous critics of the press, forgetting the dignity of their calling, have bombarded him with somewhat offensive epithets. The controversy does not concern us here. Those in America who are most thoroughly interested in literature recognize Mr. Howells as a man of letters with unusually broad scholarship and wide experience, whose opinions, especially on matters of contemporary literature, though often stated with some extravagance, are uniformly worth consideration. It is the "fiction" part of the little volume which is valuable. In it the author thrusts aside, once for all, the theory which in Mr. Wilde we have just found admirable,—that of art for art's sake. "To spin a yarn for the yarn's sake, that is an ideal worthy of a nineteenth century Englishman, doting in forgetfulness of the English masters, and groveling in ignorance of the Continental masters; but wholly impossible to an American of Mr. Henry James's modernity. To him it must seem like the lies swapped between men after the ladies have left the table, and they are sinking deeper and deeper into their cups and growing dimmer and dimmer behind their cigars." We have, then, a fundamental opposition. Mr. Wilde laments that the art of the imagination, the art of lying, is decaying. Mr. Howells rejoices that from lies men turn to truth; that from the works of the pure imagination, or of those touched with the mania of emotional romanticism,—from Scott, with his mediæval ideals, from Thackeray, the caricaturist,—the main current of our contemporary literature turns in the direction first pointed out by Miss Austen. She was "the first and the last of the English novelists to treat material with entire truthfulness." After her, by fault of the mania for romanticism, the art of fiction visibly declined in England, as on the Continent, until recently there have sprung up in several countries men who have made friends again with nature

and the truth, who write of what they see about them, taking the utmost care that their own fancy shall not color or heighten or in any sense idealize — any further than lies necessarily embodied in human nature — the common stuff of life. The art which is the willing lie these men disdain: their duty is to render account of the life about them “with simplicity, naturalness, and honesty.” Of such an art not only the critics, but all men in whom humanity dwells, are competent judges. They “need not cast about for the instruction of some who profess to know better, and who browbeat wholesome common sense into the self-distrust that ends in sophistification,” even though “they have been taught to compare what they see and what they read, not with the things they have observed and known, but with the things that some other artist or writer has done.” The whole basis of criticism is changing. “The time is coming, I hope, when each new author, each new artist, will be considered, not in his proportion to any other author or artist, but in his relation to the human nature, known to us all, which it is his privilege, his high duty, to interpret.”

I have let Mr. Howells speak for himself, because the earnestness and good sense of his words cannot fail to carry with them conviction, though they bear in themselves the seed for an opposition equally earnest and equally just. We have, then, three typical critics, the first a free lance in letters, with booty and pleasure throughout the district of his foray; the second and third, dogmatic knights on either side of the silver-golden shield. To change the figure into one which has a real similarity, the æsthetics of literature are not unlike those of eating and drinking. He who is wise will, with Mr. Moore, show a hearty zest for what comes to his table; like Mr. Howells, he will find most pleasure in fare which is simple and natural; and, like Mr. Wilde, he will not disdain, at the proper time, a dainty dish.

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THE NEW COURSE OF STUDY OF ADELBERT COLLEGE OF WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

THE fact of the current discussion as to education is quite as important as are the conclusions of the discussion. So long as the purposes, methods, and principles of education are debated, so long will education be a winning cause. When the purposes of education have become fixed, its methods settled, and its principles immovably laid down, then education has approached its period of senility and decline. Educational satisfaction leads to educational stupefaction, and stupefaction is akin to death.

The discussion attending the elimination, or rather the enlargement of the old education, has been an intrinsic good. The results of the discussion have already proved themselves to be also a good. The old education has gone. It has gone never to come back. One parts with it as with an old friend. It did noble service for American boys and men. It had the essential elements of the finest and most precious training. It was not rich in the affluence of knowledge, but it taught men to think. To think is always better than to know. It was deficient in culture, but it impressed scholars with the value of hard work, and inspired them to do hard work. It did not make character beautiful or charming, but it gave to character rugged strength. It did not promote an easy intellectual facility, but it did foster a large individuality. It did not specially sharpen the intuitive faculty, but it disciplined the faculties of research and of judgment. Yet it did not conceive of the mind merely as a storehouse for treasuring truths, it also conceived of it as a tool, machine for doing a certain work, for producing certain effects. It rather disciplined than enriched. It made rather great men than great gentlemen.

An education of such qualities and results is not to be treated with criticism either general or harsh. Its adaptiveness to its conditions, its inclusiveness of the scholarship of its period, its worthiness of results, are to be commended. Yet that it has rendered excellent service is not a sufficient reason for continuing it, and its merit in the past gives no evidence for believing but that a system of greater merit may be found in the present or future. But whatever was the value of the old education, and it was great, that education cannot return. The necessary conditions are against it. The old education included the studies represent-

ing the chief knowledges of its time. But these fields of knowledge were narrow. The limits were quickly reached. The last twenty-five years have seen a vast enlargement of the domain of scholarship. The college catalogues witness to the enlargement. Even the increasing bulkiness of these catalogues is significant. Compare the catalogue of the current year with the catalogue of the year 1866-67, and it is made evident that courses in almost every one of the great departments are offered, which no less than a quarter of a century ago were not thought of, or which, had they been thought of, no teacher could have been found able to teach, or, which, if a teacher able to teach could have been found, no pupil desiring such instruction could have been discovered. Vast has been the increase of knowledge in mathematics in its relation to physics, and physics in the realm of electricity has become a subject of momentous discoveries. Biology has opened the doors of life to the ordinary student. Chemistry, through many departments, has increased and enriched its relationships. Philosophy has absolutely changed its point of view of studying metaphysical problems, and has many fold enlarged its field of observation. Philosophy has become psychological, and has ceased to be purely ontological. Political economy has broadened into social science, with the rise of the terribly serious sociological problems of our generation. History has also revolutionized its methods, and its study has been made at once more comprehensive and more minute in subject as well as more scientific in method. The modern languages have assumed a very large place in the curriculum. Even the ancient languages of Latin and Greek are spreading their literatures before the ordinary reader in a richness and variety formerly known only to the pedantic recluse. Thus through every department of study has this enlargement gone. The college offers this increasing number of studies to the student because the knowledges of the world have also increased. It is also true that the increasing number of studies has farther resulted in the enlargement of the field of knowledge. So long as the college has to do with knowledge, so long must it seek to offer to its students an opportunity for knowledge; and the wider and deeper becomes knowledge itself, the more various its fields, the more adequate must become the facilities provided by the colleges for its pursuit. The best way to prevent this constant growth in the curriculum is to stop the growth of knowledge. The best way to stop the growth of knowledge is to make all men fools. So long as men

observe and think, so long will there be an enlargement of the course of study. The college as the fostering mother of the sciences and literature cannot but nourish every scholarly interest which the Zeit-Geist lays in her lap. It is the age, not the college, which is to be held responsible for the elective system; it is the age, not the college, which is to be held responsible for the vast increase in the number of the courses of study. When humanity is enlarging its stores of knowledge and of culture, the colleges can either recognize or refuse to recognize this enlarging. If they refuse to recognize it, they are committing suicide, and indeed they ought to die; if they recognize this enlarging, they feel the consequent duty of enlarging their facilities in a proportionate degree.

But this increase in the number of studies does not carry with it an obligation on the part of every student to increase the number of studies which he himself pursues. His individual powers are as limited as were his fathers'. He cannot triple or double his hours of work. The question is, therefore, pressed upon every college as to the methods it will permit the student to employ in availing himself of the increasing intellectual wealth of humanity. Different colleges offer different answers. The general answer is represented in the elective system. This general answer covers specific and varying answers, embodying the extent to which the elective system is carried. The system may be either partially or it may be completely elective. It may not begin till the Senior, it may begin with the Freshman year; it may cover only one study of the Senior year, it may embrace every study of the curriculum of the four years.

The importance of the elective system is in proportion to its extent. If a student can elect only one study of one year, it is of no serious consequence if he make a wrong choice. If he elect each study of each year, wrong choices debase his whole collegiate career. It is to be said that the elections made by students at Harvard — the college that is the notable representative of the elective system — are remarkably wise. Though, I may be permitted to say, they do not seem to me to be as wise as to many Harvard professors, yet I am free to confess that they are wiser than *a priori* reasoning would lead me to think. The two perils belonging to these elections are haphazardness and narrowness. The student is in danger of making his elective system no system at all, choosing courses he likes, or courses that are "soft," or courses in which high marks are usually given. His haphazard-

ness might result in the second peril suggested, narrowness, for he might elect his studies from one subject or two on the ground that he can pursue them with little labor. But usually haphazardness indicates a large variety of choices: a course in mathematics, a course in Greek, two courses in French, three in science, etc. Such a variety is indeed hardly greater than the old education, with such patches of improvements as certain colleges have tried to lay on it, offers; but such variety represents intellectual dissipation. It lacks that thoroughness of intellectual discipline which the old and genuine education did give; it also lacks that richness of culture which the new education provides. Students who graduate, having pursued such desultory and disconnected subjects, and in such superficiality as this desultoriness necessitates, have not received from their college what they ought. College has been to them neither an inspiration, nor an enrichment, nor an education.

A second peril of the elective system is narrowness. This peril shows itself in the student choosing all his studies from the Freshman year on with too direct reference to his profession. He thinks he will become a doctor; and at once on entrance he elects chemistry, zoölogy, and allied subjects; he thinks that civil engineering will be his calling, and the demands of the prospective calling point out to him mathematics and physics as his studies. A boy of eighteen beginning to study directly for his profession and pursuing the study for the following seven years tends to become a narrow, one-sided specialist. It results in a specialism which is so special as to defeat its own purpose. For no man is a worthy specialist who is only a specialist. Of course the studies directly preparatory for the professions differ in their breadth. The college studies which best fit one for the practice of law are history, philosophy, social science; and history, philosophy, and social science are much broader than chemistry and zoölogy, or than mathematics and physics. Likewise the studies which the man intending to become an editor or a clergyman chooses are broad. It is, therefore, to be acknowledged that the danger of narrowness in the elective system is not so great as at first thought it might seem to be, and is less also than the danger of ill-regulated choices.

With the desire of having the advantages of the elective system, and also in the hope of avoiding its perils, Adelbert College of Western Reserve University has adopted a unique course. It is unique. All its elements are found in other colleges, but all in

no one. Like the method at Johns Hopkins, it is a group system, but unlike the method at Johns Hopkins, the groups are not solid, each student is allowed to take one or more studies outside his group, "free electives." Like the method at Bryn Mawr, each student has certain free electives, but unlike the method at Bryn Mawr, the group system does not take effect till the beginning of the Junior year, and certain studies are still prescribed. The reasons for these discriminations are not far to seek. To place the group system at the beginning of the course and to continue it, results in and presupposes that the college makes specialists. Most students are not able to choose their life's work at the beginning of the Freshman year; it were not well to make so early a choice, even were they able. Most students too, candidates for the Bachelor's degree, should receive instruction in Latin and Greek by college methods and by college teachers, which not a few would not receive did the group system begin with the Freshman year. Further: free electives are allowed to a slight extent to permit the student to attain knowledge of subjects outside his group. This freedom is designed to remove the fear of narrowness. The group system as a system is designed to direct the attention of the student toward his work in life, and toward the general method of preparation for doing this work. The special studies which constitute this method and which compose a group are subsidiary to the method and to the group. The aim of his college course is presented as more immediate, the method for securing this aim is presented as more comprehensive and more compact, than is possible under any other system. The peril of ill-regulated choice is lessened. The peril of narrowness in choice is not increased. Through the combination of the prescribed courses of the first two years, and of the group system with the free electives of the last two years, a college graduate should be able to know enough about many things to deserve to be called liberally educated, and yet should not know so little about all things as to merit the charge of being superficial. His education is at once broad and thorough. He is prepared to become a specialist. He is not unprepared for being a man.

It is not unfitting to draw out in detail the elements of this unique course. All studies other than those prescribed in the Junior year and Senior are divided into "groups," nine in number. This division is wide: Classical group, Mathematical-physical, Chemical-biological, Physical-chemical, Teutonic, Ro-

582 *New Course of Study of Adelbert College.* [December, mance, English, Historical-political, and Philosophical. The elements of each group together with those devoted to each are represented in this table:—

I. Classical Group :

{ Latin, 3 hours a week, four half-years.
{ Greek, " " " "

II. Mathematical-Physical Group :

{ Mathematics, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{ Physics, " " " "
{ Chemistry, " " one half-year.
{ English Literature, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

III. Chemical-Biological Group :

{ Chemistry, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{ Biology, " " " "
{ Geology, " " one half-year.
{ English Literature, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

IV. Physical-Chemical Group :

{ Physics, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{ Chemistry, 3 hours a week, three half years.
{ Mathematics, 3 hours a week, one half-year.
{ English Literature, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

V. Teutonic Group :

{ German, 3 hours a week, four half-years.
{ Anglo-Saxon, 3 hours a week, one half-year.
{ English Literature, 3 hours a week, two half-years.
{ Italian, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

VI. Romance Group :

{ French, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{ Italian, " " two "
{ Spanish, " " " "
{ Anglo-Saxon, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

VII. English Group :

{ English Literature, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{ Anglo-Saxon, " " one half-year.
{ Rhetoric, " " two half-years.
{ Latin, " " " "

VIII. Historical-Political Group :

{ American Political History since 1783 } Each 3 hours a week, two
{ English Constitutional History } half years (alternate years).
{ Modern European History and Politics } Each 3 hours a week, one
{ since 1789. Anthropology and In- } half year (alternate years).
{ ternational Law }
{ American Colonial History. English } Each 3 hours a week, one
{ Political History since 1760 } half year (alternate years).

IX. Philosophical Group :

Philosophy,	3 hours a week,	four half-years.
Ethics,	" "	two half-years.
Politics,	" "	one half-year.
Anthropology	{	Each 3 hours a week one half-year (alternate
International Law		
		years).

At the close of his Sophomore year each student indicates his choice of one of these groups. The group which he chooses forms the basis of his work for the two remaining years. As his course continues, he devotes an increasing proportion of his time to the studies of his group. In the first semester of the Junior year, ten hours of the sixteen which are demanded of each student each week are "prescribed," and six belong to the studies of his group. In the second semester the "prescribed" work is lessened by three hours to seven, the group still represents six hours, and the student has the opportunity of taking one three-hour course from all those offered. In both semesters of the Senior year the "prescribed" work is still further reduced, consisting of only four hours, six hours are devoted to each group, and the student chooses also studies representing six hours from all the courses provided.

This system embodies the prolonged reflection of a faculty, whose members have been trained at a dozen colleges and universities in this country and abroad. It is significant that this system was adopted by this faculty of thirteen gentlemen of diverse antecedents by a hearty and unanimous vote. Such an adoption may be interpreted as furnishing a ground of hope for its usefulness in Adelbert College of Western Reserve University at Cleveland.

Charles F. Thwing.

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A WORD IN BEHALF OF EUDÆMONISM.

In the September number of this "Review" appeared an article by the Rev. Chauncey B. Brewster, entitled "The Challenge of Life." In many respects the paper is so good that at first glance criticism seems ungracious; nevertheless, with its chief contention I experience much discontent. The first part consists of a lucid and interesting exposition of the pessimistic philosophy of Von

Hartmann; the latter and critical part is concerned with pessimism only indirectly. It is primarily an argument against all forms of hedonism, eudæmonism, if not regarded as a phase of hedonism, being plainly included within the sweep of condemnation. Pessimism, we are told, is challenging life; how shall the challenge be met? The scornful voice in the poet's breast has leaped to the rostrum, and, no longer "still" and "small," now shouts to the world, —

"Thou art so full of misery,
Were it not better not to be?"

The gage of battle has been thrown down; who shall take it up? Mr. Brewster is ready with reply. Certainly not any hedonism, nor eudæmonism, he makes haste to respond.

To much that he urges in support of this proposition it would seem that Christian thinkers must needs assent. Egoistic hedonism must assuredly be ruled out. No selfish pleasure will suffice for divine offspring; no immediate satisfaction to the moral agent will meet human need in this

"World of incompleteness, sorrow swift
And consolation laggard."

No happiness, in fact, low enough to own the force of gravitation, and belonging to earth rather than to the universe. So, likewise, when he passes to "pleasure of a nobler sort," and considers "universalistic hedonism," and the happiness of all as the end of life, one cannot but follow. We are forced to agree with him; in so far, that is, as earthly horizons limit the view. Mill's experience, to which he alludes, was not singular. The materials of a stable edifice of general happiness do not appear to exist on this planet. Such are the flaws in even our best materials, and such the imperfection of our best construction, that the edifice of society can be supported, and kept in even tolerable condition, only by the painful toil and the vicarious suffering of a large portion of the community. If existence is to be vindicated on the arena of this world, it is to be feared the champion of pessimism will ultimately bear down all opposition, and ride victorious over the field.

But the author of the paper under review leaps from these positions to very high, and, as I must think, very remote ground indeed. He says (*italics mine*): "It is not upon the low ground of *any* happiness, *howsoever* or *whensoever*, now or hereafter, that life is to be vindicated against pessimistic questioning and despair.

Our stand must be taken upon the lofty position of a moral life, to which all else is subordinated, embracing *moral ends to which both pain and pleasure are means*. When duty is placed upon her throne, the realm of life is secure. *When virtue for its own sake is recognized in its due precedence, as end of life*, then, despite all failure otherwise, the end remains unmoved, and life is vindicated."¹ There is so much noble sentiment in this passage that the philosophy beneath the drapery is more or less disguised. With only practical ethics in mind, many of us will feel, as strongly perhaps as Mr. Brewster, that true living consists not so much in nice calculations as to the conditions of highest happiness, as in trustful, loyal obedience to divine instincts, those heavenly finger-posts of the soul; and especially in the new birth, the reversing of the common selfish order within, and the substitution of centrifugal for centripetal forces; in

... "good deeds

Wrought for good's sake, mindless of heaven or hell; "

in launching one's bark fearlessly on the great stream of the divine purpose. But how is one to justify such a course to the reason? This is the real question that faces us, a philosophical rather than a practical one; and it is, in the last analysis, the real challenge which pessimism brings to life. Let it not be supposed that it can be ignored safely in our day. When reason has developed sufficiently to sit in judgment over the soul's instincts, it must also find a way to justify them, or it will not be long in disowning their authority. How is self-forgetfulness to be justified to reason?

The natural answer would seem to be, by convincing it, either by argument or by pointing to the love and wisdom of God, that self-forgetfulness is the only way to largest life and truest well-being, at once for the individual and for his fellows; that, to borrow from Confucius, "so kindly hath He [God] suited our duty to our interests that obedience to his will is happiness to ourselves." Mr. Brewster, however, is either indisposed to defer much to the demands of reason, or thinks it can be satisfied in another and better way. Self-forgetfulness is sound policy; obedience to conscience and surrender to the divine life is the true and only course, he would have us believe, because thus we shall attain to virtue; and virtue is the final goal of life, beyond and above any kind of happiness whatever. Indeed, happiness is

¹ *Andover Review*, September, 1891, p. 246.

entirely incidental, except so far as it shares with pain the honor of promoting virtue. In my eyes, I must confess, virtue so defined, stripped of every suggestion of subservience to blessedness, wears an unlovely aspect. It seems arbitrary and forbidding. Man is exhorted to climb a towering mountain, heeding not weariness, nor cold, nor painful bruises. And he is to press on up to the wind-swept summit, not for the sake of the prospect, not for the uplift of soul and the moving of divine impulses within him as the majestic white giant of the range looks him gravely in the face, or the charming sun-wooded, half cloud-screened valley draws aside the veil from her loveliness — not from the drawing of any such magnets is he to clamber on, for these are varieties of happiness. On the contrary, he is to pursue the toilsome ascent solely that he may be up. And if at the top, fog or snow-choked atmosphere shut him in remorselessly, denying him every delight and chilling him to the marrow, he is to be quite superior to such an outcome, and by all means to consider his undertaking a success. For he will still know that he is very high up, — his barometer will tell him that, — and to be high up is what he was made for. And this remote and abstract conception is urged upon us as the true counterweight at the bar of reason for the very concrete ills and stern facts of pessimism!

The issue joined in this discussion is the old one between the formal and the vital view of divine things. Is there in the skies a standard of form and order which is the ultimate fact in all life, men being created in order to conform to it, very much as, according to certain Rabbis, the Hebrew people were chosen for the sole purpose of keeping the Sabbath? And is the Most High, or possibly some order of things behind the Deity, a Martinet, — in view of the dark and wide fact of suffering it may be that the name Procrustus would be more apt, — insisting upon conformity to rule at whatever cost? Or, on the other hand, is well-being, the life and blessedness of God, the final fact, the end to which ultimately all facts and all standards and laws contribute? And are these latter but the necessary conditions of a child of the Infinite's development into such well-being, the means by which, in connection with the human instincts which answer to them, the All-Father leads his children along ways of life, from weakness to strength, from selfishness to love, toward the goal of mature sonship and a large divine fellowship, that is, a large sharing in the divine life and in its fruitage, the divine blessedness? Is there a system for which beings are made, or do all systems

exist for the benefit of beings? Was man made for the Sabbath, or the Sabbath for man?

Those of us who choose the second of these alternatives, and believe that life is a larger word than order, are not justly to be called epicureans, nor even utilitarians. We are no advocates of a refined selfishness, of a religion which is but greed springing from earthly marts to celestial streets. We hold, indeed, that the highest and widest blessedness of which beings are capable is the end of existence, and believe that every man may, and should, and as a matter of fact does, consciously or unconsciously, intelligently or the contrary, seek his own happiness; but we maintain most earnestly that the higher forms of happiness are not to be reached by any selfish method, however honored by time or sanctioned by ecclesiasticism. They are to be reached only through that with which they are practically synonymous, the utmost well-being of the whole nature, and this in turn only through surrender to the divine life, through learning of Him who "emptied himself" and "poured out his soul unto death" in doing the will of God; that is, through full faith in that loving Power which has made mankind an organism, the parts finding their highest well-being in self-forgetful service of the whole, and the whole prospering only as the parts have largest and most joyous life.

With such a faith the eudæmonistic position would seem to be secure against pessimistic attacks. It does not appear how it can be carried till this, its great redoubt, is destroyed, this intelligent, far-seeing faith that, without blinking a single stern fact of existence, lays hold upon the God of love. Can such a faith be maintained? What Christian doubts it? Let us see.

Pessimism's indictment of life is concisely stated in a quotation which Mr. Brewster makes from an anonymous writer of that school. It runs: "In the eudæmonistic point of view, it [the world] is worse than no world, because the path whereon the *logos* strides from victory to victory is a path of suffering to the creature." This has the air of a strong argument, because, strictly construed, the premise laid down is true. God does work out his ends through the suffering of the creature. Nevertheless, the argument is very inconclusive. It *suggests* what is not proved, and cannot be proved, namely, (1) that the victory is the part — the true lion's share — of the *logos*, and (2) the suffering the part, or share, of the creature. But what if the picture which for eighteen centuries Christianity has held before the eyes of men be true, and the infinite life did manifestly fellowship with the creature in

suffering in old Judæa? what if that fellowship is a constant fact, and the Lamb has, of a truth, been "slain from the foundation of the world"? and what if immortality is fact, not illusion, and in the fullness of the mature life hereafter, the child is to share with the parent in triumph and position? What if Paul has co-ordinated facts correctly when he tells us that we suffer with the *logos*, "that we may also be glorified with him"? Then, I take it, the major premise falls to the ground, and it is not true that a world of suffering to the creature is worse than no world.

It is not easy to see why Mr. Brewster should make so little of the large fact of immortality. In any other problem the introduction of a new factor, especially one approaching infinity, would invalidate all previous calculations; why should it be otherwise in the problem of human life? No doubt it would be difficult to find a school in the land in which the boys would not vote by a considerable majority that studious life was unprofitable, *viewed from the standpoint of the value of learning during the school period*, and that, in fact, it is "better not to be" a scholar. No doubt, also, the foundation of Versailles or of Windsor Castle would be considered ill-made enough, if regarded not as a foundation but as a dwelling. We perpetually underestimate the enormous change of vital perspective wrought by the fact of immortality. What does the Apostle Paul think now of his perils and sufferings in the first century of our era? Conceding that this far from novel consideration does not solve the problem of man's trouble, I insist that it does shrink it wonderfully. The problem remains, doubtless; but it is shorn of its terrors. It is no longer despotic. I do not know why there should be non-punitive suffering in even this brief, infancy period, this larva stage, of man's long life; just as I do not see why the birth and infancy of the body are attended with pain. I do not understand why Omnipotence could not have so conditioned these individualized and semi-detached portions of itself which we know as men and women, that they should have developed spiritually toward the spiritual ideal as freely and joyously as a healthy child develops toward the physical ideal. But if we cannot see into the heart of reason and love of this diminished problem, we Christians, at any rate, have good ground for believing in the reality of such a gracious inner fact. We see not the solution; but we see Jesus, and see Him winning perfection through sufferings.¹ That is, we have a supreme object lesson in the real necessity and truly gracious character of a fact which

¹ Heb. ii. 10.

to our present understanding is incomprehensible; and it is sufficient. So long as men see in the Man of Nazareth at once a comrade sharing their "sharpest pang" and "bitterest tear," and the incarnation *par excellence*, a special manifestation of the Deity, so long will they not lose heart; so long they will find it possible to believe where they cannot see, to believe, —

"although no tongue can prove,
That every cloud that spreads above
And veileth love, itself is love."

Mr. Brewster, however, though in a few strong sentences he sets forth the mystery of pain, is seemingly unwilling that it should remain mystery until the radiance of another world pierces it through and through. He finds the end and justification of pain in sacrifice. Surely this is applying to a difficult fact an inexplicable explication. Men are to suffer and lose in order that they may undergo more loss and suffering! How differently, and, as I must think, how much more reasonably, does Ruskin write! He says: "Sacrifice of all our strength, or life, or happiness to others, though it may be needed, and though all brave creatures hold their lives in their hand, to be given, when such need comes, as frankly as a soldier gives his life in battle, is always a mournful and momentary necessity, not the fulfillment of the continuous law of being."¹ In justice to Mr. Brewster it should be said that he seems to be conscious of an end beyond sacrifice itself, an end in which I fully believe. He speaks (*italics mine*) of the "*blessedness of sacrifice*," and declares that "self-devotion may glorify life and *bless* it, as no enlightened self-interest ever could,"² and he quotes approvingly from James Hinton a passage in which "*joy and gladness*" are spoken of as ultimate facts of existence. But blessedness, joy, and gladness, of course, are forms of happiness, and to happiness, "howsoever or whensoever," our author is pledged to show no favor. So much for the sane optimism of intelligent, wide-visioned faith, a faith which I believe to be always attainable by keeping in view the twin facts of divine fellowship in suffering and human fellowship in the victories of the *logos*. The shock of arms between such optimism and advancing pessimism I view with no quakings of heart whatever.

As to the alternate way of justifying holiness in the face of mental questioning and pessimistic challenge, I am unable to

¹ *Ethics of the Dust*, sec. 6.

² *Andover Review*, September, 1891, p. 245.

share Mr. Brewster's confidence. I do not believe that "the realm of life is secure" "when duty is placed upon her throne," after duty has been divested of the fair robes of reasonableness, and clad in the garb of an arbitrary despot. Despotism is by no means the most stable form of government in this nineteenth century. Substantially the proposition is, by means of the moral instincts, and after these have been carefully stripped of all reasonableness, to bring and to hold men to a standard of being imposed upon them on grounds absolutely inscrutable. To my mind the success of such a scheme would itself be failure. Let men be satisfied that their dream of final blessedness is an empty one; that happiness is, and must always be, entirely secondary and incidental, and on the same level with pain as a minister to formal rightness, and I strongly suspect they will fail to distinguish between the system to which they have been brought and a modified pessimism. Mr. Brewster may talk about taking higher ground; men in general will consider it a surrender of the field, and something very like the despair of pessimism will settle down upon them.

What instinct is more ineradicable, more phoenix-like, than the instinct of happiness? The tenacity with which the mind holds on to hope, its aspect on the side of the future, is proverbial. Its death is despair, with which even the instinct of self-preservation loses its power. To say that this universal prompting is often, or generally, rude and unenlightened, reaching after crude and inferior objects, and rebelliously acting on finite intelligence instead of confiding in infinite wisdom and love, is simply to say that it is human. But to say that it is radically false and misleading is to impeach not so much man as his Maker; to declare that the Holy One leads men on to the ends of existence by cheating them, — just the contention, by the way, of the non-Christian theists in the matter of gospel miracles.

Mr. Brewster sees no legitimate place for sacrifice in hedonism, and under hedonism, of which itself I make no defense, he evidently means to include eudæmonism. "Its altruism," he says, "is of a mild type that does not imprudently waste itself, nor suicidally throw itself away in absolute self-devotion." If the emphasis in this sentence is on the words "imprudently" and "suicidally," it will stand, of course. Eudæmonism looks upon all unreason as blemish; but aside from these two words, the statement seems to me clearly at variance with the facts. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews was plainly of quite another

opinion; for he tells us that it was for the *joy* set before him that Jesus endured the cross;¹ and this is no isolated passage. It is one of the prominent recurring ideas in the epistle that the Christ won great things for himself through struggle and suffering, a fact which his followers should recognize for their own encouragement and guidance. The thought of blessedness as the end and fruitage of righteousness runs through the Scriptures from cover to cover, from Sinai to Calvary, from the time when the servile Hebrews were bidden to honor father and mother that their days might be long, to that night when the Christ took leave of his disciples with words of deepest spiritual import, explaining that these things were spoken to them that his *joy* might remain in them, and that their "*joy might be full.*"²

"It is not the thought of happiness," Mr. Brewster thinks, "that elicit the highest notes, or stirs the deepest chords, in human nature." Is it, then, the thought of abstract virtue, virtue unalloyed with "any happiness, howsoever or whensoever"? I am persuaded to the contrary. Let us imagine a man under the influence of such a thought. He has a conception of abstract righteousness, but finds little or no pleasure in the well-being of others, no happiness in giving the rein to love, no blessedness in God-like doing and being. Is it easy to think of that man as a volunteer in any forlorn hope of humanity, a good soldier in that small but noble army of the world's redeemers, who bear men's burdens and carry their griefs? There will be little moral action by such a man, I suspect, until abstract virtue is reinforced by something that appeals to his emotional nature; and, all kinds of happiness being ruled out, that something would seem necessarily to be force, the rod of the Moral Governor of the universe. Then, indeed, there may be morality of a hard type, but how inferior in beauty and power, and in range of achievement, to that of him who sees beyond Gethsemane and Calvary the daybreak of the resurrection morning, the ecstatic faces of friends, and the thrilled and quickened spirits of generations yet to be!

William Forbes Cooley.

SHORT HILLS, N. J.

¹ Heb. xii. 2.

² John xv. 11.

P. S. TO A MONIST.

ONE of the able writers to whom my article on "Conservative Apologetics" made respectful reference asks me what a dualist can do with that "other" which is not God. There is no deeper, no higher, no nearer question. For almost all leaders of modern thought who cherish belief in God are laying for it an essentially monistic, which for them is an essentially pantheistic, basis. If they do not identify the All with the One in respect of substance, they certainly credit Him with all the energy and life there is. This is a sort of dynamical pantheism, and logically should end in complete identification of substance with God. For what is force apart from substance, or substance apart from force? If the energy to which things owe all their cognizability and all their qualities be divine, why, then, it is plain that the essence in which these qualities inhere is divine, too. I do not now raise any objection to this conclusion, but would show how it is that a dualist of extreme type, one who regards God as absolutely creator, can find a place in the universe for that "other" which is no God.

I admit, to begin with, all the distressing antinomies which agnostics and pantheists detect in any idea of us men concerning a personal Infinite. Here are specimens to show how far it seems necessary for candor to go:—

For the Infinite to create something not himself is to do a self-contradictory, intrinsically impossible thing, since the Infinite must be the all-inclusive. To boundless Intelligence eternity must be an ever-present Now, for otherwise knowledge is in part contingent upon the succession of phenomena, and yet phenomenal succession is real, and not to know it as such is to be ignorant of the entire history of the universe. Again, unless God is heartless, an unconscious Buddha, an Epicurean's blissful, insensible deity, then He is the victim of disagreeable peculiarities and doings in human beings; or, what is just as paradoxical, He depends on their lovable qualities and acts for all the pleasure He can take in these. It must even be admitted that God cannot be infinite morally except by including all moral qualities, good and bad; which would mean that He can have moral infinitude only at cost of having no morals at all. If there are any other embarrassments for belief in the Christian's God, as there are embarrassments spread in our path by the serene humor of the pantheist, or by the nipping ingenuity of the agnostic, we should

be ready to admit their existence in advance. It is not likely that they can be more formidable than these specimen stumbling-blocks already acknowledged as logically inevitable.

But it would seem not illegitimate to suggest as to all these, and as to all their like: —

1. The Infinite is essentially inscrutable, except to itself. This is the agnostic's fundamental principle. But this very principle forbids him to insist that there is any real contradiction where finite intelligence finds an antinomy. Since it would be unreasonable for finite intelligence to expect to understand the Infinite, therefore it is unreasonable for it to regard its logical perplexities as refutations of all partial knowledge. Agnosticism thus supplies its own refutation. It is not thoroughgoing enough. For one, I utterly disavow all ability to infer what the infinite attributes of God lead Him to do. The *a priori* process is illegitimate, because impracticable, in theology; why, then, should I concede that the agnostic has made out a case against theology in this discredited, irrational way?

2. If the *a priori* method is baffled by the incomprehensibility of the Infinite, it does not at all follow that the *a posteriori* method may not give some trustworthy intimation as to the Being who is either the Maker of all, or himself the All. Physical science rejects deductions which will not bear the test of induction. If we have *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasons for distrusting the *a priori* method of studying a given subject, it does not at all follow that observation may not lead up to some real knowledge about that very matter. It is, or ought to be, but a commonplace of Apologetics that, whereas we do not and cannot have any evidence that a being entirely unconditioned, hence unrelated, exists, we do have some evidence for the existence of a Divine Being, and all of it tells that He exists just so far as it tells what sort of Being He is. A relation which reveals a Being reveals an attribute.

3. That we need not be disturbed by antinomies involved in the idea of the metaphysically infinite is clear to those who are ready to admit that the Creator accepted limitations in the very act of creating. His powers were not diminished, but their exercise was restrained. He could not make something not himself without shutting himself out from being so much of the universe, and from doing whatever so much of the universe does. This is plainest of all in respect of human wills. Our wills are our own, or they are not wills. They are even against God's will, and He

put this portentous possibility upon himself when He willed to create other wills. But to accept limitations is to come within reach of human cognizance, as agnosticism itself admits.

4. A still more thorough riddance of agnostic, which are here pantheistic, perplexities is secured when we fully face the fact that God is not necessarily infinite in every respect. He cannot be infinite in all respects. He is infinite in every excellence. Perfection, not infinitude, is the determining characteristic of the true God. If so, then each of the antinomies which logic finds in the idea of bare infiniteness concerns only an imaginary being, not God. For instance, his perfect excellence does not require that all substance should be included in his; it rather forbids this by exalting Him above matter. It does not insist that He must know eternity as Now; for the future has not gone by, and the past is not yet to come, and perfect knowledge can neither know the unreal as real, nor unknow realities. Perfection does not require that God should be unmoved by the widely various, the ever varying, states of human beings; it requires that He have a sensibility appropriate to them, each and all. Perfection does not involve making human wills free and not free at the same time. God need not undertake to force men to be free, not even to be freely innocent while they voluntarily abandon innocence. Perfection, precisely perfection, forbids God to attempt anything so absurd as a self-contradictory thing. We may easily enough see how an infinitely excellent God may fitly create rational and free beings to be his own companions, and to find in Him their highest good; and this, too, although it is confessedly beyond us to guess how this was altogether wise and well when it was certain to result in alienation from himself and in the wretchedness of sin. But we do not need to guess out the solutions of his problems; it is enough if we can reasonably believe that solutions unimaginable by us are satisfactory to Him. And surely the divine perfection brings to an end the metaphysical perplexity of a being who loses moral goodness in moral infinitude, for the fact is that his only moral infiniteness is the infiniteness of moral excellence.

Curt as these replies may seem, they are perhaps long enough as a postscript to another article, and long enough, I trust, to be intelligible for those who take interest in these problems.

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EDITORIAL.

SHORT PASTORATES FROM THE SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW.

It is not difficult to notice that there is at present a prevailing unrest among ministers. The thought of remaining for a period of years at work in one place seems to be unattractive. There is many a Congregational church that is under the itinerant system to a greater degree than the neighboring Methodist church is: the pastoral terms are shorter, and there is a dispiriting interregnum between them. It is very often the case that ministers in such a church, instead of being pastors, are to all intents only chaplains, or at most evangelists. And it is a not less serious matter that, so far as the social life of the community is concerned, they have the little share of one who has but lately come, and is soon, it may be expected, to go away. There are many towns and villages where the minister is looked upon as securing the benefits of the organized life, without touching its burdens and responsibilities. In that larger proportion of life, even of Christian life, which goes on apart from direct church associations, the minister is too often a passing visitor, enjoying no confidences, and consciously without influence. In a time when it is beginning to be realized that one of the greatest openings before Christianity lies in the way of social citizenship, it cannot be right that Christian ministers have so rarely given hostages to fortune, and become pledged and naturalized members of the community in which they live.

It may be admitted at once that the old kind of pastoral authority has passed away, perhaps to no one's special regret. And yet the minister of the past wielded a power that may well be envied by the new generation. He knew his flock, and called them by name. He was known of them. They associated the thought of him with all the marked events of their individual and common existence. The minister's influence was in many respects narrow, but it was a social influence. If it was narrow, the reason was that life itself was under close limits. He compassed the life of his community; he participated in all of it, from year to year, even to children's children.

The pastoral activity which has taken the place of this is freer but less forceful. Preaching is more interesting, more inspiring; but it is more distant. Pastoral visitation has lost the old religious intensity that it had when the minister catechised from house to house; and there seems to be much doubt among young ministers, at least, how to make this part of their work most useful. The ministry is conscious of change, conscious of new occasions and new duties, sensible of the fact that there are widening opportunities; and hence the unrest we have noticed is a sign of promise. The difficulty is in the way this unrest expresses itself, in sending men hither and thither in search of the larger possibilities,

when the whole lesson of the theology, as well as of the sociology, of the present, is that these possibilities are to be found close at hand. It is to be feared that the ministry may make the old mistake — doubly dangerous now — of thinking that they must go far afield and find broad lands, in order to gain the richer harvests. It is the depth of soil that counts.

The people of the churches are coming, often unconsciously to themselves, into a new kind of life, something more varied, more eventful, more interesting, than they have lived before. The popularizing of education, it may even be said of culture; the increase of comforts; the development of the feeling of humanity which comes from intercourse with the distant world; and above all, the vague sense of coming changes, — these influences are giving a larger horizon to the simplest walks of life. The social movement does not exist merely where it is being discussed, or where it is visibly at work. It is in the air. And people nearly everywhere are waiting to know what is the bearing of Christian faith upon the new hopes that are abroad among men. They are as yet uncertain whether the church has a mission to the whole of life, or only to a fraction of it. At bottom, their question is whether Christianity is set for the redemption of individuals, or for the redemption of the world.

In the face of this longing for nobler truth, and with it a willingness for nobler action, it is too often the case that the minister, the only guide as to higher things the people have, sees an opportunity, but sees it elsewhere. From the social point of view, a large proportion of the ministers of the present leave their work when they have but just made a fair beginning. Many a man, convinced that his parish furnished him too slight an opportunity, might find a call to a fresher and more devoted ministry, without change of location, in the signs of the times, and in the strivings among his people for a larger life and for a better relation with humanity.

The next great revival is going to be in the direction of social Christianity. Under its impulses, the best men will go into places now considered slight in opportunity. They will dispel the notion that the more extensive field necessarily allows of a man's doing the more in his day and generation. Instead of touching many people on a single side of their nature, these men will take a few, and influence them deeply through the whole range of life. We cannot but believe that such men, when they come, will introduce another era in Christian history. They will be discoverers. They will open up new avenues to the church at large, until it shall be more nearly coterminous with the kingdom of God.

For one thing, the ministry of the future will need to show explicitly how the religious motive expresses itself in the different spheres of life. The art of living the Christian's life in these modern days is the most intricate of all arts, and yet the present state of instruction in the art is

to a large extent as if a teacher of sculpture should confine himself to the history and possibilities of sculpture, and never enter with his pupils into the handling of the clay. The ministry of the future will, we think, give more effort toward showing how religion adjusts itself to the other elements of the better life; thus bringing out the essential harmony of all good things, showing that nothing which makes men truer and nobler is foreign to Christianity, and making it clear that Christianity condemns only what is false and absurd in the nature of things.

Let us also hope that in the future there may be brought out more than ever the Christian possibilities of art and music, of education, of refined social intercourse. Why should not the church hold before its people everywhere that ideal of cultured manhood and womanhood toward which it is already working in the Christian college? There would thus be new means through which Christian people could be established and confirmed in their faith in spiritual things. There would be new means of approaching on some other side of the higher nature those who are not first of all appealed to by the more direct ministry of religion. There would be the possibility, with this broader programme, of getting Christian principles registered in the public life of communities and of the nation.

It may perhaps be suggested that the minister of the future will stick closer to his text than has been done in this present instance. To this it must be said that the main object has been to offer some considerations as to what the social point of view is; feeling that when that point of view is justly apprehended, any further discussion is almost unnecessary. In the light of such considerations as those which have been presented, and of the feelings which come from the progress of social Christianity, we are convinced that there are coming to be entirely different standards for measuring the opportunity furnished by fields for ministers' work. The lines of activity which seem to be indicated for the religious leaders of the coming generations cannot be undertaken except through influences moving slowly and profoundly. Social Christianity demands of any who would be its apostles a close, continued intimacy of knowledge and sympathy with those whom they would help. There are of course other points of view from which the question of short pastorates may rightly be looked at, but from the social point of view it is hard to see how there can be any such thing.

THE ACQUITTAL OF PROFESSOR BRIGGS.

THE Presbytery of New York, at its meeting of November 4th, after hearing Professor Briggs's reply to the charges of its prosecuting committee, dismissed the proceedings against him by a vote of ninety-four to thirty-nine. In view of the failure of the motion to dismiss the case, made and urged by the friends of the accused at the October meeting of

the Presbytery, the size of the majority must be taken as showing a strong reaction in Dr. Briggs's favor.

An important cause of the reaction was, no doubt, the calm, luminous, and incisive "Response" of Dr. Briggs. This, while not avowedly defensive nor explanatory, was perhaps more effective in removing prejudice and misunderstanding than a defensive and explanatory address would have been. It was professedly and in essential content a criticism of the charges of the prosecuting committee, made in the exercise of the right of the accused to file objections to the sufficiency of the charges in form and in legal effect. Incidentally, however, two of the utterances of the Inaugural declared by the committee to be heretical were cleared of misinterpretation and tested by the Presbyterian standards. This, no doubt, gave relief to some minds. Dr. Briggs's demonstration of the insufficiency of the prosecuting committee's charges and specifications must have helped many towards the conclusion reached by the Presbytery. For it was both natural and kind to attribute the committee's failure to make triable charges, not to its mental incompetency, but to the lack of material at its command.

The prosecuting committee will appeal to the General Assembly. It is very doubtful whether the Assembly will entertain the appeal. True, the Moderator of the Presbytery has decided that the committee is "an original party in the case." But excellent Presbyterian authority can be cited for the opinion, which seems to us supported by common sense, that a committee appointed by the Presbytery, having no powers except those given it by the Presbytery, cannot be an original party as against that body with a right of appeal from its decisions.

Dr. Briggs's opponents have, however, another string to their bow. Some thirty members of the Presbytery have announced their intention of making a complaint to the Synod of irregularity in the proceedings of acquittal. Presbyterian law doubtless gives the right of such complaint to a dissatisfied minority. Whether the Synod will sustain it, and require the Presbytery to try Dr. Briggs again, is, of course, doubtful. As the Synod does not meet until October, 1892, and as its decision, whatever its nature, will probably be followed by an appeal to the General Assembly of June, 1893, it seems unlikely that disciplinary proceedings against Professor Briggs will be resumed. The strength of the revision party in the church warrants this prediction. Dr. Briggs has in all probability secure standing as a Presbyterian minister.

This probably means that the Presbyterian Church will not hereafter require of its ministers and teachers profession of belief in the infallibility of the Bible. Dr. Briggs's refusing to make such profession was the real ground of the attack upon him. He admitted that he had found historical mistakes in the Scriptures, and claimed that the church cannot give the sacred writings the careful study necessary to the faithful use of them without coming upon such errors. This admission, it was said, was

a violation of the promise made by him at his ordination to be loyal to the system of truth embodied in the Westminster symbols. A cardinal doctrine of that system is that which presents the Bible as "the only infallible rule of faith and practice." This implies, it is said, the correctness of all the affirmations of the Bible, whatever their nature may be. Therefore, a Presbyterian minister who acknowledges that he has found historical errors in the Scriptures should be deposed from the ministry. The offensiveness of the critical positions taken by Professor Briggs was owing to their supposed contrariety to Biblical affirmations. He subjected himself to discipline, it was urged, in saying that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, and that Isaiah was the author of only half the book which bears his name, because the Bible refers to Moses as the author of the Pentateuch, and prefixes to quotations from both halves of Isaiah the name of that prophet. His opponents say that one who says that the facts of the Bible contradict these or any other affirmations "reviles and discredits the Word of God" (to borrow a description of Dr. Briggs's conduct used in the General Assembly last summer by a member of the prosecuting committee of the New York Presbytery), and is unfit to be a Presbyterian minister.

Professor Briggs maintained that loyalty to the Presbyterian doctrine about Scripture does *not* imply assent to all the historical statements of the Bible; that, on the contrary, one may heartily accept the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as "the only infallible rule of faith and practice," while conceding that it contains such errors. This position he maintained firmly at his trial, asserting it and vigorously defending it in his address to the Presbytery. His acquittal, therefore, if it be, as is altogether likely, the end of the attempt to discipline him, amounts to a declaration from the Presbyterian Church that it does not regard the religious authority of the Bible as necessarily excluding from it all human imperfection.

Professor Briggs will have done great service to Presbyterianism, and to the whole Protestant church, in securing this. The greatness of the service rendered, and the cost of it, may well cause any faults in the manner of defending the truth to be soon forgotten.

In justice to Dr. Briggs's opponents, it should be said that his Inaugural was unnecessarily aggressive in tone. It was also unwisely discursive. The sections treating of the religious office of the reason and of the state of the righteous after death marred the unity of the discourse, and invited misunderstanding by the meagreness which limitations of time made necessary. And the latter of these was so worded as to misrepresent Dr. Briggs's opinion. When the author said, "The bugbear of a judgment immediately after death, and the illusion of a magical transformation in the dying hour, should be banished from the world. . . . The former makes death a terror to the best of men. The latter makes human life and experience of no effect, and both cut the nerves

of Christian activity and striving after sanctification. Renouncing them as hurtful, unchristian errors," etc., he seemed to believe that life in the middle state would work such a moral change as is denied to it in these words of the "Response to the Charges:" "If any insinuation had been made that I had taught that the redeemed enter the middle state guilty and sinful, this could easily have been refuted." If a man at death enters into a state in which he is sinless and free from guilt, and assured of being so forever, is he not, then, subjected to a judgment? What can "judgment at death" be but deciding that one is in this moral condition, and assigning him to a fit environment? Why, then, is the doctrine of such a judgment to be called a "bugbear," "a hurtful and unchristian error"? Of course, Dr. Briggs's doctrine of "Progressive Sanctification" did not change between the delivery of the Inaugural and the reading of the "Response to the Charges." But the description and commendation of it in the former were given in heated rhetoric. These faults of the Inaugural, however, are of little importance when compared with its high merits, and the misunderstanding they have caused has not kept either the Presbytery or the public from seeing the real issue. By raising this, and manfully fighting it through, Dr. Briggs has earned the gratitude of all intelligent students of the Bible.

[SUNDAY-SCHOOL INSTRUCTION.

THERE has been some discussion of late concerning the relation and proportions which should be maintained between the didactic and hortatory elements in Sunday-school instruction, — one party urging that the chief end of the Sunday-school is to teach religious truth; the other insisting that the constant aim should be to quicken the conscience and to move the will. Perhaps, as is so often the case in such discussions, there is really less difference of opinion upon the main question than appears upon the surface, less, it may be, than the disputants themselves suppose. All will doubtless admit that the final aim of all teaching is to secure correctness and completeness of life, and without doubt all will admit, also, that in religion, as in other practical matters, this can be secured only by wise and comprehensive instruction. The distinction which is sometimes made between the ideals and aims of the Sunday-school and of the day-school is more apparent than real. They both exist for the same reason, — to make wise and good men and women; and their methods and ideals must submit to the same tests, — are they fitted to attain this end? The difference is in the text-book used, the department of truth which is studied, and, because this truth lies nearer the heart of things, the more conscious and constant recognition of its direct bearing upon conduct. Knowledge which does not make life better and fuller is a very barren thing, and life which does not draw its nutriment from sound knowledge is always feeble, and is liable to become false and

mischievous. The Sunday-school must not shrink from the question which we are constantly applying to the secular schools: Is it doing all that we ought to expect of it in fitting its pupils for the serious work of life? Nor is this question fully answered when it is shown that it is very entertaining and attractive, nor even when it appears that it leads most of the children to connect themselves with the church; for the end is to secure a sound and real life, and not a passing pleasure, or a formal relation.

Now, to gain this end, there must not simply be a modicum of sound instruction, but a maximum. Teaching should receive the same emphasis which it receives in the day-school. If truth is the nutriment of life, then life must be fed freely, and all the truth must be taught which can be received and appropriated. Perhaps it is unnecessary to say this; it would certainly involve a waste of time to delay to prove it. The very name of the Sunday-school, the story of its origin, and the history of its successful and useful life, show that the reason for its existence is that it may lead the children to right living by teaching them religious truth. Under any conditions it would lose its power if it should forget this. There are, however, some reasons in the present condition of society and of thought, why systematic and comprehensive Sunday-school instruction is especially imperative. It may be well to note two or three of these reasons.

One is in the state of unrest and transition through which the religious thought of the age is passing. The gravest questions are pressing for an answer, — questions which relate to the source of religious authority, to the power of religion to maintain itself, and to its power and its right to control men's lives, and to rule human society. Can the church answer these questions? Can it retain its old convictions and ideals, and continue to persuade men to accept them, or can it modify these convictions and ideals to meet new light and new demands, and still prove its right to confidence and leadership? Such questions cannot be avoided, and they must be answered in the light of truth. If the church thrusts them aside, and ignores, or rebukes, or exhorts those who urge them, it will surely lose the respect of thinking men. If it renders careless and superficial answers, it will gain distrust and contempt. Zeal which is not according to knowledge is fanaticism, and the more ardent it is, the wilder it becomes. It is a hard lesson to learn, not fully mastered yet, though taught in many bitter experiences, that truth is the only implement which zeal can use with the hope of benefiting men, or even with ordinary safety. But truth is gained only by much hard study, and by systematic and unwearied teaching. If the children who are in our Sunday-schools to-day are to solve aright the problems which will be before them and their generation, they must know all that can possibly be taught them of the Scriptures and of religious truth. The outcome will be a sad one if religious ignorance is permitted to meet

skeptical learning. Nothing could be sadder, unless, perchance, both parties should prove to be ignorant. This demand for faithful and comprehensive teaching does not mean, however, that all the doubts and questions which criticism starts shall be brought into the Sunday-school and be discussed before young children. Sunday-school instruction, like all teaching, must be sensible and progressive. It should be positive, in the sense that truth is taught rather than error exposed. It should expound the substance of Scripture rather than show its defenses or contend with its opponents. Men are recognizing more and more clearly that religion must stand or fall by its own inherent power, or weakness, and that it can neither be defended nor destroyed from without. The power of Biblical religion to maintain itself during the next fifty years, to receive and to appropriate new light, to adjust itself to new conditions, and to enlarge its ministries, depends, in very large degree, upon the amount of exact and systematic knowledge which the next generation has of the contents of the Bible.

But this necessity is reinforced by the fact that, aside from such instruction as may be given in Christian homes, the children of the present age are absolutely dependent for Biblical and directly religious knowledge upon the Sunday-school, or upon such means as the church provides for them. The day-schools are making less and less provision for this kind of teaching, and it requires no prophetic vision to see that our public schools cannot soon, if they can ever, return to the old method of giving to the Christian Scriptures and their doctrines an important place in their courses of instruction. It is probably undesirable that they should attempt to return to their old ways, with our heterogeneous population, with its various and conflicting views. We can neither trust the teachers to impart such instruction as is needed, nor can we force the children to receive it. But this may prove to be a blessing and not a misfortune, if the church and its Sunday-school can do the work for which they are best fitted, and to which they are called. It is a humiliating confession when Christian people and Christian ministers say that unless the public schools teach ethics, and the fundamentals of religion, the children will grow up ignorant of these things. If church and mission Sunday-schools were doing their duty, no such danger would threaten us. A comprehensive, systematic course of instruction, constant pressure to secure regularity of attendance, wise and firm superintendence, and frequent examinations would make such schools yield far more than can possibly be secured from the public schools by any amount of clamoring for religious teaching or services in their courses. If it be said that this is ideal and impracticable, the answer is that it is practicable because it is ideal; it recognizes the central idea of the Sunday-school, makes it the controlling force, and gives it freedom and breadth of movement. It is not claimed that every school can secure at once perfect teachers or perfect methods, but only that it can at once lay hold of a high ideal,

and steadily aim to reach it. The objection that to throw this emphasis upon instruction will make the Sunday-school a less effective means of grace is like saying that careful instruction in political economy will check the growth of good citizenship, or that vigorous teaching of the art of war will make a cadet less patriotic.

The purpose of this paper is not to answer, but to start, the question whether the present method of Sunday-school instruction meets the ideal of the Sunday-school and the real needs of its students as well as they should be met. With this method we are all familiar. It involves the choice of about fifty short selections from the Scripture to form the basis of a year's instruction. These are chosen ostensibly because they form good points of departure for direct appeals to the conscience and the will. They do not always lack unity of thought or progress in knowledge, but when these are present they are subordinate and incidental. These paragraphs are taken from their connections, printed with brief notes, and with pictures and hymns and tunes, and, in this form, put into the hands of teachers and pupils. Sunday-school teaching is thus made easy, but is it made fruitful in broad, sound knowledge, — the stuff of which character and devotion are made?

We are informed that the committee charged with making a selection of lessons for the next period of seven years recently held a meeting in New York, at which representatives of those who prepare and publish lesson-helps presented certain requests. Among these was the request that the "selections should not exceed twelve verses each." Nothing could better illustrate the limitations and tendencies of this system. It shows the inevitable dominance of lesson-helps and lesson-helpers. Doubtless such limits increase the ease and the profits of such writers and publishers. It would show inexcusable simplicity, however, to ask the question, Will such a limit increase the children's knowledge of the Scriptures? It would exclude the 51st, the 90th, and the 91st Psalms, the Parable of the Talents, and the Parable of the Prodigal Son. Indeed, it would probably make it necessary to reject or to break into fragments a large majority of the most significant and instructive sections of the Bible. But this only suggests and illustrates disadvantages which necessarily attach to this system. Are there advantages, which cannot be secured by any other system, which more than balance these?

THE NINTH YEAR OF THE "ANDOVER REVIEW."

THE Editors of the "Review" take occasion to call the attention of its friends, as it enters upon its ninth year, to the field which it now occupies, and to the circumstances which may be expected to enlarge its scope and influence. The more descriptive part of what is here said is for the use of our readers, who may wish to familiarize others with the character of the "Review."

Eight years ago, when the "Review" was established, there had been for some time a manifest, and to many minds a painful, separation between ordinary theological and religious opinion and the more serious thought which was beginning to find expression in the current literature. Theology had put away its dogmatic tone, but it was not speaking with persuasion; and religion, though busy in the work of the churches, was not applying itself to the problems which were vexing society. The "Review" began its work, as one among various forces which were designed to recover theological thought and religious energy to the peculiar service demanded by the time. From the beginning its aim was positive, though comprehensive and catholic. It was started under a clear and well-defined policy. And the method according to which the "Review" was organized was such as seemed best fitted to carry out the intention of its founders. Its pages were arranged not only for the publication of contributed or solicited articles, but also for continuous editorial discussion, and for departments which might illustrate the progress gained in the new development and application of Christianity. It was also published monthly, — a marked innovation upon the custom which had assigned theological and religious discussion to the form of the quarterly.

The controversy which arose over some of the editorial utterances of the "Review" was doubtless incidental to the conditions to which we have referred. It was not invited by the editors; it was not shunned by them. It was accepted as a liability of any honest and effective criticism of religious opinions and methods which had lost much of their original reality and force, a liability which was not to be evaded by reticence or by unworthy concession. And now that the controversy, so far as related to Andover Theological Seminary and the Congregational churches, is substantially over, we deem it a matter of congratulation on the part of all, that the future is open, without embarrassing compromises, for the broad, candid, and earnest application of the principles of theological and religious progress.

The "Andover Review" was not established as an institutional or denominational organ. The settlement, therefore, of local difficulties does not fulfill its end, but serves rather to give enlargement and freedom to its original design. That design was to make it a fit representative of catholic and progressive Christianity. We believe that it has maintained this position with increasing breadth. Its contributors are from among all who are in sympathy with the principles which it represents, without distinction of sectarian beliefs and politics. Its editorial outlook is toward matters of common interest and concern in the religious and social conditions of to-day.

While reviews and magazines are being multiplied, the "Andover Review" retains the field which it occupied at the beginning. As far as known to the editors, nothing has come in to supplant it, or to render it less necessary; and it duplicates the work of no other publication. It

is distinguished from purely critical journals, whether Biblical, historical, or philosophical, by its endeavor to interpret the results of the best scholarship alike to ministers and laymen. It is distinguished from the popular monthlies which treat incidentally of social and ethical questions, by its treatment of the same questions from the religious point of view.

The subject matter of the "Review" is embraced under four general departments:—

1. THEOLOGICAL.

Articles are in preparation upon the Person of Christ, in the light of recent discussions, upon some of the Social and Ethical Aspects of Redemption, upon the Recasting of Creeds, as in the revision of the Westminster Confession, and upon several subjects designed to illustrate the Method and Progress of Biblical Criticism, especially of the Old Testament.

2. RELIGIOUS.

In this department special attention will be given the coming year to Biblical instruction in the Sunday school, to the Liturgical Service of the Churches, to the enlargement and expansion of methods of Christian work, and to Missionary Problems. Mr. Starbuck will add to his graphic review of missionary operations a series of articles upon questions of vital concern in the Conduct of Missions.

3. SOCIOLOGICAL.

The "Review" has already given a large space to the treatment of social subjects, but it now has increased facilities for work in this department, through the increase of its staff of contributors, through the enlargement of social study in the Seminary, and through the establishment of the Andover House in Boston to promote the specific ends of Social Christianity. Mr. Robert A. Woods, the Head of the Andover House, will report upon the work of the House and of similar institutions.

4. EDUCATIONAL AND LITERARY.

The "Review" does not profess to be an educational or literary journal, but it finds occasion in every number to deal with some of the present moral aspects of education and literature. During the year articles have appeared from some of the foremost educators of the country, and literary articles have been supplemented by Professor Hardy's delightful papers on "Letters and Life."

We give, subject to slight changes, the

CONTENTS OF THE JANUARY NUMBER.

THE GREAT LOVE. A study in theology founded upon the First Epistle of John. By Rev. Christian Van Der Veen, D. D. Dr. Van Der Veen is the author of the "powerful article" (so characterized by the reviewers) upon "The Preaching of the Gospel," in the November number of the "Review." No writer has a more direct approach to the heart of theology.

THE MEDIATING FUNCTION OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTER TO-DAY. By the Rev. Dr. Philip S. Moxom. A paper of exceeding timeliness, showing the new responsibility of the minister in his relation to society.

CHANGES IN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION PROPOSED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE PRESIDENTS OF NEW ENGLAND. By Professor D. C. Wells. The changes proposed affect the mental training of the child from ten to fourteen. The article is of interest to all parents and teachers.

THE APPRENTICE SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. By Lieutenant A. V. Wadhams. Lieutenant Wadhams discusses the grave question of providing fit material for the new navy from the point of view of an officer intent upon the *morale* of his profession.

THE EXPANSION OF THE LOCAL CHURCH. By Rev. A. E. Dunning, D. D. A topic which is awakening great interest in England, and which is becoming of practical concern to the churches of this country. Dr. Dunning was among the first to agitate the subject, and to show its practicability.

MISSIONARY PROBLEMS IN THE TURKISH EMPIRE. By Rev. C. C. Starbuck. Mr. Starbuck writes from personal sources of knowledge of some of the most pressing problems in connection with the missions of the American churches in Turkey.

EDITORIALS.

The Place of the Teaching of Jesus in the Christian Revelation.

Social Christianity, illustrated by the "Andover House Association."

The Theological Restiveness of Ultra Conservatism.

The New Type of Prison Officials, with Special Reference to the late Colonel Gardner Tufts.

DEPARTMENT OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

The Rabbinical Education of Paul, by Rev. S. Weyler.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES. By Mr. Robert A. Woods.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The "Review" is now offered at \$2.00, one half the regular price, to all Theological Students, to all Home and Foreign Missionaries, and to all Christian Associations and Charitable Organizations for their Reading Rooms. We apprise our readers of this fact, in the hope that some may add to their own subscription one or more names to be placed upon the list of special rates.

THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE ANDOVER CASES.

We publish in this number of the "Review," from copy taken directly from the originals, and corrected in proof by the same standards, the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in the Andover cases, together with the dissenting opinion of CHIEF JUSTICE FIELD. The manuscript giving the judgment of the Court is in the handwriting of MR. JUSTICE KNOWLTON, and bears his name. It is understood to have been concurred in by JUSTICES ALLEN, HOLMES, MORTON, LATHROP, and BARKER.

We are keeping, it is believed, entirely within the bounds of truth and fact, when we affirm that no other result than that which has now been reached could command so general an approval. On the one hand, the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice will be claimed to show that the cases involved questions respecting which there might fairly be differences of judgment; on the other, the large number of his associates who concur in the decision gives to it a peculiar weight of authority and impression of finality. Probably some on each side of the controversy would have been glad if the court had given an opinion on other disputed points than those which are decided; but perhaps the general good will be more promoted by a result which concludes the contest, and at the same time leaves the participants free to indulge in many of their own cherished theories.¹ The visitors are vindicated

¹ It leaves, for instance, our friends of the *Congregationalist* free to remark: "Whether or not Professor Smyth has conformed in his teaching to the creed he has promised to maintain, is a question not touched upon [directly?] by the court. That question is still in abeyance in the public mind." It does not, however, leave them equally free to say: "This decision does not imply that Professor Smyth did not have a fair hearing before them [the visitors]. . . . He had in effect the same hearing which he would have had if the Trustees had appeared." These statements are defective. The court says: "On questions so difficult that the members of the board of visitors were divided in opinion at the close of the hearing, we cannot say in the present case that a different result might not have been reached if the trustees had been heard." That cannot be called, in any complete and impartial sense, "a fair hearing," or "the same hearing," which deliberately excluded a rightful presentation of the case which might have changed the result.

Nor is the *Congregationalist* any longer free to say: "The only decision affecting Professor Smyth on that matter [namely, conformity to the creed] is the moral one involved in the fact that the visitors sustained the complaint made by the prosecutors against him." The court affirms by necessary implication that the trustees are "primarily responsible for the affairs of the seminary," and subsequently, by explicit declaration, that "the power and duty to remove a professor who teaches doctrines contrary to the statutes is in the trustees." It also states that the visitors "were divided in opinion" in their finding. The "moral" decision, therefore, is this (adding to the statement of the court simply facts of public record or otherwise indisputable, particu-

as respects their legal existence, while their powers are more carefully defined and their methods of procedure strictly limited; the trustees are justified in their contention for their administrative rights, while, within determinate limits, a supervisory power is accredited to the other board; the professors, though still subject to the authority of the visitors, can no longer be directly and summarily dealt with, but only through processes which secure ample opportunities for a fair appreciation of their work and their claims. The seminary remains intact on its original basis, and at the same time is freer than ever before to adjust itself to its work. On the whole, we believe that all parties will find increasing satisfaction in the result, and that it marks, therefore, a new and important stage in the history of the seminary, and will not be without influence on other institutions of sacred learning and in the wide fields of religious thought and life.

The decision of the court respecting the legality of the board of visitors is so compact in its reasoning that we may fail to appreciate its argumentative force. If we rightly apprehend it, the question is approached with a degree of hesitation, and is met, however decisively, with an appreciation of its difficulty. It is essentially a federal question; though we suspect that any desire to treat it as such will be forestalled, both by the just weight of authority which belongs to the tribunal before which it has been argued and the unanimity of the bench, and also by the practically the fact that the trustees, under their official responsibility, pronounced a formal and recorded decision in the case of Professor Smyth [see *Andover Review*, vol. viii. pp. 72-80] : —

For Professor Smyth :

Pres. Julius H. Seelye, D. D., LL. D.
 Rev. Daniel T. Fiske, D. D.
 Edward Taylor, Esq.
 Rev. C. F. P. Bancroft, Ph. D.
 Thomas H. Russell, Esq.
 Hon. Joseph S. Ropes.
 Rev. Alexander McKenzie, D. D.
 Rev. William H. Willeox, D. D., LL. D.
 Hon. Robert R. Bishop.
 Pres. Franklin Carter, LL. D.
 Alpheus H. Hardy, Esq.
 Rev. James G. Vose, D. D.
 Hon. Horace Fairbanks.

Against Professor Smyth :

Rev. William T. Eastis, D. D.
 Hon. Joshua N. Marshall.
 Rev. J. W. Wellman, D. D.

We should also, perhaps, recall, as related to the "moral" result, the further fact, that the decision of the visitors, at the same meeting, upon precisely the same evidence, was four times reversed. The only question, therefore, would seem to be, supposing that attention be directed solely to the action of the visitors, whether four subsequent decisions by the same body, at the same meeting, on the same evidence, equal in "moral" weight one antecedent decision; unless, indeed, it be, what "moral" weight is there anyway in an absurdity?

tical removal — through the limitation put by the further action of the court upon the proceedings of the supervisory board — of the more serious exposures to collision. The court appears to hold that the theological institution in Phillips Academy is sufficiently cognate to the purpose of the original founders to come under the charter, yet that it is also sufficiently distinct to admit of a separate supervision of such professorships in it as may be founded under this stipulation. The influence of such a decision must be to emphasize, in administration, the relative independence of the seminary, as this has hitherto been maintained.

The remainder of the decision deals at length, and with marked clearness and cogency of reasoning, with the question of visitatorial procedure. For the first time in American law, this subject has been thoroughly and judicially expounded. That the visitors should have mistaken their course is not so much to be wondered at when looked at from this point of view. They seem to have treated it mainly as a matter of statutory prescription, and to have overlooked the relation of these statutes to earlier precedents and practices, and, above all, to the principles on which those usages rest. The more thorough examination of the subject conducted abroad by Judge Bishop and others, together with a more careful scrutiny of the Andover statutes and the history of legal training and practice in this country, put the proper construction of the prescribed duties of the board of visitors in a new light. When once discovered, it was easy to see that the historical requirements were clearly and wholly in the line of essential justice and of common sense. The simple principle that the agents of a corporation should not be liable to removal without notice to the corporation, that the responsible management of an institution should not unawares be deprived of those through whom it conducts its affairs, will commend itself to the general judgment. We cannot but express some modest surprise that a jurist so learned and accomplished as our admirable Chief Justice, and so capable of the ingenious and penetrating reasoning displayed in his dissenting opinion, should affirm that because Professor Smyth's case was ably and thoroughly argued, both *pro* and *contra*, by the respective counsel, the trustees had no claim to be heard, unless it was absolutely necessary, "as a strict matter of law," that they should be thus represented in order that the visitors might take jurisdiction. Waiving for the moment what the law requires, there is clearly an injustice, of which it would seem that the court must take cognizance, in holding the trustees to strict responsibility for the management of the seminary, and at the same time subjecting them to the entire removal of their agents without opportunity so much as to remonstrate. The mill must work, and the management be held accountable if it does not, yet at any moment, without notice, another power can withdraw every hand they have engaged to run it.

Happily, according to the researches of counsel and the opinion of the court, this is not the law of visitation. This proceeds upon the theory

that in all dealings with the agents the management is dealt with, and must be made a party in the proceedings.

We have heard of but one objection to the application of this principle in the Andover case. This is, that the powers and duties of the visitors are completely defined in the Founders' statutes (Associate and Additional), and that the court should have limited its examination to these instruments. To this there are two replies. These statutes were drawn up at a time when the English visitatorial system was more familiar than in later times. The colonial practice still survived. There was far less statute law than now, and more recurrence to the precedents and principles of English practice. The general scheme, and to a noticeable degree the diction, of the Andover statutes of visitation, are ultimately dependent upon these English traditions. Any just interpretation of them requires an acquaintance with, and use of, these traditions. The other reply rests upon the explicit testimony of the statutes. These recognize that the original union by which the seminary was formed was "upon visitatorial principles," and affirm that the perpetual union, which seven years later was effected, "shall be established upon visitatorial principles, to continue, as the sun and moon, forever." What these "visitatorial principles" were, can only be determined from the antecedent history of visitation. They are now definitely and fully set forth in the opinion of the court, and in the elaborate briefs of counsel, which thus become valuable additions to American legal literature.¹

It is with especial gratification that we meet in the opinion of the court that constant recurrence to fundamental justice which is a shining virtue of Massachusetts and other eminent judicial opinions, and which seems never more appropriate than in dealing with statutes which close their enumeration of the power and duties of the visitors they establish with these impressive words: "and in general to see that our true intentions, as expressed in these our statutes, be faithfully executed, always administering justice impartially, and exercising the functions of their office in the fear of God, according to the said statutes, the Constitution of this Seminary, and the Laws of the Land." The court again and again recalls and applies in its reasonings what must be recognized as just and right. Such a method of interpretation is a precedent and a

¹ At the final hearing before the full bench, October 14 and 15, 1890, printed briefs were submitted by Hon. Charles Theodore Russell, Professor Theodore W. Dwight, LL. D., and Professor Simeon E. Baldwin, of counsel for Professor Smyth; also a joint brief signed by Professor John C. Gray, George O. Shattuck, Esq., and Hon. Robert R. Bishop, counsel for the Trustees; also a joint brief signed by Hon. E. Rockwood Hoar, LL. D., Asa French, Esq., and Arthur H. Wellman, Esq., counsel for the Visitors. Arguments were made by Messrs. Russell, Dwight, Baldwin, Gray, Shattuck, Hoar, French, and Wellman, all of which, with the exception of Judge French's and Mr. Wellman's, were subsequently printed for the court when the case was re-submitted, September 1, 1891.

virtual instruction to every visitor, and to every trustee and professor, enjoining that in dealing with the seminary creed, which is a part of the statutes, he should recognize these same principles of fairness and righteousness. It is neither right nor just to construe a creed as one would a military order, or an emperor's rescript, or a note of hand; to deal with it as a disciplinary code rather than as a statement of principles; as a chapter of the Koran, and not as an interpretative transcript from the book of life. Such a method — the one we are controverting — is unjust to the progressive men who helped to form the seminary creed, and it is fatal to the bright hopes which they cherished of the work the seminary was to do through the coming generations. We are not suggesting or favoring any lax construction of its articles, any loose and immoral apprehension of its obligations. We are simply maintaining, as we have done from the beginning, the rights of all who construe it or subscribe to it, to the full scope and free and normal development of its living principles.

Enough has been said to show how unwarrantable is the statement that the Andover cases have been decided upon a mere legal technicality. A decision of the fundamental question, whether or not the visitatorial system established at Andover is legally valid, is no technical matter. The reaffirmation of the principles which determine the nature and methods of visitation, and the application of these principles to the statutory provisions at Andover, express authoritatively legal opinions and judgments which go beyond the form to the substance of the law. Nor, as we have seen, is the decision without suggestion as to the proper interpretation of the Andover creed. It should be remembered that the creed is a part of the statutes. How has the court construed these statutes? The editors of this "Review" could ask for no surer vindication, upon what are called the merits of the case, than to have the validity of their interpretation of the Andover creed determined by the principles and methods which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has followed in its interpretation of the statutes of which this creed is a part. *Ex uno disce omnes.*

The decision has been widely welcomed in the interest of Christian liberty. We accept the omen, not forgetting the words of one of the noblest of the early fathers of the church when he says that by this liberty "a man is more tested," nor losing sight of the apostle's word, of which he reminds us, that "as free we should use our freedom as bondservants of God."

OPINION OF THE COURT.

EGBERT C. SMYTH, Appellant, *v.* THE VISITORS OF THE THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE IN ANDOVER.

THE TRUSTEES OF PHILLIPS ACADEMY *v.* THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHERS.

KNOWLTON, J. The Theological Institution in Phillips Academy in Andover has a peculiar organization. In 1778 the academy was founded by Samuel Phillips and John Phillips, "for the purpose of instructing

youth, not only in English and Latin grammar, writing, arithmetic, and those sciences wherein they are commonly taught, but more especially to learn the great end and real business of living," and was placed under the control of a board of trustees. In 1780 this board was incorporated by an act of the State of Massachusetts Bay as "The Trustees of Phillips Academy," with a view to accomplish more successfully the purpose of the original founders. The act provides that these trustees "and their successors shall be the true and sole visitors, trustees, and governors of the said Phillips Academy in perpetual succession forever," and gives them power to make such laws, orders, and rules as to them seem best. They are authorized to receive gifts, and to hold them "on such terms and under such provisions and limitations as may be expressed in any deed or instrument of conveyance to them made," provided that the condition of the grant or donation does not require them "to act in any respect counter to the design of the first grantors or of any prior donation." Prov. St. 1780, c. 15; 5 Prov. Laws (State ed.), 1418. By the last will of John Phillips, proved and allowed on April 18, 1795, one third of the residue of his property was given to the trustees of Phillips Academy, "for the benefit more especially of charitable scholars;" and it was provided that those who expected to become clergymen might be assisted in the study of divinity by "some eminent Calvinistic minister of the gospel." By the Statute of 1807, c. 22, the corporation is authorized to hold, "for the purpose of the theological institution, and in furtherance of the designs of the pious founders and benefactors of said academy," real and personal estate, the income of which is "to be always applied to said objects, agreeably to the will of the donors, if consistent with the original design of the founders of the said academy." Afterwards, in the same year, Phoebe Phillips and others established and endowed "a public theological institution in Phillips Academy," on the condition that it "be accepted by the trustees aforesaid, and that it be forever conducted and governed by them and their successors in conformity to" certain "general principles and regulations" which they unitedly adopted as the constitution of the institution. Under this constitution and the preceding legislative act of the same year the theological institution became a department of Phillips Academy, the management and control of which were in the corporation, under regulations or statutes which were set out at length in the instrument creating it. The trustees were charged with the duty of conducting the institution in conformity with the wishes of the donors as expressed in these regulations, and elaborate provisions were made prescribing methods of management. At the same time, certain visitatorial powers were reserved to the founders in Article 32 of the instrument, which is as follows: "Notwithstanding this seminary is placed by this constitution under the immediate care and government of the Trustees of Phillips Academy, it is always to be understood, and it is hereby expressly declared, that every founder of a professorship, scholarship, or any other living whatever in this institution, will have the exclusive right of prescribing the regulations and statutes to be observed by the said trustees in conducting the concerns of the same, said regulations and statutes being always consistent with the principles and objects of this institution; and also the right, for the term of his life, of appointing in the original deed or grant such local visitor or visitors as he may think proper, and to endow him or them with all visitatorial powers and authorities necessary to secure and enforce due observance

and execution of his said regulations and statutes." This was the original foundation of the theological institution in Phillips Academy.

In 1808, Moses Brown and others gave a fund of forty thousand dollars to the corporation, the income of which is to be applied to the maintenance of two professors in the theological institution, and by certain elaborately drawn instruments they prescribed the terms on which the gifts were made, and the manner in which they were to be used. These gifts were accepted by the trustees, and the regulations for the management of them are entitled "The Statutes of the Associate Foundation in the Theological Institution in Andover," or "The Associate Statutes." In May, 1808, in pursuance of a power reserved by them in the original constitution, the original founders, Phœbe Phillips and others, by additional regulations, brought the original statutes into conformity with the associate statutes in all important particulars.

In general character the statutes of the associate foundation differ but little from the original statutes. They leave the whole management and control of the theological institution in the board of trustees, who constitute the corporation, and who hold the property, subject only to a visitatorial power in the board of visitors, whose general duty is to visit the corporation and see that the trustees manage the institution in conformity with the statutes, and if errors or abuses are discovered, to correct them; and subject also to a right and duty on the part of the visitors to take original supervisory action in two or three matters in the management, as in the examination of professors prior to their inauguration, and in the approving or negating the election of a professor by the trustees, and in appointing a standing committee to ascertain the qualifications of applicants for admission to the seminary.

The first part of Article 12 of the Associate Statutes is as follows: "That the trust aforesaid may be always executed agreeably to the true intent of this our foundation, and that we may effectually guard the same in all future time against all perversion, or the smallest avoidance of our true design as herein expressed; we, the aforesaid founders, do hereby constitute a board of visitors to be, as in our place and stead, the guardians, overseers, and protectors of this our foundation in manner as is expressed in the following provisions," etc. By Article 20 it is provided, that "the power and duties of the board of visitors thus constituted and organized shall be as follows, namely: to visit the foundation once in every year, and at other times when regularly called thereto; to inquire into the state of this our fund, and the management of this foundation, with respect both to professors and students; to determine, interpret, and explain the statutes of this foundation in all cases brought before them in their judicial capacity; to redress grievances, both with respect to professors and students; to hear appeals from decisions of the board of trustees, and to remedy upon complaint duly exhibited, in behalf of the said professors or students; to review and reverse any censure passed by said trustees upon any professor or student on this foundation; to declare void all rules and regulations made by the said trustees relative to this foundation which may be inconsistent with the original statutes thereof; to take care that the duties of every professor on this foundation be intelligibly and faithfully discharged, and to admonish or remove him either for misbehavior, heterodoxy, incapacity, or neglect of the duties of his office; to examine into the proficiency of the students, and to admonish, suspend, or deprive any student for negligence, contumacy,

or any heinous crime committed against the laws of God or the statutes of this foundation; and, in general, to see that our true intentions expressed in these our statutes be faithfully executed; always administering justice impartially, and exercising the functions of their office in the fear of God, according to the said statutes, the constitution of this seminary, and the laws of the land."

The powers and duties of the trustees in regard to the affairs of the corporation remain as prescribed by the original act of incorporation and the amendatory act, and by the original constitution of the theological institution, except so far as they are abridged or modified by the associate statutes.

We have before us two cases, — one the appeal of Egbert C. Smyth from the decree of the visitors of the theological institution in Andover, removing him from his office as Brown Professor of Ecclesiastical History, the other a bill in equity, brought by the Trustees of Phillips Academy against the Attorney-General and others, asking for the determination and instruction of the court in regard to the validity of the above-mentioned decree of the visitors.

It is contended by the appellant in the former case, and by the plaintiff in the latter case, that the provision for a board of visitors in the associate statutes is inconsistent with the act of incorporation of the Trustees of Phillips Academy, and invalid, and that the Statute of 1823, c. 250, incorporating the board of visitors, is unconstitutional and void.

We are of opinion that this contention is not well founded. While by the original act the trustees are constituted the sole visitors of the corporation, we think it is not inconsistent with the design of the founders of the academy that they should accept and manage, under the authority of a legislative act, donations for a different but kindred purpose, and should permit supervision of their conduct in this department by a board of visitors appointed by the donors. The validity of these statutes, and of the act incorporating the board of visitors, seems to have been settled by adjudications of this court. *Phillips Academy v. King*, 12 Mass. 546; *Murdock*, appellant, 7 Pick. 303; *Murdock v. Phillips Academy*, 12 Pick. 243.

At the hearing before the board of visitors on the complaint of J. W. Wellman and others against Egbert C. Smyth and others, professors in the theological seminary in Andover, the trustees applied for leave to appear and be heard as a party, and their application was rejected. Again in this court the trustees have asked to be heard in that suit; and they contend that the decree of the visitors should be set aside because it was made without hearing them, and they make a like contention and argument in their suit in equity. The question which they present involves an inquiry into the nature of visitatorial proceedings in general, and into the relations of the visitors to the managing board of the corporation under the statutes of the founders of the theological institution in Phillips Academy. The nature of the duties of visitors of educational or charitable institutions is to some extent implied in the name which these officers bear. They are to visit the corporation. They are to go where it is and see it and its representatives face to face. 2 Kent Com. (13th ed.) 302; *The King v. Bishop of Ely*, 1 Wm. Bl. 82; *Eden v. Foster*, 2 P. Wms. 325. Their visitation is for the purpose of inquiring into its condition and ascertaining whether it is properly or improperly managed, and whether in all respects it is conducted according to the principles of its foundation.

A visitation may be general or special; and under most English foundations, to protect the managing board from too frequent interference, a general visitation can only take place at the expiration of a certain interval, as one, three, five, or ten years. Following this theory the Andover statutes prescribe that general visitations shall be once in a year. Associate Statutes, Art. 20. A special visitation may be made at any time at the request of the governing body, or of any one claiming a grievance against it, and who, on that account, has a right to promote the office of the visitors. When special duties are imposed on the board of visitors by the founder, the visitors may perform them at such times as required by the statutes which confer their authority. Ordinarily at a special visitation the managing body of the institution is necessarily a formal party before the visitors, because the visitation proceeds on a formal application by the managers, or by some one asking relief against them. When questions arise at a general visitation, whatever the form of the proceedings, the real party whose conduct is on trial is the managing board by reason of whose act or omission the institution is alleged to have gone astray. Although the visitors are not a court, in the performance of some of their duties they act judicially, and they must be governed by the will of the founder as expressed in his statutes. It is a fundamental principle of all judicial proceedings that one whose conduct is called in question shall be heard in his defence, and this principle is as important in its application to the managing board of a charitable corporation whose acts or omissions are under investigation by a board of visitors as to an individual charged with the commission of a crime. *Murdock*, appellant, 7 Pick. 353; *Murdock v. Phillips Academy*, 12 Pick. 243. It is inconceivable that a board of visitors intending to be governed by principles of justice should for a moment think of refusing the managing body a hearing in a case where the proceedings are directly against it to set aside its action. But it should not be forgotten that almost everything which comes within the jurisdiction of a board of visitors acting under their general visitatorial power involves a trial of the managing board, and the jurisdiction of the visitors to deal with the agents or servants or individual beneficiaries of the institution is, ordinarily, merely incidental to their jurisdiction over the institution itself as represented by its managing officers. If by the statutes they are given express authority to act in a visitatorial capacity in regard to an agent their action may no less directly affect the institution itself. The form of the proceeding is immaterial; if the visitors are in fact seeking to revise the action of the managers by virtue of their supervisory power the managers should have an opportunity to be heard.

So far as the industry of counsel on either side has furnished us with authorities we have found nothing to indicate that visitations of educational or charitable institutions under foundations like that which we are considering have ever been had without notice to the managing board. In some relations, under the ecclesiastical system in England, the bishop has visitatorial power of a different kind, which we need not consider; but in institutions like the theological department of Phillips Academy the right of the managing board to be heard before the visitors in every proceeding affecting the corporation seems to have been always assumed. In *The King v. Bishop of Ely*, 2 T. R. 290, 336, 338, 345, in considering the question whether a visitor acted in his official capacity, Ashhurst, J. said: "But even supposing that this matter was within the Bishop's

visitatorial authority, yet he has not acted in the character of a visitor. The exercise of a visitor's power in a case like the present is a judicial act, and a judge cannot determine without hearing the parties concerned. So that, even if he had the right to exercise such a power, he should have done it in a formal manner and should at least have convened the parties interested to give them an opportunity of making a defence." Buller, J. used the following language: "His proceedings therefore have not even the show of a visitation; for, whenever that is intended, the parties whose conduct or whose rights are objected to should be heard, or at least convened before him, and have an opportunity of being heard; but, in the present instance this ceremony was totally omitted." Grose, J. said: "Neither did he himself conceive that he was acting as visitor; his acts show that he was not; and he acted without giving notice to the persons on whom he was judging." Not only is this language applicable in terms to the governing board of a corporation whose conduct is called in question, but the facts of that case show that the judges had reference to the governing board of Peterhouse College, to whose action the controversy related. In those cases under royal charters where the visitatorial power is in the King, visitatorial proceedings in regard to the management of the affairs of the corporation have been conducted before the Lord Chancellor, who has observed the same rules as to bringing before him all parties interested as in ordinary cases in chancery; and every reason that exists in any case why parties interested in a proceeding should have a right to be heard applies in cases like the present.

The counsel for the trustees asserted at the argument that it had been the universal practice in England for visitors to give notice and an opportunity of being heard to the managing body before making a decree affecting the management of an eleemosynary institution, and they offered to present affidavits showing the result of extended researches in regard to the subject; but, the respondents objecting, and the facts not being regularly before us as evidence, we have considered only such cases as appear in the reports or come within general historical knowledge. These indicate that the practice in England has been as contended by the trustees. *Phillips v. Bury*, 2 T. R. 346; *S. C.* 1 Ld. Raym. 5; *The King v. Bishop of Ely*, 2 T. R. 290; *Attorney General v. Dixie*, 13 Ves. 519; *Attorney General v. Earl of Clarendon*, 17 Ves. 491.

It cannot be maintained that the visitors are the corporation that holds the property and is primarily responsible for the affairs of the seminary, or that they sufficiently represent the corporation when sitting as judges. They are incorporated as a separate board, and are the judicial department of the theological institution. They are not supposed to be familiar with the details of the business of the principal corporation, nor to understand the practical effect of many things in its management. They do not represent the corporation as an administrative board, and at a hearing in regard to the management of its affairs they would ordinarily need the aid of facts, suggestions, and arguments, which the managers alone could properly present. Besides, while they act as judges they are not in a position to defend ardently and vigorously acts of the corporation which might be unjustly and vigorously attacked by others.

It is a mistake to treat a proceeding before the visitors to remove five of the professors of an institution like the Theological Seminary at Andover as a suit against the professors alone. If they are wrongly there,

the trustees should have removed them. The proceedings look to a change which would be likely to concern very deeply the interests of the seminary. Can it be said that the officers of the corporation who have been charged with its management in the past and who will be held responsible for its condition in the future are not interested in a matter so vitally affecting it? Shall the officers of the corporation in such a case be forced to keep silence and trust to professors whose opinions or teachings are criticised to protect the interests of the corporation? Suppose a learned professor with mistaken self respect should refuse to defend himself at all under accusations in regard to the character of his teachings, must the trustees run the risk of losing his valuable services for want of a proper presentation of the truth at the hearing before the visitors? Even if he is willing to do what he can in his own defence, shall the managing body of the corporation be refused an opportunity of presenting in their own way considerations which they deem vital to the welfare of their institution, which the professor might overlook, or present but feebly?

The statutes of the theological seminary at Andover are of a character to emphasize the considerations which are generally applicable in cases of this kind. Article 14 of the original statutes of the seminary is as follows: "Every professor in this institution shall be under the immediate inspection of the said trustees, and by them removed agreeably to the will of his founder for gross neglect of duty, scandalous immorality, mental incapacity, or any other just and sufficient cause." Under the associate statutes this article is left in full force. *Murdock*, appellant, 7 Pick. 353; *Murdock v. Phillips Academy*, 12 Pick. 243. Except in the appointment of a standing committee to ascertain the qualifications of applicants for the advantages of the seminary, and in the revision of the action of the trustees in the election of professors, the powers and duties of the board of visitors, as prescribed in Article 20 above quoted, are strictly visitatorial, and the provisions of the original act of incorporation of Phillips Academy, and of the additional act of 1807, and of the original constitution of the theological institution primarily put upon the trustees the entire responsibility for the management of the seminary. The associate statutes are engrafted upon the original statutes and the acts of the legislature, and are to be considered with them. The power and duty to remove a professor who teaches doctrines contrary to the statutes is in the trustees, and if they see fit not to remove one who is charged with teaching erroneously, the visitors may take original proceedings for that purpose. But we are of opinion that in such a case the statutes require that the trustees should be heard, if they desire, as they would be on an appeal from their own order of removal or refusal to remove in proceedings before themselves. In the present case the trustees were not heard before the visitors, although they made a formal application for leave to become a party at the trial. The action of the visitors in this particular is subject to revision by the justices of this court who are expressly given authority under Article 25 of the associate statutes to set aside any decree which they deem contrary to the statutes, or beyond the just limits of the power of the visitors. By Article 20 the visitors are required to administer justice impartially, and exercise the functions of their office "according to the said statutes, the constitution of this seminary, and the laws of the land." We do not intimate that the visitors, in determining questions before them, are to be held to all the rules and formalities which would be observed by a court

of law under similar circumstances, nor that their action can ordinarily be revised by a court in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the statutes, unless it so affects a charity that a court of equity ought to interfere under its jurisdiction for the protection of trusts. But where a principle essential to a fair and proper adjudication of the rights of parties is disregarded in deciding a question, their action under statutes like those before us is invalid.

On questions so difficult that the members of the board of visitors were divided in opinion at the close of the hearing, we cannot say in the present case that a different result might not have been reached if the trustees had been heard. In this view of the subject it becomes unnecessary to consider many of the questions which were argued before us. The mistake of the visitors seems to have been in failing to appreciate that their functions in this hearing were merely visitatorial, and that they could not, as an administrative body, represent the interests and present the cause of the corporation whose conduct was on trial before them.

For these reasons we are of opinion that the action of the visitors was not in accordance with the statutes which they were trying to maintain, and that their decree must be set aside.

From the views already expressed it follows that the record of the board of visitors should be amended as requested by the appellant in the eighth particular of his suggestions for the diminution of the record, so as to show the proceedings in reference to the application of the board of trustees to appear and be heard before the visitors.

The application of the trustees of Phillips Academy to be heard before us as a party in the original suit having been granted, their bill in equity is dismissed without prejudice.

Decrees accordingly.

DISSENTING OPINION.

FIELD, C. J. I dissent from that part of the opinion of the court which holds that the decree of the visitors should be set aside on the ground that the trustees as a corporation was not formally made a party to the proceedings before the visitors. It is immaterial whether or not the application of the trustees to be permitted to appear as a party be a part of the record of the visitors, because this record, even if the application of the trustees is excluded from it, does not show that the trustees as a corporation was cited to appear, or did appear, in the proceedings. It is abundantly evident that Professor Smyth, as well as the complainants, was represented before the visitors by learned counsel, and that both the prosecution and the defence were conducted with great thoroughness and ability, so that justice does not require that the decree be set aside on the ground that the trustees were not made a party unless, as a strict matter of law, it was indispensably necessary to make them a party in order that the visitors might acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter of the complaint. Professor Smyth in the complaint was charged with heterodoxy, if he was charged with anything that could justify the decree. It is conceded by the majority of the court that the visitors had original jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint. The visitors have been made a corporation by the Statute of January 17, 1824, and by that Statute are empowered to "do and perform all acts and things required of them by" the statutes of the founders, and this court by the same statute is authorized "to declare null and void any decree or sen-

tence of the visitors" which may be considered "contrary to the statutes of the founders and beyond the just limits of the power prescribed to them thereby." Both the visitors and this court are acting under this special Statute. The question is whether there is anything in the associate statutes of the founders of the theological institution subject to which Professor Smyth holds his office that in a proceeding of this kind absolutely requires the trustees to be made a party.

In considering this, it is necessary to inquire particularly into the power and duties of the visitors under the associate statutes. The Act of Massachusetts Bay, passed October 4, 1780, incorporating the trustees of Phillips Academy in Andover, made its trustees the sole visitors, and prescribed that the number of the trustees should not be more than thirteen nor less than seven; that the principal instructor for the time being should be one of them; that a major part should be laymen and respectable freeholders, and also that a major part should consist of men not inhabitants of the town where the seminary was situated. No religious or theological test of any kind was prescribed as a qualification for the office of trustee.

By the original statutes of Phœbe Phillips and others who were the founders of the Theological Institution in Phillips Academy, and by the associate statutes of Moses Brown, William Bartlet, and John Norris, and by the additional statutes of the original founders, an entirely new visitatorial scheme was established for the theological institution. The associate statutes, subject to which Professor Smyth holds his office of Brown Professor of Ecclesiastical History, prescribed a creed of theological doctrine to be taught in the institution, and required every professor on the associate foundation, "after a careful examination by the visitors with reference to his religious principles," to publicly make and subscribe a solemn declaration of his faith in Divine Revelation, and in the fundamental and distinguishing doctrines of the Gospel as expressed in the following creed," etc., and then follows a long and carefully prepared creed.

Art. III. is as follows: "The preceding Creed and Declaration shall be repeated by every professor on this foundation at the expiration of every successive period of five years; and no man shall be continued a professor on said foundation who shall not continue to approve himself a man of sound and orthodox principles in divinity agreeably to the aforesaid Creed." The professors are to be chosen by the trustees, and the "choice presented to the visitors for their approbation," and, "if this choice be negatived, another election shall in like manner be presented, and, *toties quoties*, till an election be made which shall be approved by the visitors." Art. VI.

Art. XII. is as follows: "That the trust aforesaid may be always executed, agreeably to the true intent of this our foundation, and that we may effectually guard the same in all future time against all perversion or the smallest avoidance of our true design, as herein expressed, We, the aforesaid founders, do hereby constitute a board of visitors to be as in our place and stead the guardians, overseers, and protectors of this our foundation. . . . And it is farther expressly provided, that the perpetual board of visitors first herein named shall consist of two clergymen and one layman, all of whom shall be men of distinguished talents and piety." By Art. XIII. it was provided that no person should be eligible as a visitor under the age of forty years; and, with the exception of the original visitors, a visitor ceases to hold his office when he completes his seventieth year.

The board was to meet every year at the aforesaid theological institution to execute the business of their appointment; and "also, upon emergencies, when called thereto, as hereinafter directed." Art. XIV.

By Art. XIX. it was provided that every visitor, before taking his seat at the board, should make and subscribe a declaration as follows: "Approving the statutes of the aforesaid theological institution, and those of the associate founders, I solemnly declare, in the presence of God and of this board, that I will faithfully exert my abilities to carry into execution the statutes of the said founders, and to promote the great object of the institution." Every visitor was also required to subscribe "the same theological creed which every professor elect is required to subscribe, and a declaration of his faith in the same creed shall be repeated by him at every successive period of five years."

The powers and duties of the board of visitors thus constituted and organized were set forth in Art. XX., which is as follows: "The power and duties of the board of visitors thus constituted and organized shall be as follows: namely, to visit the foundation once in every year, and at other times when regularly called thereto; to inquire into the state of this our fund, and the management of this foundation, with respect both to professors and students; to determine, interpret, and explain the statutes of this foundation in all cases brought before them in their judicial capacity; to redress grievances, both with respect to professors and students; to hear appeals from decisions of the Board of Trustees, and to remedy, upon complaint, duly exhibited in behalf of the said professors or students; to review and reverse any censure passed by said trustees upon any professor or student on this foundation; to declare void all rules and regulations made by the said trustees, relative to this foundation, which may be inconsistent with the original statutes thereof; to take care that the duties of every professor on this foundation be intelligibly and faithfully discharged, and to admonish or remove him either for misbehavior, heterodoxy, incapacity, or neglect of the duties of his office; to examine into the proficiency of the students, and to admonish, suspend, or deprive any student for negligence, contumacy, or any heinous crime committed against the laws of God or the statutes of this foundation; and, in general, to see that our true intentions, as expressed in these our statutes, be faithfully executed, always administering justice impartially, and exercising the functions of their office in the fear of God, according to the said statutes, the constitution of this seminary, and the laws of the land."

Art. XXII. is as follows: "The visitors shall appoint a standing committee to ascertain the qualifications of applicants for the advantages of this foundation. Those whom they approve may be recommended for admission as resident applicants on trial for two months; and, if at the expiration of this term the faculty approve them, they may be placed on the list of resident students until the next annual meeting of the visitors. And, if upon examination by the board of visitors, they be then approved, they shall be registered as associate students; but, if not approved by the visitors, after careful examination and the best information respecting them, they shall be dismissed from the foundation."

Art. XXVI. is as follows: "Every annual meeting of the board of visitors shall be introduced with prayer, after which these statutes shall be read by the president."

I do not propose to inquire how far Moses Brown and William Bart-

let and John Norris in establishing these statutes adopted the original statutes of the institution established by Phoebe Phillips and others, or to discuss any differences that may be suggested between the original statutes of the institution as modified by the additional statutes of the original founders and the associate statutes. I assume, without considering it, that the Brown Professor of Ecclesiastical History, holding his office, as I understand, under the associate statutes, might be removed from his office by the trustees, acting under Art. XIV. of the original statutes of the Theological Institution, "for gross neglect of duty, scandalous immorality, mental incapacity, or any other just and sufficient cause," and that heterodoxy is a just and sufficient cause. Still it is evident that for the protection of the institution from heterodoxy, Moses Brown and his associates relied mainly upon the board of visitors established by them. The board of visitors was to be composed ultimately of two clergymen and one layman of distinguished talents and piety, in the prime of life, who were to read or to listen to the reading of the statutes every year, and who, before taking their seat at the board, were required to declare their faith in the creed prescribed by these statutes, and to repeat this declaration of faith every five years. They were required to examine the persons proposed for professors, with reference to their religious principles, and to examine the applicants for admission as students, and to approve or reject both professors and students. The trustees might be of any or no theological belief, and a majority of them were laymen, and no qualifications were required which would enable them to decide intelligently theological questions. It is manifest that the associate founders were unwilling to trust the management of their foundation on its theological side to the trustees. Accordingly the associate statutes gave the visitors established by them not only general visitatorial powers, but special powers, both original and appellate, and it is in the exercise of one of these special powers that the visitors acted in the present case. No question arises in the case of the incidents of general visitatorial powers. So far as the visitors may attempt to supervise the action of the trustees, justice may require that the trustees should have notice and an opportunity to be heard. So far as the visitors are authorized "to hear appeals from decisions of the board of trustees," that board would be in a sense a party, as their record must be produced before the visitors, and as the trustees might be both prosecutors and judges the trustees might have an interest in maintaining the propriety of their action.

But the duty imposed on the visitors "to take care that the duties of every professor on this foundation be intelligibly and faithfully discharged, and to admonish or remove him, either for misbehavior, heterodoxy, incapacity, or neglect of the duties of his office," as well as the duty "to examine into the proficiency of the students, and to admonish, suspend, or deprive any student for negligence, contumacy, or any heinous crime committed against the laws of God or the statutes of this foundation," is a duty directed, not against the trustees, but against the professors and students, and is one that must be performed by the visitors according to their own judgment, and not according to the judgment of the trustees. It is an original and not a supervisory power. The complaint of Mr. Wellman and others against Professor Smyth, filed with the visitors, charged no maladministration on the part of the trustees; and the conduct of the trustees was not in any way involved in the proceedings. It was the primary duty of the visitors to entertain the complaint,

if it seemed to them to require consideration. The visitors, in determining the matter of the complaint, could render no decree or judgment against the trustees. If the trustees, as a corporation, had been cited to appear, it is difficult to see in what capacity they would appear in the proceedings, whether for the prosecution or the defense, or sometimes for one and sometimes for the other. If Professor Smyth had pleaded that he was guilty of the charges and specifications, could the trustees have pleaded that he was not guilty, or if he had pleaded that he was not guilty, could the trustees have pleaded that he was guilty? If the trustees are made a party, what is or can be the issue tried between them and the complainants, or between them and Professor Smyth? Suppose Professor Smyth had admitted in evidence before the visitors that the doctrines he taught were inconsistent with the creed established by the associate founders in manner and form as charged, and had consented to be removed from his office, or had asked leave to resign his office, could the trustees have prevented it?

There may be some embarrassment on the part of the trustees after Professor Smyth has been removed from his office by the visitors pending an appeal to this court. If the court affirms the decree, then he is removed from office, as of the date of the original decree; if the complaint is dismissed, or the decree is set aside, then he remains a professor until he dies, resigns, or is removed from office by a new decree. But the status of Professor Smyth pending an appeal to this court, if he is removed by the visitors, is a consequence of the action of the visitors, and the embarrassment of the trustees arises not during the trial but only after the visitors have determined the matter of the complaint. The relation of the trustees to Professor Smyth after the decree of the visitors pending an appeal to this court is the same whether they have been admitted as a party to the original proceedings or not. The same embarrassment arises in every case where one body has the power of removing an officer and another body pays him his salary while he holds his office. It arises in most ecclesiastical trials. It arises in the case of the policemen of Boston appointed by the Board of Police, who may be removed by the board, but while they continue in office are paid by the city. It was never supposed that the city of Boston was a necessary party to a complaint against a policeman before the Board of Police. *Ham v. Boston Board of Police*, 142 Mass. 90. In the present case the visitors are a special tribunal under the statutes of the associate founders and the statute of the Commonwealth for the trial of Professor Smyth on such a complaint as was made in this case. Professor Smyth had the rights of any incumbent of an office who can only be removed for cause, and these are defined in *Murdock v. Phillips Academy*, 12 Pick. 262. The trustees were not the prosecutors. The members of the board of trustees, if they knew anything of the matters charged, could be called as witnesses, but the conduct of the trustees as a corporation was not involved in the proceedings, and the opinion of this corporation on the truth or falseness of the charges, or whether, if true, they constituted heterodoxy, could not lawfully be used to influence the judgment of the visitors. Even if the opinion of the trustees could be received for this purpose, it would be competent as evidence, but the competency of such evidence would not require that the trustees be made a party. If this were an appeal from the decision of the trustees the opinion of that board could not lawfully be used to affect the judgment of the visitors. This is the general rule

in proceedings on appeal. "They [the visitors] are bound on appeal to hear the cause *de novo*, and without any regard to antecedent steps except that the cause shall be regularly brought before them." Murdock, appellant, 7 Pick. 328, 329. *A fortiori* when the visitors take original jurisdiction of a complaint the opinion of the trustees who never heard the complaint cannot be admissible.

I think that the appeal cannot be disposed of on the ground that the trustees were not made a party to the proceedings before the visitors, and that it should be considered on its merits so far as under the Statute of January 17, 1824, this court is authorized to consider it. I refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits for the reason, among others, that there may be a new trial of the complaint by the visitors, and another appeal to this court.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

RESPONSE TO THE CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESBYTERY OF NEW YORK.¹

MR. MODERATOR, MINISTERS, AND ELDERS OF THE PRESBYTERY OF
NEW YORK :

Gentlemen,—I appear before you at this time in compliance with your citation, dated October 6, 1891, to plead to the charges and specifications placed in my hands by the Presbytery at that time. It is now my right, in accordance with the Book of Discipline, § 22, to "file objections," if I have any, "to the regularity of the organization, or to the jurisdiction of the judicatory, or to the sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form and in legal effect, or any other substantial objection affecting the order or regularity of the proceeding."

I have no objections to the regularity of the organization, nor to the jurisdiction of the Presbytery of New York; but it is necessary, both in my own interest and in the interest of the order and regularity of the judicial proceedings in the Presbytery, to file objections "to the sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form" and "in legal effect."

It is far from my purpose to raise any objections of a technical kind, that may in any way directly or indirectly delay the probation of charges that are approved as sufficient, and specifications that are recognized as relevant by the Presbytery of New York; but the order of the Book of Discipline requires that the question of *relevancy* should first be decided

¹ The Prosecuting Committee, appointed by the Presbytery of New York in the case of Dr. Briggs, have formulated and taken an appeal from the Presbytery to the next General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The document numbers 24 pages. We should suppose that the first question for the Assembly to determine must be, whether such a committee has any standing before the Assembly; whether its occupation was not gone when the Presbytery which appointed it dismissed the case.

A complaint of the decision of the Presbytery, addressed to the Synod of New York, has also been filed. It is signed by Rev. Dr. William G. T. Shedd, Dr. R. R. Booth, and thirty-two others. It is sufficient for the purposes of this *Review* thus to refer to these documents. As we have published the charges against Dr. Briggs, we give also his response. — ED.

by the Presbytery, before I can with propriety plead "guilty," or "not guilty."

No one has made this clearer than the Rev. E. R. Craven, D. D., the chairman of the Committee of the General Assembly which prepared the present Book of Discipline, when he said:—

"In every trial there are two issues: first, do the facts alleged, if true, sustain the charge? and, second, are the facts true? Ordinarily the affirmative of the former question is tacitly assumed by both the judicatory and the accused person. In such cases the only question to be decided is the latter. Cases sometimes arise, however, especially where there is an individual prosecutor, in which both issues must be tried. They cannot, with propriety, be tried together, for one is a question of law, the other of evidence. In such cases it is manifest wisdom to dispose of the legal question first, and thus possibly prevent a useless waste of time and laceration of feeling."—*Presbyterian Review*, 1884, p. 57.

Adopting the course thus recommended, I do hereby file the following objections to the "sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form and in legal effect."

I.—THE PREAMBLE.

The report of the Committee of the Presbytery, which presented the charges and specifications, contains, in its preamble, intimation of charges and specifications which they have not proposed for trial, as follows:—

"It has been decided by your committee that it is neither necessary nor advisable to embrace in the list of charges all the doctrinal errors contained in the inaugural address, and, while its teachings respecting miracles, the original condition of man, the nature of sin, race redemption, and Dr. Briggs' scheme of Biblical theology in general, are not in harmony with the Scriptures, and are calculated to weaken confidence in the Word of God, and to encourage presumption on the clemency and long-suffering of God, yet in order that we may avoid an undue extension of the trial, and the confusion of thought that might follow an attempt to compass all the errors contained in said address, we have deemed it best to confine attention to a few departures from the teachings of the Scriptures which are fundamental to the entire discussion.

"Furthermore, your committee is not unmindful of the fact that the erroneous and ill-advised utterances of Dr. Briggs in the inaugural address have seriously disturbed the peace of the Church and led to a situation full of difficulty and complication, and have produced such wide-spread uneasiness and agitation throughout the Church as to cause sixty-three Presbyteries to overture the General Assembly with reference to the same, yet for the reasons above given we have determined not to include this grave offense against the peace of the Church in the list of formal charges" (pp. 4, 5).

I object (1) that, if there are any such errors contained in my inaugural address as the committee allege in the preamble of their report, it was their duty to formulate them into charges and specifications sufficient in form and in legal effect.

(2) That, if the committee did not think best so to do, they should have refrained from alleging doctrinal errors which they did not propose to submit to probation, and which so alleged without opportunity of refutation, seem calculated to exert prejudice against me in the minds of the members of the court.

(3) That, if, as the report alleges, "The erroneous and ill-advised utterances of Dr. Briggs in the inaugural address have seriously disturbed the peace of the Church," and these constitute a "grave offense against the peace of the Church," it was the duty of the committee to

formulate this grave offense into a charge and specification "sufficient in form and legal effect."

(4) That, if it was not deemed best so to do, the report should have refrained from alleging a grave offense which was not proposed for probation, the allegation of which might prejudice the decision of those charges and specifications offered for probation.

The Presbytery are requested therefore to blot out from the report these insinuations and imputations of doctrinal errors and grave offense.

If I have in any way, directly or indirectly, been the occasion of disturbing the peace of the Church, I deeply regret it. If I have given pain and anxiety to my brethren in the ministry, or to the people of Christ's Church, by any utterances in the inaugural address, I am very sorry. But after repeated re-readings of the address, away from the seat of strife, in a foreign land, I cannot honestly say that there are any such doctrinal errors in the address as the report alleges, and at the bar of my own conscience, I feel no guilt as regards the grave offense of disturbing the peace and harmony of the Church.

II. — THE CHARGES.

I object "to the sufficiency of the *Charges*" "in form" and "legal effect."

The rules relating to the charge in the Book of Discipline are: (1) "The charge shall set forth the alleged offense" (§ 15); (2) "A charge shall not allege more than one offense" (§ 16); (3) The supreme court of the Church has decided that "All charges for heresy should be as definite as possible. The article or articles of faith impugned should be specified, and the words supposed to be heretical shown to be in repugnance to these articles; whether the reference is made directly to the Scripture as a standard of orthodoxy; or to the Confession of Faith, which our Church holds to be a summary of the doctrines of Scripture" (*Craighead case*, 1824, p. 121).

I object that the charges comply with none of the rules.

(1) *Charge I. sets forth "more than one offense."* It alleges "teaching doctrines which conflict irreconcilably with, and are contrary to, the cardinal doctrine taught in Holy Scripture," etc. (p. 5). If, as alleged, more than one doctrine, or a plurality of doctrines is taught, which conflict with a cardinal doctrine of Holy Scripture, there is a plurality of offenses, and each one of these cardinal offenses should be mentioned in a separate charge. Charge I. alleges several offenses.

(2) *Charge I. does not "set forth the alleged offense."* It alleges "teaching doctrines that conflict with, and are contrary to," etc. It does not specify what doctrine it is, or what doctrines these are which "conflict irreconcilably with, and are contrary to the cardinal doctrine." I object (a), that I cannot with propriety plead guilty, or not guilty, to teaching such doctrines, until I know what doctrines the prosecution have in mind.

(b) So far as I know, I have never taught any doctrines that conflict with a cardinal doctrine of Holy Scripture. It is conceivable that I may be mistaken, and that I might acknowledge my error if such doctrines were specified by the prosecution.

(c) The charge is so general, vague, and obscure, that it comprehends any and every reason that any one may find for judging that my teachings are contrary to my ordination vow, "that the Scriptures of the Old

and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice ;" and thus enables the jurors to vote for my condemnation, one for one reason, another for a second reason, a third for a third reason, and so on, securing by the cumulation of votes for different reasons, a judgment that might not be secured if each reason were proved and voted upon by itself.

(3) *The charges are not specific and definite.* It is true that Charge I. is so far definite that it alleges the cardinal doctrine that "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice ;" as that doctrine with which the doctrines taught by me are in irreconcilable conflict. This implies that I have taught some other doctrine than said cardinal doctrine. But the charge is not definite and specific in that it fails to define what doctrine it is that has been taught in the inaugural address, that is in conflict with, and contrary to, said cardinal doctrine.

Charge II. is less general and vague than Charge I., for whereas Charge I. alleges "teaching doctrines" which conflict, Charge II. alleges teaching "a doctrine of the character, state, and sanctification of believers after death" (p. 39), which irreconcilably conflicts; but this latter is yet indefinite and vague, for the reason that it does not define what precise doctrine it is, out of the many different doctrines taught by theologians in this department of Eschatology, that is an offense. Charge II., while more specific than Charge I. in its reference to the doctrine taught by Dr. Briggs, is more seriously at fault than Charge I., in that Charge I. mentions the cardinal doctrine that "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice," but Charge II. does not state what doctrine it is of Holy Scripture or of the Westminster Confession with which the doctrine taught by me is in irreconcilable conflict.

I would be entirely willing to waive this objection to the charges as not specific and definite, if this were the only ground of objection, and there were any proper way of reaching definite charges by means of the specifications. But this way out of the difficulty is closed against us, as we shall soon see. I am obliged in the interest of the orderly procedure, in a case which is subject to the review of a superior and of a supreme court, to file this objection, even if it be less serious than others which are now to be adduced.

(4) I object to the sufficiency of Charge II. for the reason that *it does not indicate that the offense charged is against an essential and necessary article of the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession.* The Law of the Church as expressed in the Book of Discipline (§ 4) is, that —

"Nothing shall therefore be the object of judicial process which cannot be proved to be contrary to the Holy Scriptures, or to the regulations and practice of the Church founded thereon; nor anything which does not involve those evils which Discipline is intended to prevent."

In the second term of subscription, the offense in doctrine is limited as follows: "Do you sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this Church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" This subscription is in accordance with the Adopting Act of 1729, which requires subscription to the Confession of Faith and Catechisms, "as being in all the essential and necessary articles, good forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine." The supreme

court of the Church, in the Harker case, 1765, defined this when it said, "essential to the system of doctrine contained in our Westminster Confession of Faith considered as a system." These regulations and decisions of the supreme court of the Presbyterian Church require that nothing shall be considered as an offense which is not contrary to an essential and necessary article of the Westminster Confession. Charge I. complies with this rule in so far as it represents that the doctrine "that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice" is a "cardinal doctrine;" but Charge II. does not comply with the regulations of the Church, in that it neglects to state what cardinal doctrine, or what essential and necessary article, of the Westminster Confession of Faith it is with which the doctrine taught by me is in irreconcilable conflict.

When these two charges are placed side by side, the one exposes the faults of the other, and convicts it of insufficiency. Each is insufficient where the other is sufficient. Each is indefinite and vague where the other is more definite and specific. Charge I. defines the doctrine to which the doctrines taught by me are opposed; Charge II. makes no statement at all of any doctrine of Scripture or Confession to which my teachings are opposed. Charge II. mentions a general group of doctrines taught by me which, it is claimed, is opposed to Scripture and Confession, but Charge I. makes no definition whatever of any doctrines taught by me. Charge II. alleges one offense where Charge I. alleges several. Charge I. states cardinal doctrine where Charge II. makes no mention of cardinal doctrine. *Charges I. and II. are therefore "insufficient in form and legal effect."*

III. — THE SPECIFICATIONS.

I object to the specifications as irrelevant, "insufficient in form and legal effect," for the following reasons: The law of the specification as given in the Book of Discipline is that "*The specifications shall set forth the facts relied upon to sustain the charge*" (§ 15). The committee seem to have an indefinite conception of the nature of specifications. Some of the specifications seem to have been framed as if they were particular items of the general charge, others as if they were particulars of a still more general charge than that alleged in Charge I., and still others as if they were striving to state the facts required by the rule for specifications in our Book of Discipline. Lest there should be obscurity in the minds of the members of the court on this point, I shall take the liberty of citing from that ancient and classic authority in Presbyterian law, upon which the American Book of Discipline is based. The libel in the Scottish law-books comprehends the three parts, — charge, specification, and judgment.

"A Libel is a Law Syllogism, consisting of the Proposition or Relevancy, which is founded upon the Laws of God, or some Ecclesiastical Constitution agreeable thereto, as, whosoever is absent from publick Divine Service on the Lord's Day, ought to be censured. The second Part consists of the subsumption, or probation, which condescends on matter of Fact, viz., But such a person did, upon such or such a Lord's Day, absent unnecessarily from the publick Worship of God. The third Part consists of the Conclusion or Sentence, which contains a Desire, that the Profaner of the Lord's Day, according to the Laws and Customs mentioned in the first part, may be censured." — Walter Stewart, "*Collections and Observations concerning the Worship, Discipline, and Government of the Church of Scotland,*" p. 268.

The standard authority of the Church of Scotland at the present time gives a similar statement:—

"The body of the libel consists of three parts, which together should form a regular syllogism. The first, or major proposition, sets forth the criminality of the *species facti* charged, and alleges the guilt of the accused; the second, or minor, narrates the *facts* of the particular offense; and the third, or conclusion, deduces the justice of punishing the individual offender. The major proposition should be made as brief and comprehensive as possible. By overloading it, the logical structure of the libel is impaired, and unnecessary discussions on relevancy may be raised. It may be difficult to bring ecclesiastical offenses under specific and generic names to the degree in which crimes are classified in the civil law. But it is desirable that this should be done as far as possible, in order to facilitate certainty and simplicity in the criminal proceedings of church courts. Where it is necessary to use circumlocution in expressing the general nature of the offense, nothing should be introduced which is not essential to the criminal charge. Where it is impossible, from the nature of the offense, to bring it under any generic denomination, the particular offense intended to be charged should be set forth in the major as criminal in the abstract, and should be repeated in the minor as having been committed by the accused at a certain time and place."—Cook, "*Styles of Writs, Forms of Procedure, and Practice of the Church Courts of Scotland*," pp. 119, 120.

The standard authority of the Free Church of Scotland is in entire accord therewith:—

"It has been established by long practice that no judicial process of a serious kind can be carried out against a minister or a probationer, except by the use of what is called a libel. This is a document consisting of three parts, and forming a regular syllogism. The first, or major proposition, sets forth the nature of the alleged offense, declares its contrariety to the Word of God and the laws of the Church, and indicates the kind of consequences which ought to follow from it. The second, or minor proposition, asserts the guilt of the minister or probationer, and specifies what are believed to be the leading facts involving guilt, and particularizing time, place, and other circumstances. This proposition may contain one or more counts of indictment. The third part connects the major and minor proposition together, and thereby deduces the conclusion that the minister or probationer, as guilty of the offense mentioned in the major proposition, ought to be subjected to the consequences, provided the minor proposition be made good, either by confession or by adequate evidence. It is of great importance that care be taken to frame the libel with accuracy, so as to avoid grounds for questioning its relevancy."—Sir Henry Moncrieff, "*The Practice of the Free Church of Scotland*," pp. 118, 119.

The rules of our Book of Discipline are based upon the practice of the Church of Scotland. The charge corresponds with the first or major proposition of the Libel; the specification corresponds with the second or minor proposition; the sentence, with the third part or conclusion. It is essential that the minor premise, or the specification, should be relevant to the major proposition or the charge; otherwise a person may be judged innocent or guilty of a charge with which the facts adduced have no manner of relevancy, and sentenced to unrighteous suffering. A Presbytery cannot with propriety enter upon the probation of a specification, which specification if proven would not substantiate the charge.

With these preliminary statements I shall now proceed to file objections to the relevancy of the specifications.

1. — SPECIFICATION OF CHARGE II.

I prefer to dispose first of the single specification under Charge II.

Charge II. is followed by a heading entitled "Specification;" but in fact there is no specification whatever, but only the general statement: "In the said inaugural address, delivered, published, extensively circulated, and republished as above described, Dr. Briggs teaches as follows" (p. 39). Turning to Charge I. we find that a statement corresponding to this is made as the second section of the charge. Place the two side by side and this will be evident at a glance:—

CHARGE I.

"These hurtful errors, striking at the vitals of religion, and contrary to the regulations and practice of the Presbyterian Church, were promulgated in an inaugural address which Dr. Briggs delivered at the Union Theological Seminary in the city of New York, Jan. 20, 1891, on the occasion of his induction into the Edward Robinson Chair of Biblical Theology, which address has, with Dr. Briggs' approval, been published and extensively circulated, and republished in a second edition with a preface and an appendix" (p. 5).

SPECIFICATION OF CHARGE II.

"In the said inaugural address, delivered, published, extensively circulated, and republished as above described, Dr. Briggs teaches as follows" (p. 39).

If such a statement belong to Charge I., it does not belong to the specification of Charge II. The only item under the so-called specification of Charge II., not corresponding to the statement made under Charge I., is the clause "teaches as follows." In all the previous specifications, the references under the head of "Inaugural Address" are a part of the proof; here, however, they are made a part of the specification. This so-called specification is a heaping up of extracts from six pages of the inaugural address. I shall admit the correctness of the citations. If therefore no objection is taken to their propriety in the specification, or to their relevancy under the charge, the defendant is placed in a disadvantageous position as to the verdict which might be rendered against him on the basis of any one of the thirty-four verses of Scripture cited, or any clause of the several extracts from the Standards.

There is nothing whatever in the specification. It makes no specification of fact such as could be admitted or refuted. If the specification had pointed to any erroneous doctrine taught by me; if I had been charged with teaching second probation or any probation whatever after death,—I might have pointed to several of my writings in which this doctrine is distinctly disclaimed. If the doctrine of purgatory had been imputed, or regeneration after death, or transition after death from the state of the condemned to the state of the justified, any and all of these could have been disproved from my writings. If any insinuation had been made that I had taught that the redeemed enter the middle state guilty and sinful, this could easily have been refuted. But no such doctrines are specified. No specific doctrine whatever is mentioned. There is nothing in the specification that can be tested by the defendant or challenged by the Presbytery.

There was no sufficient reason for indefiniteness and vagueness here. The doctrine taught in the inaugural address is Progressive Sanctification after Death. The doctrine alleged to be in conflict with it is Immediate Sanctification at Death.

It will be necessary for the prosecution to prove (1) that immediate sanctification at death is taught in the Scriptures and the Standards, (2) that it is a cardinal doctrine of the Westminster Confession, and (3) that the two doctrines are in irreconcilable conflict with each other, ere the Presbytery would be justified in condemning me. The charge and so-called specification do not make a definite issue. They put the charge and specification in such an obscure, indefinite, and empty form that the defendant is placed at a serious disadvantage in pleading, and the jurors may be justified in voting to condemn, on any plausible ground that might seem to them sufficient, to prove that in any way the views of the future state expressed in the inaugural address are in conflict with their own views of Scripture and Confession.

2. — SPECIFICATION 5 OF CHARGE I.

Having disposed of the specification under Charge II., we may now devote our attention to the seven specifications of Charge I. These specifications may be grouped under several heads. I shall review them in an order more suitable to my purpose than that of the Report itself. I shall first consider specification 5; (2) specifications 1 and 6; (3) specifications 2, 3, and 4; (4) specification 7. The first of the specifications to which I object is specification 5: —

"Dr. Briggs makes statements in regard to the Holy Scriptures which cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of the true and full inspiration of those Scriptures as the Word of God written" (p. 21).

It should now be kept distinctly in mind that a specification must confine itself to setting forth "*the facts relied upon to sustain the charge*" (§ 15). This specification does not state a fact, but makes an allegation which is of the nature of a charge. This will be clear if one compares this specification with Charges I. and II. Charge I. alleges that Dr. Briggs teaches "doctrines which conflict." Charge II. alleges that he teaches a doctrine of "the character, state, and sanctification of believers after death" which conflicts. This specification alleges that he makes "statements in regard to the Holy Scriptures which cannot be reconciled with," etc. Specification 5 is therefore really as much of a charge as Charges I. and II., and has been improperly brought under Charge I. But even as a charge, it is no true charge. It shares the faults of the other charges. This specification uses the plural "*statements*," involving several offenses, and it does not specify what one of the many statements in regard to the Holy Scripture it is designed to allege against me. Placing this specification side by side with Charge I., it is clear that this specification cannot be brought under Charge I., for it deals with a different doctrine. In Charge I. the cardinal doctrine, that "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice," the first of the terms of subscription, is the doctrine against which it is alleged that I offend. In this specification it is "the true and full inspiration of Holy Scripture as the Word of God written" (Confession of Faith, I. 2) against which offense is alleged. These two doctrines may be brought under the general doctrine of Holy Scripture; but the one of these doctrines cannot be brought under the other. Therefore Specification 5 is irrelevant to Charge I.

When one compares this report, with its charges and specifications, with the report of the committee to examine the inaugural address, made to the Presbytery in May last, and recognizes that the chairman and

the majority of both committees are the same, one is entitled to ask how they can reconcile the two reports. What they then, in their first report, made their second charge, and what they then argued as their principal offense, namely, the offense against the inerrancy of the original autographs of Scripture, has been reduced in this report to a specification under Charge I. Here was a definite, a distinct difference of doctrine as to the inerrancy of Scripture, which should have been formulated into a definite charge with specifications, so that the Presbytery might vote on the question: Does the Westminster Confession teach the inerrancy of the original autographs of Holy Scripture? The charge definitely made and argued last May has been depreciated in this report. It has been subordinated as a specification under a different charge. It has been couched in such general, obscure, and indefinite language as not to enable a juror to vote on the direct question of the inerrancy of the original autographs of Scripture; but to induce him to vote the defendant guilty of a general charge for any private reasons of objection against his doctrine of the Bible, whatever they may be.

Specification 5 ought to be restored to its original position as given in the report of the committee to the Presbytery in May last, and made as a distinct charge, and it should state definitely the issue involved, namely, what doctrine is it that Dr. Briggs teaches that is irreconcilable with the cardinal doctrine of Scripture and Confession, as to the inerrancy of Holy Scripture? Is it a cardinal doctrine of Holy Scripture and Confession that the original autographs of Holy Scripture were inerrant? If such a definite charge had been made, then the Presbytery could test it intelligently and decide with precision.

3. — SPECIFICATIONS 1 AND 6 OF CHARGE I.

Specifications 1 and 6 may be considered together, because they are the only two of the eight specifications that can be recognized as in any sense true and real, as alleging actual facts.

A. — SPECIFICATION 1.

It is a fact that the Inaugural Address declares that there are "historically three great fountains of divine authority, the Bible, the Church, and the Reason," but Specification 1 is illegal in form, in that it introduces an inference from the fact, by the prosecution, that cannot be recognized as either true or valid. It is not altogether clear what the prosecution mean to infer by their word "*sufficient*." If they mean to intimate that the inaugural teaches that the Church and the Reason are each alike *sufficient* fountains of divine authority, and that the Church and the Reason are no less "*sufficient* to give that knowledge of God and His will which is necessary unto salvation" than Holy Scripture, they infer what they have no right to infer from anything taught in the inaugural address. It is unlawful to put in specifications inferences of the prosecution not recognized by the accused, as if they were facts. For the supreme court of the Church has decided in the Craighead case —

"That a man cannot fairly be convicted of heresy for using expressions that may be so interpreted as to involve heretical doctrines, if they may also admit of a more favorable construction: because no one can tell in what sense an ambiguous expression is used but the speaker or writer, and he has a right to explain himself; and in such cases candor requires that a court should favor the accused by putting on his words the more favorable rather than the less favorable construction. Another principle is, that no man can rightly be

convicted of heresy by inference or implication; that is, we must not charge an accused person with holding those consequences which may legitimately flow from his assertions. Many men are grossly inconsistent with themselves; and while it is right, in argument, to overthrow false opinions by tracing them in their connections and consequences, it is not right to charge any man with an opinion which he disavows." — Craighead case: "*Minutes of the General Assembly*," 1824, p. 122.

Specification 1, though it cites a fact, when the invalid inference is stricken out, is yet irrelevant; for the specification does not attempt to prove that this fact conflicts with, and is contrary to, the cardinal doctrine that "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice." Furthermore there is no process of logic by which this specification can be brought under the charge. The Reason is a "great fountain of divine authority," and yet not an "infallible rule of faith and practice." The Church is a "great fountain of divine authority," and yet not an "infallible rule of faith and practice." The Bible is a "great fountain of divine authority," and it is also "the only infallible rule of faith and practice." Here are two different statements of truths that may be embraced under a more general truth, but to affirm the one, as to Bible, Church, and Reason, that "they are great fountains of divine authority," is not to deny that the Bible is the only one of which the other can be affirmed, namely, that "the Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice." When God speaks through the conscience, He speaks with divine authority and the conscience becomes a "great fountain of divine authority;" but the conscience does not become thereby an "infallible rule of faith and practice." God speaks through the holy sacrament with divine authority, and the sacrament of the Church is then a "great fountain of divine authority;" but it does not become thereby an "infallible rule of faith and practice." I affirm that I have never anywhere, or at any time, made any statements or taught any doctrines that in the slightest degree impair what I ever have regarded as a cardinal doctrine, that "the Holy Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

B. — SPECIFICATION 6.

It is a fact that I have taught and most firmly hold and assert "that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch, and that Isaiah is not the author of half of the book which bears his name," but Specification 6 does not indicate by what method of reasoning it brings this fact under the charge. It is irrelevant to the charge. If it be a valid offense, it ought to have been made the ground of a distinct charge, and it ought to have been definitely stated what relation Moses has to the Pentateuch, and Isaiah to the book that bears his name, according to the Confession, and in what way the doctrine stated by me conflicts therewith, or with Holy Scripture. Though Moses be not the author of the Pentateuch, yet Mosaic history, Mosaic institutions, and Mosaic legislation lie at the base of all the original documents; and the name of Moses pervades the Pentateuch as a sweet fragrance, and binds the whole together with irresistible attraction into an organism of divine law. Even though Moses be not the author of the Pentateuch, yet the Pentateuch may be, as I firmly believe, one of the books of Holy Scripture, having divine authority; and the Pentateuch is, as I have always taught, one of those Holy Scriptures which together constitute "the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

Even though "Isaiah did not write half the book which bears his name," yet I firmly believe that holy prophets no less inspired than Isaiah wrote the greater half of the book under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, so that the book with different authors is as truly one of the books of Holy Scripture, "the only infallible rule of faith and practice," as if it were written by Isaiah alone. The fact adduced has no manner of relevancy to the charge.

If the Presbytery should decide that these two specifications, 1 and 6, are relevant to the charge, they would put the accused in a false position and expose him to the peril of a condemnation on the basis of these two facts, which, after rejecting the illegal inferences, he must acknowledge as true, but which he claims need explanation, and are entirely irrelevant to the charge. If it be true that the Scriptures and the Confession teach that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, and that Isaiah wrote the whole of the book which bears his name, these doctrines should be affirmed in charges, as cardinal doctrines, and the doctrines taught by me should be placed in such a sufficient legal form that the jurors might vote clearly and directly upon them.

It is conceivable that I might be proven guilty of teaching doctrines contrary to the Confession in regard to both Moses and Isaiah, and the Church and the Reason as fountains of divine authority; but it would still remain unproven that such teaching was opposed to cardinal doctrines of the Confession. Much less would it be proven that these doctrines conflict irreconcilably with the cardinal doctrine "that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

4. — SPECIFICATIONS 2, 3, AND 4 OF CHARGE I.

Specifications 2, 3, and 4 may be grouped, because the same objections hold against the three. They all make false inferences and erroneous statements. It might be proper in a civil court to challenge the proof of these so-called specifications of fact; but in the ecclesiastical court, according to the decision already quoted in the Craighead case, inferences and statements, not recognized by the accused, are not valid in the specification of offenses. And it is certainly in the interest of truth and the saving of valuable time, that exception should at once be taken to them as irrelevant and invalid specifications under the charge.

A. — SPECIFICATIONS 2 AND 3.

Specification 2 alleges that: —

"Dr. Briggs affirms that, in the case of some, the Holy Scriptures are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and His will which is necessary unto salvation, even though they strive never so hard; and that such persons, setting aside the supreme authority of the word of God, can obtain that saving knowledge of Him through the Church" (p. 12).

Specification 3 alleges that: —

"Dr. Briggs affirms that some (such as James Martineau, who denies the doctrines of the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection of the Body, the Personality of the Holy Ghost, who rejects the miracles of the Bible and denies the truth of the Gospel narratives, as well as most of the theology of the Epistles), to whom the Holy Scripture is not sufficient to give that knowledge of God, and of His will which is necessary unto salva-

tion, may turn from the Supreme Authority of the Word of God and find that knowledge of Him through the Reason" (p. 15).

These specifications, as they now stand, are false to truth and to fact. No such facts are recorded in the inaugural address. If, however, they were true, and it could be proven, or I should admit, that I had affirmed that the Scriptures "are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and His will which is necessary unto salvation," even then, in that case, the specifications would be irrelevant to the charge, for the charge alleges that I teach doctrines that irreconcilably conflict with the cardinal doctrine that "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice." But these specifications allege a very different thing which cannot be brought under that cardinal doctrine, namely, that I affirm that the Scriptures "are not sufficient to give that knowledge necessary unto salvation." The *sufficiency* of Holy Scripture is one doctrine, its *infallibility* another doctrine, both true and cardinal doctrines of Holy Scripture, taught in the Westminster Confession, but two different and distinct doctrines; therefore Specifications 2 and 3 are irrelevant to the charge.

Furthermore, the specifications are invalid statements of fact. For nowhere in the inaugural address, or in any other writing that I have written, is it affirmed that "in the case of some, the Holy Scriptures are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and His will which is necessary unto salvation;" or "that some, to whom the Holy Scripture is not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and of His will which is necessary to salvation, may turn from the supreme authority of the Word of God and find that knowledge of Him through the Reason." I have nowhere denied the *sufficiency* of Holy Scripture. I have ever maintained that it is sufficient for the salvation of all men, of the entire human race. The redemption through Jesus Christ is sufficient for all mankind. The Word of God, which proclaims that redemption to the world in the gospel of the grace of God, is sufficient for every one and for all the world. But the *sufficiency* of Holy Scripture is one thing, the *efficacy* of Holy Scripture is another and a different thing. The Westminster Confession teaches that "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof (of Holy Scripture), is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts" (I. 5). The Larger Catechism represents that "the Spirit of God maketh the reading, but especially the preaching of the Word, an effectual means of enlightening, convincing, and humbling sinners, of driving them out of themselves, and drawing them unto Christ; of conforming them to His image and subduing them to His will; of strengthening them against temptations and corruptions; of building them up in grace and establishing their hearts in holiness and comfort through faith unto salvation" (Quest. 155).

It is evidently the teaching of our Standards that, while the Scriptures are always sufficient, they are not always efficacious to those who use them; but that their efficacy depends upon the presence and power of the Divine Spirit in and with the Scriptures in their use. I affirm both the sufficiency of the Scriptures and the efficacy of the Scriptures, when the Divine Spirit accompanies them; but this is not to affirm that in fact all those who use the Scriptures as a means of approach to God do certainly find them efficient in their case, or that the Divine Spirit may not work effectually upon some men through the Church or the Reason.

It is a cardinal doctrine of the Reformed churches that the Divine Spirit is free, and is not confined to any one or to all of the means of grace. This doctrine finds expression in the words of our Confession, where it says, "the Spirit who worketh when, and where, and how He pleaseth" (x. 3).

I have taken the late Cardinal Newman at his word when he said he did not find certainty of divine authority through the Scriptures, but did find certainty of divine authority through the Church. I have not affirmed that Newman found divine certainty without the influence of the Divine Spirit. I have said that he found divine certainty by the influence of the Divine Spirit working through Church and Sacrament, which are means of grace as truly as Holy Scripture. I have not said that Newman did not find the Scripture *sufficient* for salvation. Newman himself never said that. He was always devout in his use of Holy Scripture. I said that he did not find *certitude* in the Scripture, but that in his case the Divine Spirit gave that certitude through the Church as a means of grace.

So also in the case of Martineau. I did not affirm that he found the Scriptures *insufficient* for his salvation, but I said that he did not gain *certitude* either through the Scriptures or the Church; but that he claimed, and I recognized his claim, that he found this *certitude*, this *certainty* of divine authority, in the forms of the Reason, using Reason as Martineau and others have commonly used it, to include the conscience and the religious feeling.

It is in accordance with the common doctrine of the Reformed churches, that the Spirit of God may work directly upon the souls of men apart from Bible, Church, and Sacraments. It is a simple question of fact whether the Divine Spirit has not thus worked in the case of Martineau. My judgment may be challenged for accepting Martineau's own testimony in the case; but my orthodoxy cannot be rightly challenged for recognizing Martineau as a case, in the category of cases, recognized by our Confession, of those directly approached by the Spirit, "who worketh when, and where, and how He pleaseth" (x. 3).

The prosecution, with great impropriety, have inserted in the midst of the fact so wrongly imputed to me a summary, of their own composition, setting forth the errors of James Martineau. This is entirely irrelevant. I have nowhere affirmed the orthodoxy of Martineau. On the other hand I selected him, as a man entirely outside of the camps of evangelicals and churchmen, to represent a class of men who found divine certainty in the Reason. The prosecution may find it difficult to believe that God would grant certitude to such a man through the Reason; but they do not, and they cannot, adduce from Holy Scripture or Confession any evidence to show that God may not in fact grant even such a man as Martineau access to Him through the Reason, notwithstanding all his heterodoxy and neglect of the means of grace so necessary to other men. If I have in the cases of Newman and Martineau taught erroneous doctrine when I have said that the one found divine certainty in the Church and the other in the Reason, when they could not find that certainty in the Bible, then that passage of the Confession should be pointed out which teaches as a cardinal doctrine, that the Bible is the *only means* used by the Divine Spirit to grant *certitude, certainty, assurance of grace, and salvation*; and that cardinal doctrine, if it can be found, should be put in a definite charge, sufficient in form and legal effect.

B. — SPECIFICATION 4.

Specification 4 also comes under this head. It alleges that "Dr. Briggs asserts that the temperaments and environments of men determine which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue" (p. 19). This is also a false inference. The specification makes two important changes in my doctrinal statement. The inaugural says, "Men are influenced by their temperaments and environments." The specification changes the passive construction into the active, and thus gives greater emphasis to the verb. It also uses, instead of the verb "influence," the much stronger word "determine." I have never said that "the temperaments and environments of men *determine* which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue." I used the expression "*influenced by*," advisedly, because it does not exclude other influences than these. Indeed, it would be quite proper, so far as the language of the inaugural is concerned, if one should say, "Men are influenced by their temperaments and environments which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue," but it is the Spirit of God who alone determines in which of the three ways they shall find the divine certainty of which they are in quest.

But even if the specification were recognized as valid and true, it is irrelevant to the charge; for it does not appear from anything in the specification itself that the doctrine of the specification is irreconcilably in conflict with the cardinal doctrine that "the Holy Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

5. — SPECIFICATION 7 OF CHARGE I.

Specification 7 alleges that "Dr. Briggs teaches that predictive prophecy has been reversed by history, and that much of it has not and never can be fulfilled" (p. 35).

This specification makes invalid inferences and statements. The specification makes two serious changes in the sentence of the inaugural: (1) It omits altogether the qualifying clause, "if we insist upon the fulfillment of the details of the predictive prophecy of the Old Testament;" and (2) it substitutes for "many of these predictions" the careful statement of the inaugural address, "predictive prophecy," a general and comprehensive term, and thus alleges that the address teaches that "predictive prophecy has been reversed by history." This allegation is entirely without justification from anything taught in the inaugural address, or any other of my writings. I have ever taught that the predictive prophecy of the Old Testament has been fulfilled in history, or will yet be fulfilled in history. I have shown, in my book entitled "Messianic Prophecy," that "the details of predictive prophecy" belong to the symbolical and typical form, and were never designed to be fulfilled. I have shown the historical development of the entire series of Messianic predictions of the Old Testament, and pointed them towards the fulfillment in Jesus Christ our Saviour; and have urged that either they have been fulfilled at His first advent, are being fulfilled in His reign over His Church, or will be fulfilled at His second advent.

The specifications have now been tested as to their relevancy, and have all of them been found to be irrelevant. Only two of the eight specifications state what can be recognized as facts, and these two can, by no

process of logic, be brought under the charge. If there be sufficiency in form or in legal effect in any of the charges and specifications, the respondent fails to see it. He submits his objections to the Presbytery, in the confidence that they will receive due consideration, and that the Presbytery will take proper action with regard to them.

IV. — THE PROOFS.

The objections might be brought to an end here, were it not important to save the valuable time of the Presbytery by calling attention to all such faults in connection with the charges and specifications as should be considered.

The citations from the inaugural, from Holy Scripture, and from the Westminster Confession and Catechisms have the same fault that we have found in the charges and specifications. There is a general vagueness and indefiniteness.

I object (1) that it is not in good form *to cite any more from the inaugural address than is sufficient for the proof of the specification under which the citation is made.* Under the so-called specification of Charge II. a long citation is made from three pages of the inaugural address, and a second long citation from two pages of the appendix of said address is given to prove one knows not what fact or charge.

(2) *The citations from the Westminster Confession are commonly of entire sections.* The committee do not claim in their charges and specifications that there is offense against the entire doctrine of these sections of the Confession. They should be required therefore to limit their citations to those portions of these sections that furnish probable proof of the position taken by them; *e. g.*, what possible advantage is gained from the citation of all the books of the Bible under two different specifications, when no charge or specification is made that the inaugural address questions any one of these books as a part of the canon of Holy Scripture?

(3) *Large numbers of texts of Holy Scripture are cited, which are entirely without value for the proof of the specification.* It is unnecessary to pick and choose, to set this forth. The passages mentioned first under the specifications will suffice.

(a) *Many texts are torn from their context.* The first passage cited is from Isa. viii. 20. The passage is incorrectly translated in the version used, for the meaning "there is no light in them" is not justified. The Revised Version renders "surely there is no morning for them," they have no hope of a dawn of brighter things. The proper rendering is:—

"When they say unto you, Seek unto the necromancers and unto wizards;
Ye chirpers and mutterers, should not a people seek unto their God?
On behalf of the living will they seek unto the dead for instruction and for testimony?
If they say not so, who have no dawn," etc.

This passage has no reference whatever to the Holy Scriptures, or any part of them, but is a rebuke of the people of Judah for seeking necromancers and wizards rather than the living God.

(b) Many of the texts are given *in King James's Version* in cases where the Revised Version gives the correct rendering. In the first citation under Specification 2, the passage from 2 Tim. iii. 16 is given from King James's Version; but the Revised Version renders, "Every Scrip-

ture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." There is a difference of doctrine here which is of some importance in the use of this text for purposes of probation.

(c) *The Confession requires that in all controversies of religion the Church is finally to appeal to the original Old Testament in Hebrew and the New Testament in Greek* (§ 18). No such appeal is made in the specifications, even in cases where the version quoted is regarded by scholars as incorrect or wrong. The first citation under Specification 3 is from King James' Version of John v. 10. If one turn to the original Greek he will see that the translation, "believeth not the record that God gave of his Son," does not correspond with the original, which reads "witness" and that "witness" is not Holy Scripture either in whole or in part. The passage is therefore irrelevant to the specification to prove that I am in error in teaching that Martineau found divine certainty through the Reason. In that this passage of Holy Scripture teaches a direct and immediate testimony of God within a man without the mediation of Holy Scripture, it rather favors the doctrine that God may, as in the time of the apostles, pursue this direct method with some men in our days.

(d) *A considerable portion of the verses cited have no manner of relevancy to the specifications under which they are given.* If they are suffered to remain, they will tend to needlessly prolong the trial. The three citations from Holy Scripture under Specification 4, from 1 Peter i. 23, 25; Gal. i. 8, 9; John xiv. 6, have no manner of relevancy to the question whether men are or are not "influenced by their temperaments and environments which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue." That men are "begotten again" through "the Word of God," "which liveth and abideth;" that an "anathema" is pronounced upon any one who preaches "any other gospel" than the gospel preached by Paul; that Jesus is "the way, the truth, and the life," and "no one cometh unto the Father but through Him,"—are doctrines taught in these passages and are firmly believed by me, but they have nothing whatever to do with the doctrine that I have taught as to the temperaments and the environments of men.

(e) *I question the propriety of quoting any passages of Scripture in proof of doctrines not defined by the Westminster Confession and Catechisms.* The constitution of the Church defines the limits of obligation, and also protects the minister as regards all matters of belief and practice, outside of those limits. If this Presbytery had the right to decide the interpretation of passages of Scripture for the official determination of doctrines undefined in our constitution, there would be a new way of amending and enlarging the Confession of Faith by judicial decisions in heresy trials, which would contravene and subvert the constitutional method of revision, which has been made an essential part of our constitution. A study of these proof-texts exposes the fault of the specifications in this particular.

The passages from Holy Scripture cited under Specification 6 of Charge I. are sixty in number to prove that Moses wrote the Pentateuch and Isaiah wrote the whole of the book that bears his name. Only seven of these are used in the Confession of Faith, and five of these seven under other chapters of the Confession than the first, leaving only two of the sixty that were used by the Westminster divines to prove their doctrine

of the Bible; and these two not to prove, as the specification would use them, the authorship of the Pentateuch and the Book of Isaiah; but Luke xxiv. 27, 28, to prove that the Apocrypha are no part of the canon of Scripture; and John v. 46, in the original edition of the Confession, to prove that the Church is to appeal to the original texts of Scripture; but this last is very properly omitted from the American edition of proof-texts. This fact that the Westminster divines use only two of the sixty texts cited by the prosecution for proof of their doctrine of Scripture, and not one of them to prove that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch, or that Isaiah was the author of the book that bears his name, ought to convince you that, even if they are relevant to the specification, they are not relevant to any doctrine taught by the Confession.

Indeed, it would be quite easy to show that not a single one of the large number of Scripture passages adduced has any force for the proof of the specifications under which they are adduced.

All of these passages of Holy Scripture are accepted and firmly believed by me, when properly rendered according to the original Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek, which "being immediately inspired by God, and by His singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, and therefore authentic," "in all controversies of religion the Church is finally to appeal unto them."

These objections to the sufficiency of the charges and specifications placed in my hand by order of the Presbytery of New York, as to their form and legal effect, are hereby respectfully submitted to the Presbytery for their judgment.

C. A. Briggs.

NOVEMBER 4, 1891.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.¹ (Concluded.)

PART III. PAUPERISM.

TOPIC V. THE SPHERE OF PRIVATE CHARITY.

1. THE PRINCIPLE OF PRIVATE CHARITY.

It is voluntary, direct, and personal in its origin, and may be in its action. When, however, it is said to be voluntary, the obligation to charity is not to be overlooked, an obligation which increases with the increase of wealth.

For full discussion of the doctrine of the surplus of wealth, see review of Mr. Carnegie's "Gospel of Wealth" in June, 1891, number of *Andover Review*.

See, also, *North American Review*, June and December, 1889. (Carnegie.)

¹ For statement of the different parts of the course, and their relation to each other, see *Andover Review*, January, 1889, or February, 1891.

- Nineteenth Century, November, 1890. (Gladstone.)
 Nineteenth Century, December, 1890. (Manning, Adler, Hughes.)
 Nineteenth Century, March, 1891. (Carnegie.)
 North American Review, April, 1891. (Gibbons.)
 North American Review, May, 1891. (Potter, Phelps, Chamberlain.)

2. THE FIELD OF PRIVATE CHARITY.

It is intermediary as respects the State. It seldom represents mere almsgiving. It deals with the secondary stages of charity. It operates upon communities through endowments for relieving the public want, or for developing the public resources. It establishes schools, libraries, hospitals, churches. Its legitimate work is in those charities which enrich a community without pauperizing individuals. Or if applied to individuals, it seeks out those who would escape the public eye.

3. THE METHOD OF PRIVATE CHARITY.

There are three types : —

- (1.) Scientific charity — the study at first hand of social problems.
- (2.) Sympathetic charity — the art of personal helpfulness.
- (3.) Reformatory charity — the work of rescue.

TOPIC VI. THE DEFENSES OR BARRIERS AGAINST POVERTY.

1. INHERITANCE.

The majority of individuals in prosperous countries find when they arrive at conscious existence that something intervenes between them and poverty. That something is the accumulation in their behalf of those who have gone before them. If properly used, they never know the meaning of poverty.

2. CHARACTER.

Character is the poor man's capital. It may assert itself in the use of the stronger physical powers which lead to industry and thrift, or in the use of moral qualities which insure self-restraint and self-denial. Self-denial reaching to the point of self-preservation is a virtue of which the rich have no knowledge.

3. ORGANIZATION FOR WORK.

Here we touch the struggle for existence among the unemployed or irregularly employed. The work of John Burns in connection with the dockers' strike is illustrative of the method of defense against poverty in organized labor.

4. PROVISION FOR THE FUTURE.

The creation of a small surplus. This effected through banks for small savings, or through voluntary insurance, or through compulsory insurance coupled with state aid, as in Germany.

5. COÖPERATION.

The surplus now rises to the dignity of capital, and may take the active form of coöperative stores, loan associations, or productive agencies.

For authorities under this Topic, see —

- Charles Booth, *Life and Labor of the People*.
 Riis, *How the Other Half Lives*.

Woods, English Social Movements.
 Holyoake, History of Coöperation.
 Dexter, Coöperative Savings and Loan Association.
 Gilman, Profit Sharing.
 Dawson, Bismarck and State Socialism; chapter on Insurance of Working Classes.

TOPIC VII. THE SOCIALISTIC THEORY OF RELIEF.

Two questions are to be asked in estimating the value of this proposed relief.

First, What is the Socialistic Theory?

Second, How far is it applicable to Pauperism?

1. WHAT IS THE SOCIALISTIC THEORY?

Socialism means the substitution of public for private *capital*. Emphasize capital and the distinction comes out between socialism and communism. Communism substitutes public for private property. Socialism cares nothing for property which is not capital.

Nationalism is the political term for socialism, Collectivism the economic term.

Socialism means in detail —

- (1.) The abolition of private capital.
- (2.) The consequent abolition of the competitive system.
- (3.) The removal of all the accessories of the present business system, — money, rents, credit, exchange, wages.
- (4.) The centralization of power for productive uses.
- (5.) The regulation of all labor.
- (6.) The distribution of all products.

Socialism does not necessarily mean —

- (1.) That all private property would be abolished.
- (2.) That all would receive equally or according to want.
- (3.) That all private activities would be eliminated.
- (4.) That social and religious life would be revolutionized.
- (5.) That individuality would be destroyed.

Socialism would effect a tremendous change in everything that goes to make economic life. It would completely and absolutely revolutionize production and distribution, and would regulate consumption.

2. HOW FAR IS THE SOCIALISTIC THEORY APPLICABLE TO PAUPERISM?

Pauperism represents four classes: —

- (1.) The vicious and criminal.
- (2.) The idle and lazy.
- (3.) The dependent — the sick and disabled.
- (4.) The unemployed.

1. What effect would it have upon vicious pauperism? It would do away presumably with crimes against property. It would not do away with the social vices — drunkenness and licentiousness.

2. What effect would it have upon lazy pauperism? That would depend upon the amount of motive or of violence applied to the individual. It does not follow that a man who is active in crime will expend his energy in work. There is an excitement about crime which is lacking in work. Mr. Bellamy's analogy of the army does not hold entirely. The

army does not include all. It appeals to motives drawn from danger rather than from comfort. And it is based altogether upon force.

3. What effect would it have upon dependent pauperism — the sick and disabled? These are now cared for by the State. Possibly socialism would introduce a better relation between the able and the unable in society. Possibly it would take away the refining and sympathetic influences which attend individual charity.

4. What would be its effect upon enforced pauperism — upon the unemployed? Here socialism, to the degree in which it is practicable, would effect a complete remedy. The unemployed class would be eliminated from the ranks of pauperism. Certainly the line of poverty would be raised. The only question at this point would be whether this result was gained at too great a cost to society.

For authorities on this Topic, see —

The works of the greater socialists, Lasalle, Marx, Proudhon.

Schäffle, The Quintessence of Socialism.

Laveleye, The Socialism of To-day.

Rae, Contemporary Socialism.

Dawson, Bismarck and State Socialism.

The Fabian Essays.

Webb, Socialism in England.

Bellamy, Looking Backward.

Guntton, Wealth and Progress.

Andover Review, April, 1891 (Miss Dawes).

Andover Review, July, 1891 (Miss Scudder).

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

A FEW weeks ago a remarkably significant event took place in Wales. Bala Theological College was opened with fitting ceremony, and began its work of educating men for the Welsh ministry; it is the first theological college in Britain which has been opened, not only on a distinct unsectarian basis, but by men of different denominations of the Christian church uniting as founders and supporters. It is to give a theological training for the ministry to all who seek admission, and who show that they possess an adequate education in arts. Mansfield College at Oxford is free to all students, and has numbered Methodists, Episcopalians, Baptists, and Presbyterians under its roof, but its founders, its governing body and teaching staff (with very few exceptions) are Congregationalist. The Bala Theological College is professedly as well as actually unsectarian. * It is all the more striking that this should be the case in a Welsh institution, as it has been the fashion to point at Wales as the hot-bed of all the evils of sectarian difference.

Probably this event would have produced more comment if Wales were not at the present time excited with the beginning of what may prove the final struggle for the disestablishment of the Episcopal Church in Wales. This struggle is becoming so keen and strong, in view of the approval, by the leaders as well as by the rank and file of the Liberal party, of the policy of disestablishment. Undoubtedly the great mass of Welshmen desire it, and the Welsh members of Parliament are in the

proportion of twelve to one in its favor. On the other side, the Established Church defends the present state of things on the ground that the Established Church is growing in Wales in numbers and popular favor, and also on the second and more reasonable ground, that from a legal and constitutional point of view, the Established Church in England and Wales is one, and that the cry for Welsh disestablishment is a covert attack on the position of the English Church.

With the view of making a great demonstration against the disestablishment movement, the annual Church Congress was lately held at Rhyl, and a number of bishops, headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, delivered philippics on the subject. Disestablishment for Wales is, however, already decided upon in the popular mind, and cannot long be without Parliamentary enactment. The "*London Punch*," whose satire is so often full of reason and truth, and whose political verdict is never given till a perfectly safe judgment is possible, has decided against the bishops in the following lines on the Rhyl Congress:—

If Cleric Congresses could only care
A little less for the mere Church and Steeple,
Parochial pomp and power in lion's share,
And have one aim — to purify the People,
They need not shrink from Disestablishment
Or any other secular enormity;
Unselfish love of Man destroys Dissent
True Charity provokes no Nonconformity.

Wales has long claimed to be a nationality, though many have denied it that honor. There have just appeared the first two numbers of a new monthly magazine, which is started to give further expression to the national voice. The "*Welsh Review*" is starting with good promise, and is likely to succeed; it aims at being popular rather than authoritative, and seems more likely to follow than to form popular opinion.

Two recent magazine articles have lately appeared which have been much commented upon, and which show that the democratic voice will make itself heard even in ecclesiastical matters.

Mr. W. H. Horwill has been writing "*On Theological Degrees for Nonconformists*;" he points out the anomaly by which the theological degrees of Oxford and Cambridge (B. D. and D. D.) can only be conferred on clergymen of the Church of England, while the London University cannot confer any theological degrees. This is a real hardship and discouragement to theological scholarship among Nonconformists, and certainly cannot long be maintained. The exception to the rule, that only the clergy can be bachelors or doctors of divinity in Oxford and Cambridge, is in favor of Roman Catholics or clergy of the Greek Church, — a curious commentary on the pretended Protestantism of the Church of England.

In a more audacious and radical spirit Mr. H. W. Massingham has written an article, which Mr. Gladstone even went out of his way to criticise. Calling attention to the fact that the deaneries and canonries attached to the English cathedrals, and certain other offices, which are only open to Anglican clergymen, are supposed to offer peculiar facilities to men of scholarship and learning, Mr. Massingham points out how very much weaker intellectually is the relative strength of the Anglican clergy to-day than it was a couple of generations ago. The universities used to belong almost exclusively to the clergy, when all the heads of colleges and

almost all the professors, tutors, and fellows of colleges were clergymen. Gradually this has changed, and the clergy, though perhaps numbering as many learned and able scholars as ever, are relatively much weaker intellectually than the laity; from this undoubtedly true contention the conclusion is drawn that the deaneries and canonries should be given to laymen of learning who would make the use of them for which they have long been held famous. This proposal cannot be made a practical question until the disestablishment of the church is actually within reach; but when that is the case, it becomes an interesting suggestion for the endowment and advancement of learning.

From this discussion another has arisen concerning the masters of our public schools being clergymen. Our great and historic public schools are the training homes of the sons of the upper and middle class of English society; many of them are, like Eton and Harrow, rich corporations as well as of venerable antiquity; they are practically all Church of England institutions; and in some of them only a clergyman is eligible as headmaster. Mr. Gladstone pointed to the distinguished headmasters of public schools, who are clergymen, as evidence that intellect was still strong among the clergy. This gave rise to considerable discussion on the advisability of having clergymen as headmasters, on the conditions imposed in certain schools, where pressure is brought to bear to induce masters to enter holy orders, and on the question as to which public schools were really the most successful and best. All these discussions go to show how strongly the permeation of the spirit of opposition to all privilege is going on in educational and ecclesiastical as well as political affairs.

That religion is, in spite of the material and social tendencies of the day, the prime factor in our civilization is a truth which has been receiving fresh corroboration from an unexpected quarter. The talk of the newspapers at that time of year when they are always hard pressed for matter for their columns has been nothing less than the conversion of Mrs. Annie Besant from the principles of Atheism to those of Theosophy. It might seem at first sight a small thing that an impulsive woman should swing over from one extreme of belief to another. But Mrs. Besant is a woman whose family connections have been and are prominent in public and literary life; she herself has been a very popular lecturer in political clubs and secular halls; as a philanthropist and educationalist she has accomplished great things, both in a leading position on the London school board and as an organizer of labor movements among women and unskilled laborers; she has advocated the views of the Neo-Malthusians on the population question in pamphlets, the wide sale of which has brought her in a little income; lastly, she has been a leading figure in several notable trials in the law courts. Now she is giving up all her educational and most of her philanthropic work, and has withdrawn her Malthusian and secularist pamphlets from publication because she has become a convert to Theosophy. She intends devoting her great eloquence and marvelous energies henceforth to the dissemination of the truths of her new religion.

This action on the part of Mrs. Besant most undoubtedly means a great attractive power for the Theosophists, and for a time Theosophy will attract considerable attention.

Joseph King, Jr.

HAMPSTEAD, LONDON.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

WHAT IS REALITY? An Inquiry as to the Reasonableness of Natural Religion, and the Naturalness of Revealed Religion. By FRANCIS HOWE JOHNSON. Pp. xxvii, 510. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1891.

The author, laying a basis in philosophic and scientific certainty for the beliefs of natural and revealed religion, furnishes as important a contribution to resolving the deeper problems of philosophy as to reaffirming the higher truths of religion. The argument is thoroughly philosophical, the application only is religious.

Too high praise cannot be given to the lucidity of thought, which is nowhere impeded by a single obscure sentence; to the combined nerve and finish of the style; to the felicity of illustration, especially from scientific sources; to the careful verification of every fact furnished by zoology, chemistry, and other natural sciences; and to that most convincing mode of argument, the avoidance of overstatement and of claiming too much. A book rarely appears which exhibits from end to end the spirit of intellectual conscientiousness, both in matter and style, which is found in this work.

It is not easy to indicate, in a brief notice, the course of an argument which is a chain of connected links throughout, and only a few salient points can be touched. At the outset, theories which find reality in the self alone apart from the universe, and in the universe alone apart from the self, are criticised and dismissed. On the one hand, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, representing subjective idealism, and on the other hand Spencer, as representing physical realism, are shown to present one-sided and inadequate theories. The author evidently relishes the criticism of materialism more keenly than the criticism of idealism. He searches out with unerring skill the weak points of Spencer's philosophy, and exposes his fallacies with such effect that a gleam of humor is not quite concealed under the respectful tone of argument. Indeed, a predilection for scientific studies is illustrated all along by a happy use of the freshest facts from laboratory and museum. And objection to idealism is at the point of inadequacy rather than falsity, for, in sympathy with the subjectivism which is found wanting, the author himself makes the *ego* the starting point of his inquiry and the basis of his philosophy. The reality of knowledge—the reality from which we proceed to belief in the reality of the universe, of other men, and of God—is the self of consciousness. This is the true thing-in-itself. But unlike Kant's thing-in-itself, which is a thing minus its relations, the true reality is the *ego* plus its relations to other objects. This *ego* is a unity of being, intelligence, and cause, and its relations are threefold—to the body of organized animal tissues, to the whole external nature of its own creation, and to other real beings known to it through analogy and experience. By means of these relationships of man, who is one finite reality, a true, though limited knowledge of God, the soul of the sum of things, is gained. The method of analogy is employed to pass from man, a centre in his realm, to the universe as a unity governed by one central principle; to other beings like himself, whom he knows as conscious and intelligent only by analogy with himself; to animals with their intelligence; and to a Supreme intelligence and will. From this point on, that

which is peculiar to the author, or rather original with him, gives his book its greatest interest. After arguing that consciousness may exist very far down in the scale of being, and that it is impossible to draw a line below which there is no intelligence, he advocates the view that there are subordinate centres of consciousness in each human personality, in its various organs and functions; that these, some of which at first must be trained, learn to act of themselves, and yet under the direction of the central *ego*. It is also maintained that each person is a subordinate consciousness of the social body, and that God is supreme in this, as the *ego* is over its subordinate *egos*. These two analogies (and they are employed only as analogies) are traced out at many points to show the reasonableness of belief in God as at once immanent and transcendent. Evolution and creation are considered, with the conclusion that progress towards an end indicates a supreme intelligence, but who originates and develops, as matter of fact, and perhaps of necessity, under limitations. The evil in the world, which is due to conflict, may be a necessary incident; and combination, even on lower stages of life, is a factor of constantly increasing importance. Revelation is not unnatural, but, as the appearance of a new and higher type of that truth which is mighty, is in analogy with all evolution, which proceeds by breaks in that which has become encrusted, the breaks occurring by means of the superiority of the new type. The truth of revelation becomes a possession for the individual and society only by the search of reflection, and even of struggle, and not by the mechanical agency of an infallible church or an infallible book. Miracles could accompany and illuminate the purpose of revelation, since all evolution has proceeded in part by surprises, but miracles occupy a subordinate and provisional place. Continuity appears in the fact that creation and salvation are different phases of the same process. All illumination of moral truth brings a deeper condemnation of sin, and so the fall of primitive man, which was a result of his illumination, is a type which is repeated when the clearer truth and the higher law of Christianity appear.

In an appendix, the Evolution of Conscience and the Necessity of Conflict are treated in an interesting manner.

The book is one of the stimulating sort. It is well abreast of the newest discoveries and the latest accepted theories of science. It does not waste time in 'proving what educated readers already believe, but starts out at once, from points of agreement, on the broad highway of the argument. It is, therefore, as compact in size as in thought. Its greatest service is in suggesting at every point, even when writer and reader do not fully agree, the harmony of science, philosophy, and religion.

George Harris.

PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL MORALS. By Rev. HENRY HUGHES, M. A., formerly Junior Student of Christ Church, Oxford. Vol. I., pp. 369. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1890.

The preface sounds the keynote of the present volume in a rather interesting manner. The author says that "the main purpose of his book is to establish the thesis that there are, not one, but three sciences of morals. There appears to be, first, a science of the motives and ends of conduct that belong to pagan or non-religious man, to man regarded simply as a voluntary agent forming a part of the world of nature. There

appears to be, secondly, a science which, while it includes the former, takes account, also, of other phenomena arising from man being brought into conscious relations with God. Of the whole body of phenomena with which this science has to do, Jewish morality may be taken as a type. And there appears to be, thirdly, a science which embraces within its scope all the phenomena of the moral life of the present day, those which are at the same time Jewish together with others which are distinctively Christian.

There can, perhaps, be some objection taken to this way of stating the matter. That there are more ways than one to discuss problems of ethics is quite true and indisputable; but that they should be considered as giving rise to three "sciences of morals" is not so readily admitted. The author either confuses the conception of "science," or fails to remark mere differences of aspect in the same science. The distinction which he has in mind is unquestionably a good one, but it can hardly be dignified with so much importance as the author attaches to it. It has value, but this value is of another kind than that which he has given it. The first distinction corresponds, in effect, to that between the *teleological* and the *theological* point of view; and the second corresponds to that between the first two points of view and the *historical* conception of ethics. When thus stated, there will hardly appear any reason for recognizing three "sciences" of morals. The author's object in the distinction is quite apparent in his division of the subject into "natural" and "supernatural morals." In fact, this division determines his point of view and his theory of moral conduct.

The first chapter shows very clearly that the author is a disciple of Butler. His view cannot be distinguished from that celebrated philosopher's. He thinks that nature puts us under some constraint to seek our happiness. Butler had maintained that "rational self-love" was a legitimate object of conduct; by which he meant that the rational pursuit of happiness was not only permissible, but to some extent a duty and a necessity for man. He recognized, and so does our author, that "nature" has made us for happiness, or that there are instincts in us prompting us to that end, and hence they must be recognized as more or less imperative. This is represented as the "constraint of nature" upon us to seek happiness. This fact is considered by the author as "the first fundamental fact of natural morals; the first fundamental fact, that is, of the science of the regulation of conduct according to the purpose and design of nature." It is not a little interesting to remark some further observations which summarize his whole position. "By reason of its existence," the author continues, "the pursuit of happiness becomes to a certain extent elevated from the region of unmoral to that of moral conduct. So far as the constraint of happiness, as we may conveniently call it, is present as an operating motive, distinguishable from the wish for happiness, so far our adoption of the best means for promoting our own greatest happiness, being in conscious obedience to a behest of nature, appears to be moral conduct. The mere wish for happiness is an unmoral motive; the constraint of happiness is a moral one."

To many writers this would seem to be the very contrary of the truth. In the first place, if morality consists in the "constraint of happiness," would not the wish for it be moral also, because we are constrained by our nature to wish for it? Again, a Kantian would hold that the "constraint" to pursue happiness was the essence of the unmoral, because there is no freedom in such conduct. But the author does not intend

that this shall be the conception of "constraint," and here lies the confusion of his view; although there is a hint in his position of the difference between objective and subjective morality. The "constraint of happiness," however, to be a moral motive, must mean the duty to pursue it, and not the instinct or necessity of it, as a blind law of our nature.

The thesis, however, which is mainly peculiar of the author's position, and which is closely connected with his conception of the "constraint of happiness," is the distinction between "natural" and "supernatural morals." Of course we are not able to say exactly what he would include in the latter, because the subject remains to be discussed in the second volume. But enough is found in the first book to determine the general fields to be traversed, and these are represented by Greek morals and Christian morals. Natural morals are supposed to be conduct under the constraint of happiness; and supernatural morals, conduct under divine direction. The criticism that will occur to every one in this connection is founded upon the fact or belief that morals are essentially one. To talk of two kinds of morality, and then to represent this difference by the terms "natural" and "supernatural," with all the traditional implications of those terms, is to so far contrast them as to divide the sense of obligation in connection with the law of virtue. Unless there is a difference in the sense of duty regarding such morals, there is no use in making the distinction. Besides, it can but perpetuate the antagonism between Greek and Christian doctrines when so much has been done by moralists to show that they are essentially the same in their principles, although the latter is a better practical realization and extension of preceding conceptions. Christian morals are continuous with the Greek, not opposed to them.

The whole distinction is burdened too much with the scholastic antithesis between the idea of "nature" and of God. It is essentially a survival of dualism, and is out of place in a monistic age. The reconstruction of our ideas upon these questions is bringing the "natural" and the "supernatural" into harmony by denying the opposition between them and asserting their essential identity with each other. Hence, before the author has a right to assume the difference between them in his division of morals, his duty is to establish the error of existing thought regarding this main distinction. This, however, seems to be no part of the task he has undertaken. He assumes the distinction without question.

In spite of this feature, which we must regard as a defect, we are bound to say that the present volume has some characteristics of freshness. The chapters are thoroughly worked out, and the matter is the author's own in respect of treatment. There is nothing striking or original, but neither is the work a mere reproduction. The author has thought for himself upon ethical problems.

In the historical part he is less appreciative of Kant than might be expected after so much contemporary exposition of that writer. He is evidently more familiar with English than with German thought. Not a little surprising, also, is it to find Martineau criticised so fully. We should have expected more sympathy with Martineau than is displayed, because the religious conception is so fully emphasized by that writer, and easily falls into place with our author's view. It may be possible to say more when the second volume appears.

J. H. Hyslop.

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Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche. In Verbindung mit Dr. A. Harnack, Professor der Theologie in Berlin, Dr. W. Herrmann, Professor der Theologie in Marburg, Dr. J. Kaftan, Professor der Theologie in Berlin, Lic. M. Reischle, Gymnasial professor in Stuttgart, Dr. K. Sell, Professor der Theologie in Bonn, herausgegeben von Dr. J. Gottschick, Professor der Theologie in Giessen. Erster Jahrgang, 1891. Heft 1, 2. Freiburg i. B.: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).—The purpose and plan of this new review is well defined by Professor Kaftan in the opening article of the first number, "Theology and the Church." Theology and the church influence and condition each other in various ways. Theology exists to serve the church, and the church cannot do without its service in the defense of the truth and its reasoned presentation. On the other hand, the church gives a set to theology or imposes upon it limits; its life to no inconsiderable degree reflects itself in its theology. Theology and the church are therefore dependent upon each other. The normal relation between them is one of harmony, in which theology fulfills its task with a full recognition of its duty to the church, and the church, counting upon such service, gladly avails itself of it. The actual state of things does not correspond to this ideal. The representatives of theological science and the leaders of the church, instead of working together, are often opposed to each other; there is alienation and mutual mistrust. The causes of this lie partly in the direction given to the life of the church by the reaction against rationalism, partly in the direction of modern theological studies. Especially, it is the predominance of the historical method in theology, and the changed attitude to Bible and dogma which necessarily follows from the application of this method, which has made and seems to be ever widening the breach between the revived confessionalism of the church, as represented by the majority in its synods and by the church newspapers and its teachers of theology.

This situation is unnatural, and cannot be lasting. The interests of theology, no less than those of the church, demand a *rapprochement*. This cannot be reached by surrender on either side, or by compromises which neither can make in good faith. Theology must relieve the church of the apprehension that its present movement is a return wave of rationalism, must show that its change of attitude is not due to philosophical prepossessions, but to the better understanding of the facts which the historical study of the Scriptures and of the history of the church have brought us. It must show that the new apprehension of Christian truth which it has thus gained is not only not antagonistic to faith, but is capable of giving it a new immediateness and certainty; that its influence is not unfavorable to the religious life of the church, but stimulating and fructifying. It must prove by its works what spirit it is of.

To contribute to this understanding between theology and the church, to enable theology better to fulfill its mission of service in our own time, the new review has been founded. It will not add to the number—already too large for the best interests of theological science—of periodicals which serve as repositories for learned monographs and special investigations; its end is not the advancement of science, but the presentation of such of its results as have a practical bearing on the faith and life of the church and a present usefulness. It will not be the organ of a school or party, but will unite in the work men of different opinions but of one spirit.

That there is room and need for such a review can hardly be doubted. The names of the scholars who are associated in its editorial management are a pledge that the work they have undertaken will be thoroughly done, and the articles in the numbers which have reached us fully confirm this expectation.

Kaftan's opening article has been already mentioned. It is followed by a doctrinal article by Professor Herrmann on the "Repentance of the Evangelical Christian," which is well fitted to clear up the obscurity and confusion which is so widely prevalent — not in Germany alone — about this fundamental article. The second number is filled by an extremely interesting historical article by Professor Harnack on the "History of the Doctrine of Salvation through Faith Alone in the Early Church." Professor Harnack shows with painful clearness how the character of the various teachers and parties who in the early church stood for this doctrine hardly left the church any alternative to the Augustinian doctrine of justification. "Almost everywhere, if not everywhere, moral laxity, unwillingness to suffer for the faith, want of brotherly love, and lack of sincere repentance sought to cover themselves with the mantle of the *sola fide*. How can we wonder that the church rejected it?" And the moral of this lesson in history for the Protestant church, which has made this doctrine its corner-stone, is briefly but pointedly indicated.

The readers of the "Andover Review" will, doubtless, unite with me in the wish that this attempt to bring theology and the church nearer together by ways of practical service may have deserved success.

George F. Moore.

Life and Letters of Robert Browning. By Mrs. Sutherland Orr. In two volumes. Pp. xii, viii, 646. \$3.00 a set. — If the poet's family was connected with the knightly and squirely families of his name in South England, the connection was remote. "Both the vivid originality of his genius and its healthy assimilative power stamp it as, in some sense, the product of virgin soil." The Jewish admixture has been disproved. The negro admixture, through his West Indian grandmother, is not established, nor even made probable. Any one as well acquainted with the West Indies as the present writer is well aware that such a mixture is always to be presumed where West Indian neighbors affirm it. But there is no evidence of that in this case. There is therefore, at most, a mere possibility that Browning's veins were enriched by a strain of the glowing blood of Africa. The grandmother's portrait shows no traces of mixed blood. The Empress Josephine was probably a colored woman, but Browning was probably not a colored man.

Browning's parents were dissenters, though not narrow ones, and though he commonly attended the church service when he attended any, he never detached himself from dissenting intimacies. Between the two he may the easier have become indifferent to theology and fallen back on Christianity, though assuredly not in a looseness of feeling independent of thought. With all his vigor there was interwoven a fibre of nervous suffering which, the biographer remarks, may have been needed to quicken the healthy talent of his father into the intensity of genius in him. From his mother's German father he may have derived his power of infinite psychological analysis. The quiet perfection of his mother's character drew to her such an adoring love from her son as even wedded bliss and early fatherhood were powerless to bear up from an intensity of sorrow at her death that long threatened health.

The biographer thinks that Browning's purely literary education left his genius too much to itself, and that some coercion of mathematics or logic might have rendered his works easier for normally constituted minds to follow. Very probably. In point of language he made one good beginning for his vocation: he read and digested the whole of Johnson's Dictionary.

Americans are continually coming into his life and his wife's, and always in the most agreeable connections, wound up by their son's marriage with an American. They were deeply grateful, with the best reason, for the early American anticipation of his fame, which was so slow in coming at home.

The account of the Brownings' intercourse with George Sand is very interesting. Browning's grave courtesy seems to have stung her. It marked his silent disgust with the coarse and dirty men whom she allowed to fall on their knees and beslobber her hands. The enthusiasm was evidently his wife's.

The one note of discord in the awful bliss of his married life seems to have been in his intense dislike of spiritualism and persuasion of its absolute emptiness. Even a suspense of judgment in others drove him wild. Doubtless it was the ghastly uncleanness of the whole thing as a concrete reality, daring to approach the angelic simplicity of his wife's nature, which made it intolerable. He overshot all logical limit in his agony of desire to detach her from it.

The high-water mark of the long-delayed recognition at home was in 1867, when Oxford made him honorary Master of Arts, a much higher distinction, it was officially explained, than D. C. L., one since Dr. Johnson scarcely given except to princes. Fame came at last with a flood, and even the great loss yet left his latter years full of sunshine.

His letters, in themselves, are neither clear nor remarkably interesting. Fortunately there are a good many of his wife's. The biography itself, though deep, is not very lucid. One thing, however, keeps the author always on the alert. She is ever watchful to minimize the meaning of Browning's religion. She allows, indeed, that his conviction of his indestructible personality survived all the teachings of experience, and even imposed itself upon them, — in other words, that he interpreted the lower by the higher, and not the higher by the lower. She maintains that the Christmas and Easter Day poems at least bring religion into no practical correspondence with life or human experience, and upholds it as probable that they are a sympathetic appropriation of his wife's religion. She will have it that Shelley is the master-key to the real Browning, and that this implies his actual maintenance of everything which the two Christian poems appear to condemn. To the complaint that in details he accepts this age, but in fundamental principles is behind it, in denying that experiment can control the foundations of belief, she pleads for large allowance to "the transcendental imagination," although she admits that the deductions of this very deeply determined the attitude of his mind towards God and Immortality. She makes him out to have held Christ as a message and mystery of Divine Love, but not a messenger of the divine intentions towards mankind. In what way He could possibly be the one and not the other, especially as He so emphatically affirms himself to be both, is left undetermined. She represents Browning as fully possessed by the idiotic pagan assumption that every affirmation of an attribute in the Supreme Being is a denial of his exist-

ence, as if the qualities of pure Being were mutually exclusive, — a devout way of inducing infinite Emptiness in the place of infinite Fullness. Yet she sympathetically remarks that the poet could not easily be persuaded that conscious life is not real and persistent, and that affirmations concerning God, however false, are not at least a witness to the reality.

Now that we have this biography by a Christian unbeliever, it would be interesting if we could have one, of equal ability, knowledge, and candor, by a Christian believer.

Studies in Letters and Life. By George Edward Woodberry. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1890. Pp. 296. \$1.25. — The first paper of this series is on Landor. Why is it that, having received such enthusiastic appreciation from the elect spirits of literature, he is dying out, even for them? The author explains it by his lack of unifying power. He does not fuse his work in his personality. Therefore magnificent material, magnificently handled, still remains piece-work. His fine thoughts and wise apothegms, overwhelming in their number, "crown no achievement." They are flowers without a root.

Crabbe comes next. He "does not, in a true sense, give expression to the life of the poor; he merely narrates it." "Crabbe's description is perhaps the most nakedly realistic of any in English poetry, but it is an uncommonly good one. Realism has a narrow compass, and Crabbe's powers were confined strictly within it; but he had the best virtues of a realist." Men like Scott and Fox could supply the tenderness and the genius, and they loved Crabbe because he enlarged their experience. Moreover, his style, formed in the school of Pope, impressed them as it does not us. But Crabbe gives us, at his best, human life and the human heart, and this is more than "Scott's romantic tradition, or Moore's melting, sensuous Oriental dream, or Byron's sentimental, falsely heroic adventure."

The next paper is on "The Promise of Keats." The author differs entirely with those who hold that Keats had essentially achieved himself when he died. He holds him to have been "born for the future, to the future lost." He believes him, amid all the crudeness and boyish effervescence of his years, to show plainly "the elemental spark, the saving power of genius, the temperance, sanity, and self-reverence of a fine nature gradually coming to the knowledge of its faculties, and unriddling the secret of its own moral beauty." He quotes many sayings of Keats in his letters which lift him "out of and above the sphere of the purely sensuous, and reveal at once the spiritual substance which underlies his poetry."

The next paper is "Aubrey de Vere on Poetry." Of this the critic says that, by rare good fortune, "the ideas are more excellent than the manner, and the spirit finer than the ideas." The whole nature of the man speaks in it. "He is a Christian idealist, and he refuses to regard poetry except in the light of those great ideas which belong to the spirit, and, being nobly and beautifully interpreted, are the substance of the poets who live by their wisdom as well as by charm." "With Spenser, naturally, he has many affinities. The mediævalism, the sentiment of chivalry, the allegorizing spirit, and not less the Puritan elevation of the first of the Elizabethan poets, exercise a special fascination over a Catholic mind for whom the Ages of Faith, as he likes to call

them, have in a peculiar degree the ideality that clothes the past." "He reveals his own theory of poetry, and it is one that derives its philosophy from the great historic works of our literature, and is grounded on the practice of the English masters whose fame is secure. Its cardinal principle is, that man is the only object of interest to man, all else being subordinate, and valuable only for its relations to this main theme; and more particularly this subject is the spiritual life, not the material manifestations of his energies in deeds apart from their meaning." Wordsworth did not altogether escape the pantheism incident to a constant preoccupation with nature, and his poetry is therefore less distinctively Christian than Spenser's; "but Aubrey de Vere easily makes it out that Wordsworth's philosophy, much as it differed from Spenser's, is concerned with the same topics of moral and spiritual life, and is the substance of his poetry." The author, however, maintains, even against De Vere, that Wordsworth's poetry is deficient in passion. He will not allow that moral enthusiasm is just the same thing.

To Milton, the author thinks, De Vere is hardly just. The current of sympathy is broken between the Catholic and the iconoclast regicide, and he does not well perceive how thoroughly Milton is "bone and flesh of the English nation in the substance of his genius." The "noble spirituality" which the author ascribes to him, we think it might be difficult to find except in the poems of his youth. "Towards Shelley" Mr. De Vere "exhibits a respect, a penetration of the elements of his thoughtful temperament, and a comprehension of the remarkable and intimate changes of his incessant growth, that are almost unexampled in authors writing from Aubrey de Vere's standpoint." "The general decline in the moral weight and the spirituality of late poetic literature" is recognized by De Vere, and rightly connected with the decline in the authority of religion.

"The æsthetic lover of beauty, the artist who is satisfied with feats of poetic craft, will not find anything to his liking in Aubrey de Vere's essays. They are presided over by a severe Platonism intellectually, by an exacting and all-including Christianity when the subject touches upon man's life, and they will prove somewhat difficult reading, perhaps, because the thought continually reverts to great ideas, to that doctrine of life which the author seeks for in the poets, and prizes as the substance of their works. But it is well, in poetic days like these, to be brought back to the more serious musings which inspired the great ideal works of our literature, and to converse with them under the guidance of such a spirit as fills these essays with a sense of the continual presence in great literature of the higher interests of man, his life on earth, and his spiritual relations to the universe."

Next come Illustrations of Idealism. Of these the most remarkable appears to us to be the criticism of Mr. Pater's "Marius the Epicurean." It is marvelous in the searching exactness of its appreciations. Mr. Woodberry concludes his observations on the Italian Renaissance Literature with the remark that "the Renaissance was a movement of civilization not less important than the Reformation or the Revolution, and to Italy, as its source, the debt of the world is great. But the Renaissance was not conveyed to Europe by the literature of its corruption; it was conveyed in far different ways." The Italian mind, he remarks, is definite, hard, practical, and therefore irreligious. Its religion is of the emotions, flaming up and dying down. Therefore, we may remark, its

saints, as Sainte-Beuve says, have not been thinkers, which implies that its thinkers have not been saints. Even in Dante and Thomas Aquinas the outlines are too hard to cherish the deeper life of the spirit.

The author's remarks on Shelley are very extended and very thorough. He has an exceedingly exalted opinion of him. Not pretending to understand it very thoroughly, nor to sympathize with it very deeply, we will refer the reader to it as abundantly worth attention. The remarks on actors' criticisms of Othello, Iago, and Shylock are interesting. But we find Shylock a much more magnificent figure than the author seems to do, though it is true he has no heart and we rejoice in his ruin. The pleas, the author well remarks, are futile in law, but work out the higher ends of a nobler equity.

The remarks on Bunyan are an admirable vindication of him from Matthew Arnold's flippant sneer at him as "a Philistine of genius." The noble sanity of his spirit is appreciated to the full. The paper on Cowper is not unjust, except in seeming to attribute to his creed a madness that broke out before he had a creed, that was stayed for years by his creed, and that reverted in a form of impracticable contradiction to his creed. As to Channing, is it true that he helped Unitarianism to divest itself of the belief in the mystery of Christ's mission? We doubt it very much. We should rather say that Channing's spirit is presiding over the large present reflux into Trinitarian Christianity. If, however, as seems not unlikely, the author uses "mysterious" in the sense of "non-natural," he is doubtless right. See Newman's criticism on Jacob Abbott for an illustration of non-naturalness, even after deducting all the truth in his strictures which Abbott was glad to acknowledge. Of such a conception of Christ, Channing has, indeed, done much to cure the world.

The paper on Darwin is exceedingly fine and just. His moral beauty of character is fully appreciated, while yet the gradual atrophy in his mind of the highest interests of man is acknowledged. Byron is dealt with as an unworthy but not negligible character and genius. There is a gentle but very firm criticism on Browning's apparent depreciation of moral self-restraint. The largeness of his sympathies is rightly regarded as somewhat depressing his love of righteousness. His extraordinary power of reasoning in verse, and his usual neglect of the inexorable requirements for poetry of beauty and form, are hardly thought the best guaranty of literary immortality. "He belongs with Johnson, with Dryden, with the heirs of the masculine intellect, the men of power not unvisited by grace, but in whom mind is predominant. Upon the work of such poets time hesitates, conscious of their mental greatness, but also of their imperfect art, their heterogeneous matter; at last the good is sifted from that whence worth has departed."

These two hundred and ninety-six pages are compact of intellectual appreciation, love of beauty, moral soundness, and religious reverence. They are the high-water mark of literary criticism.

College Series of Greek Authors. Edited under the Supervision of John Williams White and Thomas D. Seymour. *Plato: Protagoras.* With the Commentary of Hermann Sauppe. Translated, with Additions, by James A. Towle, Principal of the Robbins School. Boston, U. S. A., and London: Published by Ginn & Company. 1889. — This beautifully printed classic, with its pleasant and handy shape, is enriched by a very thorough commentary, chiefly for the grammar, but largely for the sense.

From the introduction of Simonides' poem to the end of the dialogue, however, the commentator does not increase his pains in the latter regard so much as the increasing complexity of the treatment might well deserve. Still the ample introduction helps here, and introduces us thoroughly into this brilliant dialogue, with its perfect and brilliant dramatic art, and the number of celebrated characters figuring in it, — Socrates, Protagoras, Prodicus, Critias, Callias, Charmides, Alcibiades, Pericles' two sons, and others. The comparative youth of Socrates, the less developed enmity to the Sophists, and Protagoras' condescending prediction that Socrates is likely to be heard of some day, casting over the dialogue the freshness of a dewy morning, agree well with the inviting appearance of the edition.

The Odyssey of Homer. Translated by George Herbert Palmer, Alford Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1891. Pp. vi, 387. \$2.00. — The translator's ideal has been, he says, "to give to the thought of Homer a more direct and simple expression than has hitherto been judged admissible, . . . in the wording, to discard originality, and to make free use of the fortunate phrases of preceding translators; but to employ persistently the veracious language, the language of prose, rather than the dream language, the language of poetry;" yet to mark "the permeating joy" by a simple, unobtrusive rhythm; to make it plain that this ideal is unattainable, and yet to commend its attainment to others. As compared with Lang and Butcher, the rendering has less charm, but more body. The rhythm does not succeed in being quite as unobtrusive as the translator purposed, and might, therefore, well have been somewhat more varied. But it is a worthy and satisfying rendering of this the more charming of the two great epics of Homer, that one whose commingling of classic perfection with Germanic romance and domesticity makes it so endlessly delicious to us, the children of the north.

Publications of the University of Pennsylvania. Series in Philology, Literature, and Archæology. Vol. I., No. 1. *Poetic and Verse Criticism of the Reign of Elizabeth.* By Felix E. Schelling, A. M., Assistant Professor of English Literature in the University of Pennsylvania. N. D. C. Hodges, Agent for United States, Canada, and England, 47 Lafayette Place, New York, N. Y. Max Niemeyer, Agent for the Continent of Europe, Halle a. S. Germany. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1891. Pp. 97. \$2.00 (subscribers, \$1.50). — This monograph gives a full account of the confused impressions and endeavors of English critics when as yet English poetry meant little except Chaucer, and our forefathers were either unconscious that they were about to assist at the birth of the greatest of all poetical literatures, or that it was already born but they did not yet recognize it. It is interesting to watch the fluctuations to and fro of thought and taste, between the desire to cramp the muse that was to be in the fetters of classical verse, and the perception that our language is of another make, and is capable of things as great in its own way. Sidney and even Spencer were, happily only for the moment, seduced into the school of senility. But the voices were already strong that claimed for our tongue its own metrical rights, which Spenser and Marlowe and Shakespeare and their fellows, without waiting for the final verdict of the theorists, proceeded to demonstrate *par voie du fait*.

There is a full account of Gosson's attack on poetry itself, and Sid-

ney's magnificent defense of it. We need nothing better to justify all that was hoped of him by Elizabeth and England.

Much of the monograph, of course, is made up of technical matter, hard for most to understand even now, and particularly obscure when beaten out into the still confused terms of the Elizabethan vocabulary. The treatise is interesting from its many points of life, but especially to students of metrical theory. King James the Sixth, among the scholars, contributes "Ane Schort Treatise containing some Revlis and Cautelis to be obseruit and escheuit in Scottis Poesie." This doubly outlandish tractate illustrates to the full the jumble of sagacity and pedantry which distinguished this curious creature.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

James H. Earle, Boston. The Sunday Question; or, The Lord's Day. Its Sacredness, Permanence, and Value, as shown by its Origin, History, and Use. By Sir Edward Warren, C. E., formerly Professor in the Rens. Polytechnic Institute, Fellow A. A. A. S., etc. Pp. vii, 290. \$1.50.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri. Translated by Charles Eliot Norton. I. Hell. Pp. xxvi, 193. 1891. \$1.25. — Conduct as a Fine Art. The Laws of Daily Conduct. By Nicholas Paine Gilman. Character Building. By Edward Payson Jackson. Pp. vi, 149; viii, 230. 1891. \$1.50. — Bishop Wilberforce. By G. W. Daniell, M. A. Pp. 220. \$1.00. — Betty Alden. The First-born Daughter of the Pilgrims. By Jane G. Austin. Pp. ix, 384. \$1.25. — Christopher Columbus, and How he Received and Imparted the Spirit of Discovery. By Justin Winsor. Pp. xi, 674. \$4.00. — What is Reality? An Inquiry as to the Reasonableness of Natural Religion, and the Naturalness of Revealed Religion. By Francis Howe Johnson. Pp. xxvii, 507. 1891. \$2.00.

Thomas Whittaker, New York. Sons of God. Sermons by the Rev. S. D. McConnell, D. D., Rector of St. Stephen's Church, Philadelphia, author of "History of the American Episcopal Church," etc. Pp. 259. 1891. \$1.50. — Christian Theism. A Brief and Popular Survey of the Evidence upon which it rests; and the Objections urged against it Considered and Refuted. By the Rev. C. A. Row, M. A. Oxon., Honorary D. D. of the University of the South United States, Prebendary of St. Paul's Cathedral, and Bampton Lecturer for 1877. Pp. viii, 318. \$1.75.

Lee & Shepard, Boston. White Slaves; or, the Oppression of the Worthy Poor. By Rev. Louis Albert Banks, D. D., author of "The People's Christ," etc. Pp. 327. 1892. \$1.50.

Lortgmans, Green & Co., New York. Darkness and Dawn; or, Scenes in the Days of Nero. An Historic Tale. By Frederic W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., Archdeacon and Canon of Westminster, author of "The Life of Christ," etc., etc. Pp. xiii, 594. 1891. — An Introduction to Cudworth's Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, with Life of Cudworth, and a few Critical Notes. By W. R. Scott, First Senior Moderator in "Logics and Ethics," Trinity College, Dublin. Pp. x, 64. — Manual of the Science of Religion. By P. D. Chaudepie de la Saussaye, Professor of Theology at Amsterdam. Translated from the German by Beatrice S. Collyer-Fergusson (née Max Müller). Pp. vii, 672. \$3.50. 1891. For sale by Houghton, Mifflin & Co. — The Spirit of Man. An Essay in Christian Philosophy. By Arthur Chandler, M. A., Rector of Poplar, E., Fellow and late Tutor of Brasenose College, Oxford. Pp. xii, 227. \$1.75. 1891. For sale by Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

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From Rev. James S. Williamson, Pastor of the Congregational Church, Augusta, Me.

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From Rev. Frederic Stanley Root, Pastor High St. Cong. Church, Auburn, Me.

The *Popular Edition* of "Hymns of the Faith" was unanimously recommended to the High Street Congregational Church by a competent committee selected from Church and Parish. We find the book very satisfactory. The general arrangement of contents is admirable, and the music of the highest quality.

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